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ABSTRACT 
Public Support for Military Interventions across Levels of Political Information and 
Phases of Intervention.  (May 2009) 
Cigdem Sirin Villalobos, B.A., Bogazici University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
Scholars widely acknowledge that democratic political leaders seek public 
support for their policy endeavors, particularly when conducting costly policies as in the 
case of military interventions.  A deeper understanding of the factors that affect public 
support for military interventions is crucial to explaining more definitively the 
determinants of foreign policy decisions regarding military interventions.  However, most 
studies in this area of research examine the public as an undifferentiated mass that reacts 
uniformly to changes in the course of an intervention.  In addition, scholars often 
overlook the varying dynamics of public support across different phases of a military 
intervention.  Given these shortcomings in the literature, the objective of this dissertation 
is to examine the formation of public support as a function of political information levels 
and intervention stages.   
This dissertation is important in both methodological and theoretical terms.  
Methodologically, the major contribution of my dissertation is the adoption of a multi-
method approach that is almost non-existent in this line of research.  By bringing together 
a formal framework, experimentation, and statistical analyses of public opinion survey 
data, I develop a more refined theory and attain more robust empirical results. 
  
iv 
Theoretically, the study challenges the dominant mode of research on military 
interventions in which public opinion is treated as a homogenous mass.  Specifically, I 
explore how major factors related to public support for military interventions (such as 
casualty rates) play different roles and weigh differently in their impact on the opinions of 
politically informed versus less informed individuals across stages of an intervention.   
The results of the experiments and survey data analyses demonstrate that 
politically informed individuals express less support for a military intervention at the 
starting (rally) phase of that intervention compared to the less informed.  That said, as the 
intervention proceeds and casualties are incurred, support of politically uninformed 
individuals decreases at higher rates than does support of politically informed ones.  In 
other words, politically informed individuals demonstrate more stable levels of support 
across intervention stages.  In addition, both experimental and survey data analyses show 
that policy-specific information is generally a more influential factor on public support for 
military interventions compared to general political information. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the field of international relations, scholars find that public opinion is an 
essential factor for foreign policy decision making among democratic political leaders, 
particularly when conducting costly military interventions.  Specifically, scholars argue 
that, because democratic political leaders depend on public support for governing, 
achieving reelection, and attaining a favorable legacy, they consider public perceptions 
seriously in the course of engaging in foreign policy actions.  As such, a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics that affect public support for military interventions is 
crucial to explaining more definitively the determinants of foreign policy decisions 
regarding military interventions.
1
 
Thus far, most scholars who study how public opinion in democracies shapes 
government decisions to engage in military interventions fall short of considering 
heterogeneous responses to such foreign policy ventures.  Indeed, most studies in this 
area of research examine the public as an undifferentiated mass that reacts uniformly to 
changes in the course of intervention.  In reality, however, the mass public is divided 
across different levels of political information.  This, in turn, leads to differences in 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Journal of Political Science. 
 
1
 A foreign military intervention can be defined as the deployment of at least 500 combat-ready, regular 
military troops (ground, air, or naval) to territory outside of a state’s internationally recognized borders to 
participate in coercive and/or hostile action against a target government or non-state group for the purpose 
of achieving immediate-term political objectives (Sullivan 2007, 2008). 
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perceptions of and attitudes about political events, which influence support for (or 
opposition to) foreign policies according to one’s level of political information.
2
   
Furthermore, scholars often overlook the different dynamics of public support 
across different phases of an intervention.  The direction, significance, and relative 
weight of the factors concerning public support immediately following an intervention 
may be different than support for the “stay the course” and “withdrawal” options that 
arise once an operation is underway.   
 Another major theoretical area of research that remains for scholars to investigate 
is the process behind making a decision to support or oppose a military intervention.  To 
account for this gap in the literature, the project addresses process-oriented 
considerations such as “opinion updating” and “multidimensionality of utility/disutility” 
across levels of political information and across intervention stages in addition to the 
outcome related reflections on public support for military interventions.   
 In sum, the literature calls for a more elaborate theoretical framework to better 
examine and understand the dynamics of public support in military interventions.  To 
remedy these shortcomings, the objective of this dissertation is to examine public 
support as a function of political information levels and stages of intervention by using a 
multi-method approach that combines an expected utility framework, experimentation, 
and statistical analyses of public opinion survey data supplemented by qualitative 
knowledge.   
                                                 
2
 Political information, in a broad sense, denotes an individual’s range of factual information about politics 
that is stored in long-term memory (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10; Goren 2001, 161; see also Fiske 
and Kinder 1981).   
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Major Theories of Public Support for War 
 Event-response theories of public support for military interventions share the 
belief that foreign policy events directly determine public support for military 
interventions by altering the balance of costs and benefits.  These theories generally 
focus on the impact of casualties, the objectives of intervention, and the probability of 
success (e.g., Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gartner and Segura 2000; Kull and Ramsay 2001; 
Larson 1996).  One serious shortcoming of these theories, according to Berinsky (2007), 
is that these studies focus on collective public support at the expense of individual 
variations, and therefore, disregard heterogeneity in political information levels in the 
mass public.  From a different perspective, cue-taking theories focus on individuals’ 
information levels.  For instance, advancing “elite-cue” theory, Berinsky (2007) argues 
that how political elites view the nature of a conflict determines whether the public will 
support a war.  However, support for (or opposition to) war via elite cues also depends 
on an individual’s level of political information, since it requires one’s awareness of the 
issue positions of the elites.   
In this study, I integrate event-response theories with cue-taking theories.  To do 
so, I examine the impact of major explanatory factors on public support for war that the 
event-response literature suggest with a focus on variations due to levels of political 
sophistication in accordance with cue-taking theories.  More specifically, I disaggregate 
the measures of public support for military interventions by levels of political 
information (both general and policy/event-specific) and across different stages of 
interventions. 
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Multi-Method Approach 
One important contribution of this study is methodological through the use of a 
multi-method approach that brings together a formal framework, experimentation, and 
large-N statistical analysis of public opinion survey data.  A review of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each research method will demonstrate that some methods are superior 
for constructing theory, while others are better for testing theory (Stoll 2004, 632).  That 
said, a multi-method strategy is rarely used in the literature on public support for military 
interventions despite its many advantages and its growing acknowledgment in political 
science. 
Laitin (2002) advocates a tripartite methodology including statistics, 
formalization, and narrative (see also Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast 1998; Bates, 
Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast 1998; Lieberman 2005).  All three methods 
involve a constant interaction between theory and data.  In the first component of the 
tripartite method, cross-sectional or diachronic data are employed to find statistical 
regularities across a large number of similar units.  The second component is 
formalization.  By providing an internally consistent logic that accounts for the 
stipulated relationships among abstract variables, formal modeling assures us that our 
causal stories are coherent and non-contradictory.  The third component in tripartite 
methodology is narrative to trace historically and theorize empirically the translation of 
values on independent variables onto values on dependent variables.  In short, Laitin 
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(2002) argues that interdependence across the tripartite methodological divide is key to 
scientific progress.
3
 
Apart from the three major analytical methods, experimentation, although still 
not very common in political science, is proven to be a highly useful strategy in public 
opinion research.  As Semmel and Minix (1979, 259) point out, laboratory research 
allows for close inspection, observation, and measurement of decisional behavior 
generally not available to researchers in natural settings.  For instance, Beer, Healy, 
Sinclair, and Bourne (1987) develop a laboratory analogue of peace-war decision 
making to investigate mass public reactions to war-related primes on selected foreign 
policy acts.  Similarly, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) examine mass public 
decisions to go to war by placing experimental information items in a national survey to 
identify foreign policy dispositions.  This way, they are able to manipulate the features 
of the strategic situation and obtain a degree of control over the perceptions of the 
situation, which is not typically possible in opinion surveys.
4
  
Regarding the level of theorizing, experiments enable scholars to test complex 
theories.  As Redd (2002, 345) puts it, cognitive and social psychological theories that 
are often used in foreign policy decision making studies are not easily tested using only 
traditional case studies.  Moreover, some important questions and hypotheses relevant to 
                                                 
3 This dissertation makes use of quantitative analysis, expected utility framework, and experimentation.  
Given the challenge of employing more than one method along with time and financial limitations, an 
attempt to incorporate also case studies or small-N analysis is less manageable.  Nevertheless, while 
subjecting the hypotheses to statistical analysis and identifying patterns of association, I use qualitative 
knowledge and anecdotes to further demonstrate and illustrate my empirical findings. 
4
 For early examples of experimental research that use role-playing simulations to examine decisions to go 
to war, see Guetzkow and Valadez (1981); Hermann and Hermann (1967); and Mahoney and Druckman 
(1975).  
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the study of foreign policy are not amenable to standard empirical datasets given that 
cognitive structures are not directly observable.  In these cases, “experimental process-
tracing techniques” (designed to identify and classify decision-making processes and 
link them with foreign policy outcomes) prove to be valuable research tools.  Process 
tracing directly identifies what information the decision maker reviews to form a 
judgment and the order in which the information is accessed (see Ford, Schmitt, 
Schechtman, Hults, and Doherty.1989; Mintz and Geva 1997; Santmire, Wilkenfeld, 
Kraus, Holley, and Santmire 1998).   
 One specific advantage of using experimentation in this study is that 
experimentation allows a panel design that is recently illustrated by Scott Gartner 
(2008a).  As Bartels (1999, 1-2) puts it, “panel data permit direct analyses of opinion 
change in which prior opinions appear as explanatory variables. Given the stability of 
typical political opinions (at least, after adjustment for measurement error)—and their 
modest correlations with relevant explanatory variables—direct measurement of prior 
opinions substantially increases the efficiency of statistical estimation and provides 
crucial perspective on the relative importance of new and preexisting attitudes and 
perceptions.”  Therefore, panel design offers more direct evidence of change than the 
primary alternative, the longitudinal design, in which the researcher infers change from 
comparisons of different survey respondents at different times rather than from 
comparisons of the same respondents at different times.  Nevertheless, research topics 
that require a panel design are often set aside due to the scarcity of panel survey data in 
political science.  Given that the main focus of this study is to observe the level of 
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support at the individual level across different stages of an intervention, it is vital to 
acquire panel data.  With experimentation, I am able to look directly at the parameters 
that I am interested in this study.   
Another major advantage of the experimental method for this study is the ability 
to manipulate political information via generating ad hoc political information (see Sirin 
and Geva 2007).  I manage this by exposing the experimental group to a presentation 
that contains basic information on military interventions before the introduction of the 
experimental scenario.  An ad hoc generation of policy-specific information enables a 
true random assignment to experimental conditions by controlling for a host of 
extraneous variables that are associated with political information, such as personal 
interest in politics, intelligence, and motivation.  To tap the difference between this ad 
hoc political information and the more conventional measures of general political 
information, my experimental analyses also include one of the most common measures 
of general political information—a factual knowledge scale. 
One other advantage of experimentation for this study is that I am able to test my 
formal assumptions regarding expected utility calculations of the politically informed 
and uninformed individuals, from which I derive my auxiliary propositions and 
hypotheses.  Specifically, I suggest differences between the politically informed and 
uninformed in their perceptions of costs, benefits, and success of a military intervention, 
as well as their tolerance for expected and actual casualties.  Through experimentation, I 
introduce measures of these expected utility parameters and thus explore the processing 
mechanisms behind the level of support for military interventions.      
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Regarding the statistical analysis of survey data, the availability and quality of 
public opinion data about military interventions varies across both time and space, and 
hence, presents a number of challenges for model specification and estimation.  As 
Sullivan (2008) points out, the difficulty of choosing the correct statistical method is 
compounded because the units are sampled rather than fixed, the number of observations 
per case varies, and the time between observations is not constant.  In my analyses of 
public opinion survey data, I employ probit models using robust standard errors to 
account for any unspecified heteroskedasticity.  
I analyze public opinion survey data at the individual level.  A majority of the 
previous work on public support for military interventions has relied almost exclusively 
on periodic aggregations of survey data (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/06).  In 
particular, most studies of public support for war examine differences in collective 
public support for intervention across military interventions, while overlooking the 
differences among individuals within an intervention (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and 
Britton 1998; Klarevas 2002; Larson 1996; Mueller 1973).  Consequently, several 
existing theories have rested on untested notions of collective rationality (Berinsky 
2007).  Conducting statistical analyses at the individual level enables me to identify the 
mechanisms by which members of the mass public process information and decide 
whether and to what extent to support military interventions.   
Summary 
This dissertation investigates the determinants of public opinion on military 
interventions by looking across different levels of political information and across 
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different stages of intervention.  The importance of this study reveals itself in both 
methodological and theoretical terms.  Methodologically, the major contribution of my 
dissertation to the literature is the adoption of multi-method approach that is almost non-
existent in this line of research.  I believe that a multi-method perspective provides more 
robust empirical results as well as a more refined theory.   
 Theoretically, the study challenges the dominant mode of research in which the 
public is considered as a homogenous mass, reacting in a uniform manner to changes in 
the course of intervention.  The research disaggregates public opinion to levels of 
political information and seeks to find out how major variables relevant to public support 
of a military intervention play different roles and how these factors weigh differently in 
their impact on the opinions of politically informed versus less informed individuals.  In 
addition, the study examines the level of support and change in the level of support 
among politically informed versus less informed people at different stages of 
intervention.  Accordingly, this research sheds light on the varying dynamics of public 
opinion in different phases of a military intervention.  Last, besides the outcome related 
reflections on public support for military interventions, the project addresses process-
oriented considerations such as “opinion updating” and “multidimensionality of 
utility/disutility” across levels of political information and intervention stages, and thus 
provides a further contribution to the literature. 
The dissertation proceeds in the following order.  In the next chapter, I review 
the literatures on the role of public opinion in military interventions and on political 
information.  The third chapter presents my formal framework and the propositions and 
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hypotheses that I derive from my expected utility model through solving for the 
equations.  In the fourth chapter, I explain the design of my two experiments for the 
testing of the expected utility propositions and hypotheses, and present the experimental 
findings.  The fifth chapter constitutes the statistical analysis of public opinion survey 
data.  The final chapter provides a discussion of the main findings, identifies future 
avenues of research, and offers a conclusion.       
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON PUBLIC OPINION ON FOREIGN 
POLICY AND POLITICAL INFORMATION 
 For democratic leaders, following the will of the people is not just a normative 
ideal to fulfill; it is a prerequisite for political survival given that the public can vote out 
of office those politicians who defy their preferences.  Many scholars suggest that public 
opinion is an important factor in domestic and foreign policy making (see, e.g., Bartels 
1991a; Baum and Kernell 2001; Brace and Hinckley 1993; Hartley and Russett 1992; 
Holsti 1996; Ostrom and Job 1986).  That said, the most provocative and salient foreign 
policy issue to the public is the use of military force abroad (see Barnet 1990; Hurwitz 
and Peffley 1987a; Mueller 1973). 
The Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Decision Making 
 There are several arguments on how public opinion influences foreign policy 
decision making.  One theoretical perspective holds that public opinion serves as a 
constraint on foreign policy decision makers, particularly in foreign intervention policy, 
setting the limits within which policymakers may operate (e.g., Foyle 1999; Sobel 2001).  
The public-as-constraint argument figures prominently in the audience costs proposition 
(Fearon 1994) and in the structural explanation of the democratic peace phenomenon 
(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993).  Another 
perspective argues that public support for the use-of-force translates to “marching 
orders” reducing the president’s options only to force alternatives (e.g., Mintz and Brule 
2006).  Given these arguments, public opinion may inhibit leaders from using force and 
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direct them to alternative policy options, oblige a leader to undertake aggressive policies, 
or—in the case of support for a given foreign policy option—grant legitimacy to a 
foreign policy decision. 
A vast number of studies demonstrate that public opinion constrains intervention 
policies, at times setting the timing and/or duration of military interventions (see Aldrich, 
Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, and Sharp 2006; Kanter and Brooks 1994; Mueller 1973; Sobel 
2001).  For instance, in comparing the styles of presidents from Truman through Clinton, 
Foyle (1999) suggests that presidents rely on public support to legitimize their foreign 
policy decision making regarding interventions.  In fact, an entire literature on casualty 
aversion has emerged from the perception that the public may alter foreign policy 
intensely enough to force political leaders to avoid military involvement in an 
international crisis all together (see Mueller 1973).  Still, humanitarian emergencies 
mostly associated with civil conflicts may lead to a moral outrage on the part of a 
domestic audience, which would lead the public to pressure its government to take some 
form of remedial action (Blechman 1995; Kohut and Toth 1994; Regan 1998, 765).  In 
short, there exists substantial evidence that confirms the influential role of public opinion 
on military intervention decisions. 
 Whether it serves as a “blank check” or “marching orders,” the impact of public 
opinion on foreign policy decision making is well-documented.  One major instance is 
the Spanish-American War, where the public spurred a reluctant leader, President 
McKinley, to war (Morgan and Campbell 1991, 209).  Another example is Jimmy 
Carter’s Iran hostage rescue decision in the presence of public pressure for more direct 
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action against Iran (Brule 2005).  Likewise, Sathasivam (2003) asserts that the 
belligerent demands of the Pakistani public following India’s nuclear tests left Pakistani 
leader, Nawaz Sharif, with no choice other than to conduct a nuclear test in 1998.  Public 
opinion also played a major role in Turkey’s 1974 decision to intervene militarily in the 
ethnic conflict in Cyprus (see Adamson 2001).   
Public Opinion on Military Interventions  
Public opposition to the Vietnam War heavily influenced early research on public 
support for military interventions (Eichenberg 2005).  To start with, Mueller's (1973) 
seminal study found that domestic support for the Vietnam War erodes mainly as a 
function of mounting casualties.  Early on, this conclusion became the standard 
hypothesis on the dynamics of public support for interventions.
5
  However, later research 
began to look for explanations besides casualties for changes in public opinion, such as 
perceived interests at stake.  For example, Russett and Nincic (1976) argue that public 
support for military assistance to nations that are attacked vary according to geographic 
proximity to the United States and to the level of economic interdependence with the 
United States.  Russett and Nincic also identify a clear distinction that helping to defend 
against external aggression typically results in popular support, whereas intervention in 
civil wars does not. 
                                                 
5
 The literature on public support for military interventions mainly focuses on the impact of cumulative 
military casualties (e.g., Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Larson 1996; Larson and Savych 2005).  That said, 
several scholars examine the effects of temporally and geographically proximate casualties (e.g., Boettcher 
and Cobb 2006; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and Barratt 2004; Karol and Miguel 
2007).  Some also look at enemy body count and casualty ratio data as an indicator of how the public may 
perceive the success of a military intervention and the relative significance of U.S. casualties (Gartner and 
Myers 1995; see also Boettcher and Cobb 2006; Burk 1999; Gelpi, et al. 2005/06).  That said, many 
scholars remain skeptical regarding the accuracy of the body count and casualty ratio data produced by the 
military and the public’s awareness of such casualty accounts.    
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Building upon and refining this earlier work, Jentleson (1992) argues that public 
support varies as a function of the objective of a military intervention and proposes two 
“principal policy objectives.”  The first type of objective is called the “foreign policy 
restraint,” which entails military interventions against an aggressive adversary that 
threatens one’s national interests.  A second category, “internal political change,” 
involves “force used to engineer internal political change within another country whether 
in support of an existing government considered an ally or seeking to overthrow a 
government considered an adversary.”  Jentleson and Britton (1998) extend and further 
test this theory by adding a third category, “humanitarian intervention.”     
Jentleson (1992) argues that the public bases its casualty tolerance on the 
“principal policy objective” inherent in a military operation.  He contends that the public 
will accept missions with “foreign policy restraint” goals as important missions that are 
worth a substantial cost.  In comparison, “humanitarian intervention” missions enjoy 
public support only if the costs are relatively low.  Finally, “internal political change” 
missions face lower levels of public support.  
Alternatively, Larson (1996) argues that casualty tolerance of the public follows 
domestic elite casualty tolerance.  When elites arrive to a consensus behind the mission, 
public support will be robust even in the face of mounting costs, but when elites are 
divided, even a small number of casualties will quickly diminish public support (see also 
Berinsky 2007).  Kull, Destler, and Ramsay (1997), on the other hand, suggest that 
public support for a military mission will be more robust if the public sees that other 
countries likewise support the mission, and thus their country is not obliged to bear all of 
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the costs.  Multilateral support may function either as an elite cue—“this mission must 
be worth the cost because lots of other states are supporting it”—or it may be that the 
public simply prefers the burden to be distributed more evenly (Gelpi et al. 2005/06).  
Finally, Feaver and Gelpi (2004) identify expectations of success as the crucial 
factor in explaining the public's support for the intervention and the tolerance for its 
subsequent casualties.
 
 When the public believes that the mission will succeed, it 
continues to support the mission, even as costs mount.  When the public thinks victory is 
unlikely, even small costs will cause support to plummet (see also Eichenberg 2005).  
Gelpi et al. (2005/06) refine Feaver and Gelpi’s argument by suggesting that the public 
support and tolerance for the human costs of war are primarily shaped by the intersection 
of two crucial attitudes: beliefs about the justness of the war and beliefs about the 
likelihood of winning the war.  Ultimately, however, beliefs about the likelihood of 
success matter most in determining the public's willingness to support the intervention 
and tolerate military deaths in combat.  
To recapitulate the current state of the field, the scholarly consensus is nearly 
unanimous in favor of the “rational cost-benefit” model.  On the other hand, despite the 
multitude of factors offered, the evidence is hardly brought together in a unified analysis 
(Eichenberg 2005, 142; Gelpi et al. 2005/06, 16).  One of the major theoretical and 
empirical gaps in this area of research concerns the process behind making a decision to 
support or oppose a military intervention.  Finally, an almost exclusive reliance on 
periodic aggregations of public opinion data hampers much of the previous work in this 
  
16 
area because scarce attention is paid to individual differences, particularly regarding 
political information levels.   
Public Opinion in Different Phases of Military Interventions 
 Some scholars point out how actual support for an intervention already in 
progress may be significantly different from the originally expressed support in the pre-
intervention period (Russett 1990; Russett and Nincic 1976).  A vast body of research 
confirms that presidents enjoy spikes in their approval ratings immediately following a 
high profile foreign policy event, even when the public support for initiating that an 
intervention has been low just before the event takes place (Brody 1991; Brody and 
Shapiro 1989; Jordan and Page 1992; Lian and Oneal 1993; Mueller 1970, 1973; Oneal, 
Lian, and Joyner 1996; Parker 1995).  Scholars refer to this as the “rally-round-the-flag” 
phenomenon that is observed in the first phase of an intervention.     
 Once the short-term rally effects start to abate, other dynamics of public opinion 
come into play during the subsequent courses of intervention.  Sullivan (2008) argues 
that using time-series data compiled during each military operation, scholars can test the 
effects of numerous factors that vary across time (e.g., duration, troop numbers, 
casualties), the impact of different perceptions of costs and benefits, and the likelihood 
of success of the intervention (e.g., Gelpi et al. 2005/06; Klaveras 2002; Mueller 1973).  
However, the number of military operations for which there are reliable public opinion 
data is small.  Several studies try to solve this small-N problem by pooling all available 
data from multiple interventions into a single dataset (e.g., Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 
1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998).  Yet, pooling data from multiple interventions across 
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the course of the conflicts without controlling for the time of the poll can produce 
unreliable results and lead to false inferences (Sullivan 2008).  This is because the 
direction and significance of the factors that influence public support immediately 
following an intervention may be different for “stay the course” and “withdrawal” 
options once an intervention is underway.  Therefore, the literature calls for a more 
elaborate theory and methodology to better understand the variance in public support for 
different phases of an intervention.    
Political Information 
Political information, in a broad sense, denotes an individual’s range of factual 
information about politics that is stored in long-term memory (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996, 10; Goren 2001, 161; see also Fiske and Kinder 1981).  As alternatives to political 
information, some scholars use other terms such as political sophistication, political 
expertise, political knowledge, or political awareness.  Among these terms, political 
sophistication is the most widely used as coterminous with political information.  That 
said, political sophistication often indicate added elements besides one’s range of factual 
information about politics.  More specifically, Luskin (1990, 335) identifies three 
dimensions that determine one’s level of sophistication: (1) level of exposure to political 
information, (2) intellectual capacity or ability to retain and organize such information, 
and (3) systematic efforts to obtain and understand such information.  Based on these 
dimensions, Luskin argues that an individual’s political belief system, as a measure of 
political sophistication, varies in terms of its size (the number of cognitions), range 
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(coverage of the political universe), and constraint (the extent to which cognitions are 
interconnected and consistent).   
Since its inception in political science, the concept of an informed citizenry has 
suffered from a discordant literature that is divided over its definition, measurement, and 
causal dynamics (Luskin 1987).  Some studies focus on methodological concerns such as 
developing valid measures of political information (e.g., Luskin 1990; Mondak 2001).  
Others inspect patterns of attitudinal difference and change across levels of political 
information (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), and/or contribution of these different levels 
to aggregate opinion change (e.g., Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2000; Page and 
Shapiro 1992).  Still, others examine how information affects public opinion, policy 
preferences, and voting behavior (e.g., Althaus 1998; Bartels 1996; Gilens 2001).  
Scholars find that factors such as political interest, education, intelligence, various 
demographics like occupation or gender, and exposure to media coverage are usually 
associated with political information. 
Political Information of the Public on Foreign Policy Issues 
From a Kantian perspective, some scholars argue that democratic leaders must 
have the tacit consent of their citizens for the purposes of legitimacy in order to engage 
in military actions (e.g., Reiter and Stam 2002).  Despite the normative appeal of this 
argument derived from the principles of democratic responsiveness, whether and to what 
extent the mass public should guide and determine foreign policy remains a subject of 
intense debate (Berinsky 2007).  For decades, the conventional wisdom in this research 
area has depicted the public as highly ill-informed about foreign policy issues, guided by 
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irrational impulses, and holding extremely volatile preferences (Converse 1964; 
Lippmann 1922; for a review, see Holsti 1996).  For instance, Almond (1960, 53) argues 
that the reactions to foreign policy issues are “formless and plastic moods which undergo 
frequent alteration in response to changes in events.”  Given that, scholars have offered 
several factors that explain why citizens are hazy about foreign affairs: (1) international 
politics are often complex and ambiguous; (2) usually far removed from everyday lives; 
(3) most people believe they have no control over foreign policy.     
In recent years, however, a more optimistic view of the cognitive capabilities of 
the mass public has emerged.  Many scholars have challenged the mood theory as well 
as Converse’s (1964) assertion of “nonattitudes” (Caspary 1970; Holsti 1992; Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Russett 1990).  In fact, some scholars suggest that the public seems 
reasonably informed about particular foreign affairs (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Bordiga 
1989; Graham 1988).  In addition, research shows that people may meaningfully 
organize their foreign policy opinions without having a high level of information 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a, 1987b).  Accordingly, scholars have turned to examine how 
people can compensate for their lack of information via heuristics and make meaningful 
judgments about public affairs in general and foreign policy issues in particular (e.g., 
Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). 
There is a growing consensus among scholars that citizens hold foreign policy 
preferences that are sensible and adjustable to changes in world events with respect to 
national interests (Holsti 1992, 1996; Jentleson 1992; Nincic 1988, 1992; Page and 
Shapiro 1992; but see Bartels 2003).  Nonetheless, analyses of citizens’ foreign policy 
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opinions indicate that a majority of people are still mostly uninformed about 
international politics (see Bennett 1994; Nincic 1992; Wittkopf 1990).  In fact, even 
when politically uninformed individuals are able to compensate for their low information 
levels with the use of cognitive shortcuts, the literature points out the unremitting 
differences between highly informed people and less informed ones in various aspects of 
decision making and preference formation.  In the following sections concerning my 
expected utility framework and hypotheses, I provide more discussion about the 
differences across levels of political information regarding support for (or opposition to) 
military interventions across different phases of interventions. 
General versus Policy-Specific Information 
One major disagreement in research on political information is whether general 
or policy-specific information matters more for shaping public opinion.  On the one hand, 
some scholars suggest that individuals tend to be information generalists (e.g., Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Neuman 1986; Smith 1989; Zaller 1992).  On the other hand, 
some empirical work suggests that citizens are specialists as they tend to be informed 
about only a few issues that they are particularly concerned with (Hutchings 2003; 
Iyengar 1990; Krosnick 1990; Krosnick and Brannon 1993).  Accordingly, acquisition of 
policy information takes place in a domain specific way (Price and Zaller 1993).  
Moreover, some studies have shown that policy-specific information can lead to 
dramatic changes of opinion.  As Gilens (2001) asserts, policy-specific facts have a more 
direct influence on political judgments than general political information does (see also 
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Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 2006).  In this sense, typical general political information 
scales do not adequately capture such effects.   
Given this debate, one objective of this study is to shed light on the question over 
which type of political information—general or policy-specific—has greater influence 
on public support for military interventions.  To measure “general political information,” 
most studies use indicators such as factual test items, self-descriptions or interviewer 
evaluations of the respondents, or one’s attitudinal consistency across policy issues, and 
proxy indicators such as levels of formal education.  Though far from perfect, numerous 
scholars find education significantly correlated with political awareness, and therefore, 
employ it for their statistical analyses (e.g., Converse 1964; Krause 1997).  
Alternatively, some scholars advocate using factual test items to build political 
information scales (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Goren 2001; Lau and Erber 1985; 
Luskin 1987).   
Compared to general political information, survey data for the measurement of 
policy/event-specific information is not very comprehensive across time and cases of 
intervention, and lacks direct measures.  Nevertheless, there exist certain questions in 
past public opinion surveys that are useful for generating a proxy measure for policy-
specific information for quantitative analysis.  To this end, one major contribution of this 
dissertation is the use of manipulated ad hoc policy-specific information via 
experimentation (Sirin and Geva 2007) in the context of public opinion on military 
interventions.
6
      
                                                 
6
 I provide more information on manipulated ad hoc political information in Chapter IV. 
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Summary 
 This chapter reviewed the literatures on the role of public opinion in military 
interventions and on political information.  First, I briefly talked about the impact of 
public opinion on foreign policy decision making.  I argued that public opinion may 
inhibit leaders from using force and direct them to alternative policy options, oblige a 
leader to undertake aggressive policies, or—in the case of support for a given foreign 
policy option—grant legitimacy to a foreign policy decision.  I then reviewed major 
public opinion studies that examine chief factors concerning public support for military 
interventions such as the role of casualties, the intervention objective, and expectations 
of success. Next, I talked about political information of the mass public in general and in 
the foreign policy domain.  I also referred to the debate over the relative impact of 
general versus policy-specific information on the policy judgments and preferences of 
the public.  Building upon and advancing the arguments of the literatures reviewed here, 
the following chapter will present my expected utility framework and hypotheses 
regarding public support for military interventions across levels of political information 
and phases of intervention.     
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CHAPTER III 
EXPECTED UTILITY FRAMEWORK  
Recent research on public support for the use of military force follows a 
rationalist approach.  Scholars suggest that individuals decide on their support for (or 
opposition to) initiating and sustaining a military intervention based on a rational 
expected utility, cost/benefit calculation (Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; 
Gartner 2008a; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi et al. 2005/06; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson 
and Britton 1998; Larson 1996; Larson and Savych 2005).  Specifically, an individual’s 
support for a military engagement is a function of her or his (1) subjective evaluation of 
the utility of the intervention objective, (2) estimate of the probability of success in 
attaining that objective, and (3) expectation of the human and material costs that are 
likely to be incurred in the course of an intervention.  
EU(support intervention) = Pr(V)U – C   (1)  
Individuals support the prosecution of a military intervention if and only if their 
expected utility from the success of the intervention is greater than their utility from 
withdrawing, which is set at zero because the utility from taking no action or defeat is 
zero.  Each of the major factors that the literature associates with public support for (or 
opposition to) interventions may affect one or more of these core components of 
expected utility framework regarding individual support for military intervention.   
Pr(V)U – C > 0      (2)  
This basic expected utility framework that most recent research on public support 
for military interventions has adopted overlooks several considerations.  First, it does not 
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differentiate between potential differences in rational cost-benefit calculations of 
individuals with different political information levels.  In contrast, this study models the 
support for intervention based on one’s level of political information by introducing 
different specifications of expected utility equations for the politically informed and less 
informed individuals across phases of intervention.   
Second, one of the major components of the basic expected utility model 
presented above is the expected costs.  However, as an intervention unfolds, part of the 
anticipated costs become actual costs.  Although the literature has vastly addressed the 
role of actual costs, particularly in the form of actual casualties, the distinction between 
expected costs and actual costs remains vague.  This is partly because most studies do 
not consider military interventions as composed of different phases and simply pool data 
from across the course of multiple conflicts.  However, at the pre-intervention phase and 
the very beginning of an intervention, people will rely on estimates of costs/casualties in 
their expected utility calculations.  On the other hand, once actual costs/casualties occur 
in the subsequent stages of an intervention, the nature of their cost/benefit calculations 
will change accordingly.  Based on there considerations, I incorporate the function of 
actual costs into the perceived probability of success of the intervention.  I also expect 
that success or failure of the previous intervention stage will affect an individual’s 
perception of the probability of success.    
Third, most of the studies that adopt a rational choice approach to the study of 
public opinion overlook the notion that utilities and costs are multidimensional.  
Accounting for this notion of multidimensionality is particularly essential when one 
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considers different levels of political information because attention and the relative 
weight given to a particular utility/disutility dimension may differ among novices and 
experts.  To illustrate, an individual with a low level of political information may make a 
decision on whether or not to support an intervention by looking only at the price of 
gasoline and/or the number of casualties, whereas a politically informed person may 
prefer to observe additional dimensions, such as diplomatic credibility or sunk costs.   
In short, current state of the literature calls for a more systematic theoretical and 
empirical investigation of the micro foundations underlying expected utility calculations 
regarding support for military interventions.  To remedy this gap, I propose the 
following expected utility model, which differs from the previous models in the 
literature in terms of its specifications regarding the weight and number of dimensions 
considered in expected utility calculations in relation to different levels of political 
information and added considerations on stages of intervention (i.e., success of previous 
intervention stage and actual costs).  
EU(support intervention) = Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce > 0  
 
Where Pr(Vt) = Perceived probability of success; U = Utility of intervention; Ce  
= Expected costs. 
Specifications of the Expected Utility Model 
Ce = b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + … + bnXn + ui 
U = a1Y1 + a2Y2 + a3Y3 + … + akYk + vi 
Ca = s1Z1 + s2Z2 + s3Z3 + … + smZm + zi 
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b, a, and s denote weights of the dimensions considered along expected costs 
(Ce), utility of intervention (U), and actual costs (Ca); whereas ui, vi, and zi are error 
terms.  The letters n, k, and m refer to the number of expected cost, actual cost, and 
utility dimensions considered en route to an individual’s decision on whether and how 
much s/he will support an intervention.   
Stages of Intervention 
I divide intervention stages into basic phases (see Figure 1).  The pre-intervention 
stage/phase 1 is the stage when there are considerations of a possible intervention, but 
the military operation has not yet initiated.  The starting stage/phase 2 is the very 
beginning phase of the intervention.  As this stage, the intervention has just started so it 
is too soon to have steady feedback about how well and costly the operation is going.  
This phase can also be referred as the rally stage of an intervention.  The intervention 
goes into phase 3 and more when structural changes occur in the course intervention that 
lead to changes in the costs, utilities, as well as probability of success, and accordingly 
to changes in the public perceptions of the intervention.  We can determine the cut off 
point for the final phase of an intervention post-hoc.   
 To illustrate, one may dissect the military intervention in Iraq into five major 
phases: (1) the pre-intervention phase, (2) the starting (rally) phase, (3) the major combat 
phase, (4) the occupation phase, and (5) the sovereign Iraq phase.  The pre-intervention 
phase is the period prior to the launch of the military intervention in Iraq on March 19, 
2003.  The starting (rally) phase of the intervention begins on March 19, 2003 with the 
initiation of the military campaign in Iraq.  Since the rally phase refers to a short period 
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of time immediately following an intervention, I assume that this period lasted for the 
first two weeks of the intervention ending in the first week of April.  The major combat 
phase of the war covers the initial invasion of Iraq, the toppling of the Baath regime, and 
the movement of coalition forces into a position of occupation in Iraq.  The occupation 
phase begins in late May 2003 and continues until the coalition transferred sovereignty 
to an Iraqi authority.  With the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi authority in June 2004, 
the sovereign Iraq phase of the war starts (Gelpi et al. 2005/06).        
One should also consider the implications of particular events within a stage, as 
well as whether and how they influence the overall effect of that stage.  To illustrate, the 
capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 or the release of the Kay report in January 
2004 (suggesting no evidence that Iraq stockpiled unconventional weapons) are 
important events in the course of military intervention in Iraq (Gelpi et al. 2005/06).  
Such events may affect the public’s perception of the success of a military intervention 
and, in turn, support for that intervention.  However, the impact of such events on public 
opinion within a certain intervention phase is usually brief and does not engender 
structural changes in the perceptions of cost, utility, and success of the military 
intervention that would generate different effects on public support.        
Evidently, the cut off points of the intervention stages will differ from 
intervention to intervention; there is no-one-size-fits-all recipe and the course of the 
intervention phases certainly is not path dependent.  It is solely a rubric to disaggregate 
military interventions into basic phases so that we can observe the different dynamics of 
the intervention process such as opinion updating and changes in the level of support.   
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Conceptualizing the military interventions as composed of different stages lead 
to the incorporation of added considerations (success of previous intervention stage and 
actual costs) in the specification of perceived probability of success.       
Pr(Vt) = f(Vt-1 + S - Ca + ei) 
 
Pr(Vt) = Perceived probability of success; Vt-1 = Success of previous intervention 
 stage; S = Scale and means of intervention; Ca = Actual costs. 
Political Information 
 
I expect that when making their decision to support an intervention, politically 
informed (PI) and politically uninformed (PU) individuals will allocate different weights 
to the expected costs, actual costs, and utility dimensions.  Specifically:  
b1PI / b2PI /… / bnPI ∫ b1PU / b2PU / … / bnPU 
a1PI / a2PI /… / akPI ∫ a1PU / a2PU  /… / akPU 
s1PI / s2PI /… / smPI ∫ s1PU / s2PU /… / smPU 
In addition to different weights, the number of dimensions added together in the 
expected and actual costs, and utility parameters may differ between the politically 
informed and uninformed.  Specifically, one expects politically informed individuals to 
have more dimensions to consider compared to individuals with low levels of political 
information (see Park and Kosicki 1995).   
nPI > nPU; kPI > kPU; mPI > mPU 
 The basic premise of these specifications is that different weights multiplied by a 
different number of dimensions overall leads to different values with regards to costs, 
utilities, and expectations of success for the politically informed and uninformed 
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individuals.  In other words, individuals can be exposed to the same estimate of the 
expected costs, actual costs, or utilities, but the perceived value of these estimates will 
differ in accordance with these individuals’ level of political information and vary 
during different phases of intervention as such estimates will change.  For instance, 
politically informed and less informed people may react differently to the same number 
of actual casualties, which will reflect the differences in perceived value they attribute to 
casualties (i.e., their tolerance for casualties).   
Propositions and Hypotheses 
A major issue related to public opinion and opinion change in military 
interventions is the “rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon observed in the starting stage of 
an intervention.  A vast body of research confirms that presidents enjoy spikes in their 
approval ratings immediately following a sudden, high profile foreign policy event 
(Brody 1991; Brody and Shapiro 1989; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Jordan and Page 
1992; Lian and Oneal 1993; Mueller 1970, 1973; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996; Parker 
1995).  Although the majority of these studies aggregate public opinion into a single 
monolithic entity, recent research shows that different constituencies typically respond 
differently to presidents’ activities in accordance with their interests and level of 
attentiveness (Baum 2002, 264; Baum and Kernell 2001; Krause 1997; Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991).   
Regarding the expected utility of a military intervention, Althaus (1998) shows 
that fully informed opinion on foreign policy issues tends to be relatively more dovish 
than less informed opinion.  More specifically, Jaros, Sigelman, and Conover (1982, 
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152) argue that the most critical aspect about a lack of political information “is not that it 
leads directly to a preference for aggressive policies, but rather that it leads to a desire 
for simple, readily understood solutions.”  In that sense, the utility of a military 
intervention to deal with an international conflict for the politically uninformed is likely 
to be high since this policy option is a clear-cut foreign policy solution to the problem.  
In comparison, since political information increases awareness of multiple non-military 
intervention options beyond military solutions, the benefits of intervening militarily will 
not be as high for the politically informed unlike uninformed people.  Another factor that 
leads to higher utility ratings for military intervention among politically uninformed 
individuals is due to their susceptibility to presidential rhetoric/manipulation that aims to 
justify the decision to intervene by focusing on benefits of such military intervention 
while discounting the expected costs.   
Regarding expected costs of a military intervention, I anticipate 
interdependencies among utility, expected cost, and actual cost calculations of politically 
uninformed individuals.  More specifically, the higher the utility of an intervention, the 
lower the expected costs for the politically uninformed.  In addition, the higher the actual 
number of casualties, the higher the expected casualties.  In contrast, I expect more 
autonomous cost-benefit estimates of politically informed individuals.  This is partly 
because politically informed people tend to assess the leader’s performance in a foreign 
policy event in a broader context and by taking into consideration multiple evaluation 
points.  In contrast, politically uninformed people are less equipped to place the 
intervention in a comparable context in the past and, therefore, less capable of estimating 
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future costs independently from the expected utilities and actual costs.  Accordingly, 
since politically uninformed individuals have higher utility expectations and there are no 
actual costs at the starting stage of an intervention, I propose that the politically 
uninformed will see expected costs of an intervention smaller than the politically 
informed at this stage.   
Finally, both for the politically informed and uninformed, the perceived 
probability of success (Pr(V)) will be based on the scale and means of intervention, as 
actual costs and the success of a previous intervention stage have not come into play yet 
at the starting stage of intervention.  However, the reasons for higher utility and lower 
expected cost attributions of politically uninformed individuals to military interventions 
(i.e., military option as a clear-cut solution, susceptibility to pro-intervention rhetoric, 
interdependencies) also apply to the calculations of intervention success.  I expect that 
the politically uninformed are likely to perceive the probability of success more 
favorably compared to the informed individuals.  Formalizing this argument:    
UPI < UPU 
CePI > CePU 
Pr(Vt)PI < Pr(Vt)PU 
Accordingly,  
[Pr(Vt)(U)]PI < [Pr(Vt)(U)]PU 
[Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PI < [Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU 
EU(support intervention)PI < EU(support intervention)PU 
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Hypothesis 1: Politically uninformed individuals are likely to show higher levels 
of support for a military intervention than politically informed ones at the 
starting stage (phase 2) of that intervention.   
 Regarding the change of support from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the 
starting stage (phase 2) of an intervention, I expect that politically informed individuals’ 
approval/disapproval of their political leader is less easily swayed by abrupt events.  
Because there is almost no major new information about the intervention at the starting 
stage, politically informed individuals are likely to preserve their attributions of expected 
costs, utilities, and probability of success that they have acquired at the pre-intervention 
stage.  Highly informed individuals are less likely to change their opinions also because 
they can successfully counterargue any dissonant new information.   
 In contrast, research shows that the politically uninformed individuals have 
volatile political attitudes and policy preferences that are easily subject to change (see 
Taber and Lodge 2006).  Opinion volatility of the politically uninformed is further 
accompanied by their susceptibility to pro-intervention rhetoric that seeks to justify the 
intervention decision along with the interdependencies among calculations of cost, utility, 
and probability of success mentioned above.  In fact, Baum (2002) finds that aggregating 
the entire post-World War II period, the least politically aware individuals demonstrate a 
higher increase in their presidential approval ratings than the most politically aware 
individuals in the immediate aftermath of using force abroad.  Thus, it is highly probable 
to observe a substantial increase in the level of support among the politically uninformed 
people in the starting stage (phase 2) of an intervention.  Formalizing this argument:    
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UPU(starting) > UPU(pre-)  
CePU(starting) < CePU(pre-)  
Pr(Vt)PU(starting) > Pr(Vt)PU(pre-) 
[Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU(starting) > [Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU(pre-)  
EU(support intervention)PU(starting) > EU(support intervention)PU(pre-) 
On the other hand,   
UPI(starting) @ UPI(pre-)  
CePI(starting) @ CePI(pre-)  
Pr(Vt)PI(starting) @ Pr(Vt)PI(pre-) 
[Pr(Vt)(U)-Ce]PI(starting) @ [Pr(Vt)(U)-Ce]PI(pre-)  
EU(support intervention)PI(starting) @ EU(support intervention)PI(pre-) 
Accordingly,  
|[Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU(pre-) - [Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU(starting)| > |[Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PI(pre-) - 
[Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PI(starting)| 
Hypothesis 2: Going from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting 
stage (phase 2) of a military intervention, politically uninformed individuals are 
likely to show a higher rate of increase in support for that intervention than 
politically informed ones.   
As Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver (2007, 152) point out, some studies on public 
support for the use of force show interest in the role of retrospective and prospective 
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evaluations.  This line of research is based on Fiorina’s (1981) theory of retrospective 
voting.  According to this theory, retrospective assessments of past government 
performance, particularly with respect to the economy, influence presidential approval 
and, in turn, vote choice (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981).  In retrospective voting, 
information and decision-making rules are thought to be minimal, since perceptions are 
grounded in the reality of present or past experiences (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966).  In 
contrast, prospective voting decisions are based on future promises of parties and 
political candidates (Downs 1957; Jackson 1975; Kramer 1971).   
In the literature on the public’s vote choices with respect to retrospective and 
prospective evaluations, political information has been one of the key variables of 
interest.  However, the findings are mixed.  Studies have shown that political 
information is positively associated (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), negatively 
associated (e.g., Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 1990), and unrelated (e.g., Fiorina 1981; 
Moon 1990, 1992) to retrospective voting.  On the other hand, the literature on public 
support for military interventions has not addressed the link between political 
information and retrospective/prospective evaluations of military interventions.  In this 
study, I seek to tackle this overlooked relationship between political information and 
retrospective/prospective assessments of military interventions with a focus on the 
weight of expected and actual costs in expected utility calculations.   
I argue that politically informed individuals are likely to have more prospective 
assessments when deciding whether and to what extent to support a military intervention 
compared to the politically uninformed individuals.  This argument is in line with the 
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assertion of Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), which suggests that an individual’s 
ability to make causal linkages is strongly conditioned by his or her level of political 
sophistication.  Specifically, less sophisticated voters will tend to make simple, proximal 
attributions, while sophisticated voters are more willing and able to make distal ones 
(Gomez and Wilson 2003, 2006).  Following this logic, I expect that factors related to 
future prospects of an intervention are likely to have more weight for the politically 
informed whereas factors related to the past and current state of an intervention will have 
more influence on support decisions of the politically uninformed.   
An individual’s evaluation of an intervention retrospectively or prospectively 
closely relates to one’s expected and actual casualty tolerance.  Many scholars suggest 
that casualties are the most salient, visible, and systematic measure of costs associated 
with military interventions (e.g., Gartner 2008b; Gartner and Segura 2000; Gartner, 
Segura, and Barratt 2004).
7
  Nevertheless, as I mentioned above, the literature falls short 
of making a clear distinction between tolerance for expected casualties and actual 
casualties.  The differences among the politically informed and less informed segments 
of the public regarding expected and actual casualty tolerance is even more 
understudied.  Given this shortcoming in the literature, the following propositions and 
hypotheses address variations in tolerance for expected and actual casualties and support 
for military interventions across political levels and intervention stages.
8
     
                                                 
7
 In military parlance, the term “military casualties” includes those killed in action (KIA), wounded in 
action (WIA), missing in action (MIA), as well as prisoners of war (POW).  However, in popular usage 
and in the literature on public support for war, casualties refer primarily to military deaths.  This study 
follows the latter usage of the term.    
8
 It should be noted that human costs of an intervention go beyond military casualties.  One major 
parameter of human costs in a military intervention is civilian casualties.  Several studies show that public 
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Since the number of expected casualties in an intervention is a reflection of 
future performance of an intervention, the politically informed individuals are likely to 
place more weight on expected casualties as a reflection of their prospective thinking.  In 
comparison, the number of actual casualties is likely to weigh more in the cost/benefit 
calculations of politically uninformed individuals given their proclivity to retrospective 
evaluations.  With regards to expected casualties: 
X1 = expected casualties 
b1 = Weight of the expected casualties 
(b1X1)PI > (b1X1)PU 
Hence, all else equal,  
CePI > CePU 
The following is my auxiliary proposition regarding tolerance for expected 
casualties to be later tested experimentally: 
Auxiliary Proposition 1: The expected casualty tolerance of politically informed 
individuals is likely to be lower than that of politically uninformed ones.  
 Formalizing this argument: 
CePI > CePU 
 
                                                                                                                                                
opinion is sensitive to civilian victimization in war.  Before World War II, there the U.S. public strongly 
opposed to urban area bombing as counter to American humanitarian ideals (Hopkins 1966).  Mueller 
(1994) argues that concern about Iraqi casualties contributed to opposition to the Gulf War.  On a parallel 
basis, hypothetical scenarios regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated opposition to war in Iraq 
among a majority of Americans if it would result in “thousands” of Iraqi civilian casualties (Downes 2006, 
152; see also Borrelli and Lockerbie 2008).  That said, getting accurate estimates of civilian casualties in 
military interventions is often a problematic task.  For instance, since the start of the war in Iraq, there 
have been numerous estimates of civilian fatalities (offered by international organizations, research 
institutions, and groups of concerned citizens), which demonstrate a high level of inconsistency and 
discrepancy (see Kahl 2007; Lauterbach 2007).   
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Holding Pr(Vt) and U constant,  
 [Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PI < [Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU 
EU(support intervention | expected casualties)PI < EU(support intervention | 
 expected casualties)PU 
Hypothesis 3: In the absence of actual casualties, politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to show higher levels of support for a military intervention 
than politically informed ones.  
As a military intervention proceeds from the starting stage (phase 2) into 
subsequent stages, casualties may occur.  Politically informed people are likely to be 
more cognizant of the realities of a military intervention, which includes the possibility 
that expected number of casualties may eventually turn into actual casualties.  
Consequently, the politically informed are likely to have more accurate estimates of 
expected costs and show less severe reaction if these expected costs develop into actual 
costs.  Indeed, Gelpi et al. (2005/06) find that education has a significant impact on the 
public's tolerance for casualties.  Their results indicate that a college-educated 
respondent is about 20 percent more likely than a respondent who has not completed 
high school to tolerate at least 1,500 casualties in Iraq.  Given the proclivity of the 
politically uninformed to retrospective evaluations mentioned above, I expect that the 
number of actual casualties is likely to weigh more in the cost/benefit calculations of 
politically uninformed individuals.  Consequently, with regards to actual costs (here, in 
the form of actual casualties): 
Z1 = actual casualties 
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s1 = Weight of actual casualties 
(s1Z1)PU > (s1Z1)PI 
Hence, all else equal,  
CaPU > CaPI 
The following is my auxiliary proposition regarding tolerance for actual 
casualties to be later tested experimentally: 
Auxiliary Proposition 2: The actual casualty tolerance of politically uninformed 
individuals is likely to be lower than that of politically informed ones.  
Based on my expectations of prospective versus retrospective evaluations of 
expected and actual costs among the politically informed and uninformed that I mention 
above, I expect that the weight of actual costs is greater than that of expected costs for 
the politically uninformed individuals (CePU < CaPU), whereas it is the opposite case for 
the politically informed (CePI > CaPI).  I also propose that expected costs are a function 
of actual costs for the politically uninformed rather than being independent.  
Accordingly, in the presence of actual casualties, I expect the politically uninformed to 
overstate the expected costs and have inflated estimates compared to the politically 
informed individuals.  In contrast, I do not expect to observe such a correlated effect 
between actual and expected costs for the politically informed, since the evaluation of 
the politically informed individuals will be based on more objective points of 
consideration when estimating the future costs that may be incurred in the following 
stages of an intervention (CePI < CePU | Ca > 0).  Hence, I formulate the following 
auxiliary proposition to be later tested experimentally:  
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Auxiliary Proposition 3:  Once actual casualties occur, the expected casualty 
tolerance of politically uninformed individuals is lower than that of politically 
informed ones.  
Based on the findings of their study on civil-military relations and the use of 
force, Feaver and Gelpi (2004) conclude that casualty tolerance is positively correlated 
with an individual’s belief in the importance of a particular military mission and 
confidence regarding the success of the military effort.  Accordingly, if the expected and 
actual casualty tolerance of the politically uninformed individuals is lower than the 
politically informed, then their expectations of the utility and success from a military 
intervention will also be lower.  Putting everything together, once actual casualties 
occur in an intervention:  
CaPI < CePI < CePU < CaPU | Ca > 0 
CaPI < CaPU | Ca > 0 
CePI < CePU | Ca > 0 
Pr(Vt) = f(Vt-1 + S - Ca + ei)  
Pr(Vt)PI  > Pr (Vt)PU 
UPI > UPU 
[Pr(Vt)U]PI > [Pr(Vt)U]PU 
[Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PI > [Pr(Vt)(U) - Ce]PU 
Therefore,  
EU(support intervention | actual and expected casualties)PU < EU(support 
intervention | actual and expected casualties)PI 
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Hypothesis 4: In the presence of actual casualties, politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to show lower levels of support for a military intervention 
than politically informed ones in the subsequent stages of that intervention. 
 As mentioned, research shows that the public have volatile political attitudes and 
policy preferences in the foreign policy domain and particularly with regards to support 
for military interventions.  The volatility of public opinion is particularly evident in the 
presence of actual casualties.  One striking historical case example of how public 
support for a military intervention may suddenly turn into strong opposition is the 
intervention in Somalia following the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers on October 3-4, 
1993.  Burk (1999) suggests that quick reversals of public support based on casualties 
ignore the long-range goals of foreign policy, jeopardize mission accomplishments, and 
underestimate logistical difficulties or political costs of rapid withdrawal (see also Filson 
and Werner 2002; Goemans 2000; Slantchev 2004; Wagner 2000; Werner 1998).   
 Sullivan (2008, 115) asserts that “As a result of concerns about the losses 
associated with withdrawing from a military engagement once it is underway, some 
individuals who would not have supported initiating the use of force at a given set of 
cost and risk parameters may nonetheless support sustaining an ongoing operation with 
those parameters.”  Nevertheless, Sullivan’s argument does not take into account 
different political knowledge segments of the public regarding the sensitivity to costs of 
withdrawing.  As Gomez and Wilson (2003) put it, politically informed individuals 
possess plentiful political information, and have a variety of ways to integrate newly 
acquired information into their reserve of political knowledge.  They are thus more 
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likely to make global, as well as local attributions.  Politically informed individuals also 
tend to look beyond the most obvious causal factor in a given situation.  In a military 
intervention, the most obvious factor is the number of actual casualties.  Accordingly, I 
argue that since politically informed individuals are likely to be more cognizant of long-
term foreign policy objectives, credibility issues, and major military concerns than the 
politically uninformed, I expect the politically informed to react less severely when 
actual casualties come into stage.  These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 5: In the presence of actual casualties, politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to show higher rates of decrease in support for a military 
intervention than politically informed ones in the subsequent stages of that 
intervention.   
Summary 
In this chapter, I developed an expected utility framework to explore how major 
factors related to public support for military interventions play different roles (and weigh 
differently) in their impact on the opinions of politically informed versus uninformed 
individuals across different intervention stages.  Regarding the expected utility 
parameters, I suggested that politically uninformed individuals are likely to have lower 
estimates of costs, and higher expectations of utility and success compared to the 
politically informed ones at the beginning of a military intervention.  Given these 
proposed parameters, I suggested that the politically uninformed are likely to show 
higher levels of support than politically informed individuals at the starting stage (phase 
2) of an intervention.  Going from the pre-intervention stage to the starting stage of an 
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intervention, I expect to observe a higher amount of change in the cost, utility, and 
success estimations among the politically uninformed as opposed to the politically 
informed.  Accordingly, I hypothesized that compared to the expressed level of support 
at the pre-intervention stage (phase 1), politically uninformed individuals are likely to 
show a higher rate of increase in support than the politically informed at the starting 
stage of an intervention (phase 2).   
I also presented hypotheses on the level of support for an intervention with 
respect to actual and expected casualties.  I proposed that expected tolerance of 
politically informed people is lower than the politically uninformed in the absence of 
actual casualties.  Accordingly, I hypothesized that before actual casualties occur, 
support of politically informed individuals for a military intervention is likely to be 
lower than that of politically uninformed individuals. That said, once actual casualties 
occur, I suggested that politically uninformed people are likely to display a lower 
tolerance for both actual and expected casualties in the subsequent intervention stages 
compared to the politically informed.  Accordingly, I hypothesized that in the presence 
of actual casualties, support of the politically uninformed in the subsequent stages of an 
intervention is likely to be lower than that of the politically informed.  I also 
hypothesized that, in the presence of actual casualties, politically uninformed individuals 
are likely to show higher rates of decrease in support than the politically informed in the 
subsequent stages of an intervention.  In the next chapter, I experimentally test the 
propositions and hypotheses that I derive from my expected utility framework. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES 
General Overview 
 To test my hypotheses and expected utility assumptions on public support for 
military interventions across political information levels and intervention stages, I 
designed two experiments.  The experimental scenarios were constructed around a 
hypothetical military intervention in an ethnic conflict.  I conducted each experiment in 
two sessions.  In the first session of the experiments, to manipulate ad hoc political 
information, one-half of the participants were exposed to a 45-minute lecture on ethnic 
conflict and military interventions.  The other half of the participants were given a 
lecture unrelated to ethnic conflict and military interventions.  This lecture session was 
presented to the participants as an activity unconnected to the second experimental 
session to avoid priming of the participants’ responses to the experimental material.   
In the second session of the experiments, following the lecture session, all 
participants were exposed to a hypothetical international crisis, which involved the 
possibility of U.S. militarily intervention.  In order to manipulate phases of intervention, 
the progress of the crisis and the actions of the U.S. were presented as a sequence of 
experimental scenarios organized into four different intervention stages (the pre-
intervention stage (phase 1), the starting stage (phase 2), phase 3, and phase 4).  In the 
first experiment, at the end of each stage, participants were asked to indicate their level 
of support for the military intervention following their exposure to the information about 
the course of the intervention.  After stating their level of support, the participants 
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moved to the next stage where they would be exposed to new information (in the form of 
a newsflash) on the state of the intervention.  In all four stages, information about the 
number of expected casualties were provided.  The experimental scenarios in phase 3 
and phase 4 also reported the number of actual casualties in addition to the number of 
expected casualties.  Furthermore, two alternative intervention prospect patterns—
depicting the intervention either as improving or as deteriorating—were introduced at 
phase 3 and phase 4.   
The second experiment retains the basic structure of the first experiment 
described above.  The only difference in Experiment 2 is the additional questions about 
the participants’ perceptions of costs, benefits, and expected success regarding the 
intervention, as well as their tolerance for expected and actual casualties.  These extra 
questions were placed after the information/newsflash at each intervention stage.
9
   
To summarize the commonalities of Experiment 1 and 2, in both experiments, 
half of the participants were exposed to a lecture on ethnic conflict and military 
interventions as the manipulation of ad hoc information.  Both experiments were 
designed around a hypothetical ethnic conflict in which the U.S. decides to militarily 
intervene.  In both experiments, the course of the intervention was presented in four 
subsequent stages and the reactions of the participants to the military intervention were 
                                                 
9
 The major purpose of conducting Experiment 2 was to examine the structure of expected utility 
parameters across levels of political information and phases of intervention.  To maintain the basic 
structure of Experiment 1, the participants were also asked about their level of support for the military 
intervention before they moved to the next intervention stage.  However, the participants indicated their 
level of support for the intervention after answering questions on costs, utilities, and expected success of 
the intervention.  Due to probable intervening effects of expected utility questions on participants’ 
expressed level of support for the intervention in Experiment 2, I only analyze the level of support for the 
military intervention in Experiment 1.         
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assessed at the end of each intervention stage following the experimental scenario.  Both 
experiments introduced variations in phase 3 and phase 4 in terms of the progress of the 
intervention (improving versus deteriorating).  It should be noted that the number of 
actual casualties provided in phase 3 and phase 4 were identical in all intervention 
prospect patterns; portrayal of the intervention as improving/deteriorating was based on 
the extent of military accomplishments/failures rather than the number of casualties.  In 
short, both Experiment 1 and 2 analyze the effect of same independent variables, namely 
ad hoc political information, intervention stages, and intervention prospect patterns.  At 
the end of each experiment, I administered a questionnaire on general political 
information. 
The experiments differed in terms of the dependent variables.  The dependent 
variable in Experiment 1 was the level of support for the intervention at each stage 
intervention stage.  Experiment 2, on the other hand, focused on the expected utility 
parameters regarding the intervention (i.e., costs, benefits, expected success, and 
tolerance for expected and actual casualties) as the dependent variables.   
Participants 
A total of seven hundred and six subjects participated in the experiments.  Three 
hundred and sixty-nine subjects took part in Experiment 1.
 
 Two hundred and sixty-five 
subjects participated in Experiment 2.  The pretest of the ad hoc information 
manipulation involved seventy-two subjects from the same subject pool.  The 
  
46 
participants were recruited among upper-level undergraduate students.
10
  I randomly 
assigned the participants to the experimental conditions. 
Design of the Experiments  
I used a 2x2x4 split-plot factorial design (within and between groups) for both 
experiments.  Within-group factor was four intervention stages (the pre-intervention 
stage (phase 1), the starting stage (phase 2), phase3, and phase 4).  Between-group 
factors were (1) two levels of policy-specific information (ad hoc information versus no 
ad hoc information) and (2) two alternative intervention prospect patterns (improving 
versus deteriorating) introduced at phase 3 and phase 4.  The dependent variable for 
Experiment 1 was the level of support for the intervention at each intervention stage.  
The dependent variables for Experiment 2 were the level of perceived costs, benefits 
(utilities), expected success, and tolerance for expected and actual casualties at each 
intervention stage.  Figure 2 illustrates the design of Experiment 1.  The design of 
Experiment 2 is displayed in Figure 3. 
Both experiments included a test of general political information as a covariate, 
which I measured by a conventional knowledge scale with 26 test items.
11
  
                                                 
10
 I designed these experiments to study the policy preferences, level of support, and expected utility 
parameters of the mass public rather than that of elite decision makers.  Evidently, the information 
acquisition and processing patterns, associative memory structures, the levels of experiential knowledge, 
and the decision strategies are different for the public and elite decision makers.  Accordingly, the use of 
students in an experiment that aims to study elite behavior could be problematic.  However, since this 
study focuses on the public, I do not encounter such validity problems.  As Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 
(2006, 769) point out, when the real-world equivalent of a student sample is the public rather than the 
political elite, experiment is an appropriate research design to shed light on the behavior of the public.  
Comparing the results of his national level experiment on public support for war with those he conducted 
in laboratory conditions with students, Gartner (2008a) finds no difference in the reactions of students and 
older adults.  This recent study suggests additional external validity for experimental studies on public 
opinion that employ student samples.   
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Research Material and Treatments 
Ad hoc Political Information Treatment 
 I introduced the manipulation of ad hoc political information in the first 
experimental session by exposing half of the subjects to a lecture on ethnic conflict and 
military interventions (see Appendix C).  The lecture contained basic information about 
the definition of ethnic groups and ethnic conflict, major causes and consequences of 
ethnic conflict, and alternative conflict-resolution options through third-party 
interventions in ethnic conflict.  The lecture further provided information on different 
types of military intervention with some specific case examples, major reasons and 
outcomes of military interventions, as well as key international principles that concern 
decisions to intervene.  The tone of the lecture was kept as neutral as possible neither 
promoting a pro-intervention nor an anti-intervention rhetoric.  The other half of the 
participants received a lecture that was not related to ethnic conflict and military 
interventions.  The lecture session was not presented as associated to the second 
experiment session in order to prevent any priming effects on the participants’ responses 
to the experimental material.    
To test the effectiveness of the manipulation, I administered a knowledge quiz on 
ethnic conflict and military interventions to seventy-two participants that I randomly 
picked from the same experimental subject pool.  Half of the subjects were presented the 
lecture on ethnic conflict and military interventions and were given the knowledge quiz  
                                                                                                                                                
11
 The questionnaire is based on items from the National Election Surveys, Prior’s (2002) study, and Taber 
and Lodge’s (2006) study.   
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following the lecture.  The other half of the subjects answered the quiz without receiving 
the lecture on ethnic conflict and military interventions.  The subjects that received the 
ad hoc information treatment answered more items correctly (MPI = 5.83) than the 
control group (MPU = 4.16) given a maximum score of 8 (F (1, 70) = 29.16, p < .0001). 
Intervention Stages and the Decision Task
12
  
 At all four intervention stages, the participants were exposed to information that 
detailed the state of the U.S. military intervention in a hypothetical ethnic conflict.  At 
the pre-intervention stage (phase 1), all of the subjects read a brief scenario about a 
severe ethnic conflict on a fictitious island (called Kuzeya) in the Mediterranean Sea.
13
  
The scenario described the ethnic composition of the island as a Muslim majority (called 
Sumans) affiliated with other Islamic countries in the region, and a Christian minority 
(called Amians) strongly affiliated with the United States.  The scenario depicted the 
evolvement of an ethnic struggle between these two groups and the subsequent violence 
against the minority group and Americans residing on the island.  The story described 
harassments and kidnappings of locals and Americans in roadblocks and bombings, as 
well as an increase in the number of fatalities.  As the decision task, the subjects were 
asked to express their level of support (on a scale from 0 to 100) for a potential U.S. 
military intervention in this ethnic conflict.   
After stating their level of support for a possible U.S. military intervention at the 
end of the pre-intervention stage (phase 1), participants moved to the starting stage of the 
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 See Appendix D for the scenarios and questions used in the experiments.  
13
 The Cyprus ethnic conflict case was my guiding framework for the hypothetical ethnic conflict scenario 
with certain modifications introduced to make the context more relevant to American subjects. 
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intervention (phase 2).  At this stage, the participants were informed that the U.S. has 
just initiated a military intervention in the ethnic conflict that they have read about.  The 
participants read a newsflash about the intervention decision of the president.  Starting 
from phase 2 and for the remaining stages (phase 3 and phase 4), the participants were 
asked to indicate their level of support (on a scale from 0 to 100) for sustaining military 
intervention.   
In all four stages of the intervention, the participants were provided with the 
number of expected casualties.  The experimental scenarios in phase 3 and phase 4 also 
reported the number of actual casualties alongside the number of expected casualties.  At 
phase 1 and phase 2, the number of expected casualties was reported to be between 100 
and 300.  There were no actual casualties at these first two stages of the intervention.  At 
phase 3, the participants were informed that it had been three months since the U.S. 
initiated military intervention in Kuzeya against Suman forces and to protect Amians.  
The number of expected casualties was set to 300 at phase 3.  At this stage, the number 
of actual casualties was introduced and reported as 124.  At phase 4, the time was set to 
nine months since launch of the military intervention.  At this stage, the number of 
expected casualties was raised to 600.  The actual cumulative casualty rate also 
increased reaching 437.      
In phase 3 and phase 4, two alternative scenarios were used, one describing the 
course of intervention as improving and the other as deteriorating.  The subjects were 
exposed to different combinations of these alternative intervention prospect patterns 
across phase 3 and 4 (improving-improving; improving-deteriorating; deteriorating-
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improving; deteriorating-deteriorating).  The depiction of the intervention as improving 
was based on military achievements (such as forcing the enemy to retreat) and 
independent from the number of expected and actual casualties.  Below is an excerpt 
from the scenario given at phase 3, which portrays the prospect of the intervention as 
improving:     
New reports surfacing on the Suman-Amian conflict in Kuzeya and the U.S. 
military intervention there -initiated 3 months ago- show signs of improvement in 
the region.  American soldiers collaborating with Amian forces gained significant 
ground in the Northern provinces and more than a third of the Suman forces have 
now laid down their weapons and surrendered.  Meanwhile, in the all too 
important southern province, the second-in-command Suman general ordered his 
fighters to withdraw and release a large number of civilian captives after 
negotiations with Amian forces resulted in a cease-fire and truce.  Only weeks 
ago, such an agreement was thought by many to be a near impossible task.   
 
On a parallel basis, the depiction of intervention as deteriorating was based on 
military failures (such as inability to gain control of the enemy territory) and 
independent from the number of expected and actual casualties.  Below is an excerpt 
from the scenario given at phase 4, which portrays the prospect of the intervention as 
deteriorating:     
Now for the news on the Suman-Amian conflict in Kuzeya and the current state 
of the U.S. military intervention in trying to end the violence there.  Reports 
indicate that the enduring efforts of the U.S. forces to aid the Amians have thus 
far resulted in a steady decline towards resolving the conflict.  All provinces of 
Kuzeya, save for it southern province, remain in control of Suman forces.  
Reports from the front lines indicate that American forces continue to take the 
brunt of the responsibility in the fighting, with the Amian forces serving mostly 
as backup support for most military operations.  U.S. officials see this as a strong 
sign that U.S. intervention efforts have faltered and that the Amians may not be 
able to take control over Kuzeya. 
 
Expected utility equations, from which I derive my hypotheses, are based on 
assumptions regarding the differences in the perceptions of cost, utility, and expected 
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success of the intervention between the politically informed and uninformed.  For the 
testing of these expected utility assumptions, I conducted a second experiment.  In 
Experiment 2, the participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of costs, benefits, 
and success of the military intervention (on a scale from 0 to 10), following their 
exposure to information about the intervention.  In Experiment 2, I also inquired about 
the participants’ tolerance for expected casualties (across all stages) and actual casualties 
(only for phase 3 and phase 4) on a 0-10 scale.   
General Political Information 
 As I pointed out in Chapter II, there has been a debate in the political information 
literature concerning the relative importance of policy-specific information versus 
general political information regarding political judgments, opinion change, and policy 
preferences.  By including general political information as a covariate in my analyses, I 
tackle an interesting question on whether policy-specific information or general political 
information has a more direct influence on the level of support for military interventions 
across different phases of intervention.   
To measure general political information, I administered a questionnaire at the 
end of each experiment (see Appendix E).  The questionnaire consisted of four 
segments: domestic political knowledge, recognition of important national and foreign 
political figures, foreign policy knowledge, and policy-specific knowledge on military 
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interventions.  I then aggregated the separate scores of the four sections to obtain a total 
score of the general political information of each participant.
14
   
One may argue that rather than generating ad hoc political information as an 
experimental treatment, using the last segment of the questionnaire—policy-specific 
knowledge on military interventions—would be sufficient to examine the effects of 
policy-specific information on the level of support for military intervention.  However, it 
should be noted that such a measure of political information is often contaminated with a 
host of extraneous factors that are associated with political information such as personal 
interest in politics, intelligence, motivation, and so on.  On the other hand, an ad hoc   
generation of policy-specific information enables a true random assignment to 
experimental conditions by controlling for such extraneous variables and, thus, is a more 
direct and reliable measure of policy-specific information. 
Results 
Experiment 1 
 
The major objective of Experiment 1 is examining the level of support across two 
levels of political information (ad hoc information and no ad hoc information) and across 
four stages of intervention (the pre-intervention stage (phase 1), the starting stage (phase 
2), phase 3, and phase 4).  Specifically, I conducted Experiment 1 in order to test the 
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 I estimated Cronbach’s alpha to check whether each constitutive section of the questionnaire is 
measuring the same underlying construct (here, general political information) and thus can be combined 
together to generate an additive measure.  The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for this additive 
measure is .66 for Experiment 1, .64 for Experiment 2, and .61 for Experiment 3.  I also conducted a 
simple correlation test along with Fisher’s r to z transformation.  The results indicate significantly high 
levels of correlation among four sections of the questionnaire (p < .0001) and thus justify the formation of 
an index variable.   
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following hypotheses, which I derived from my expected utility framework presented in 
Chapter III: 
Hypothesis 1: Politically uninformed individuals are likely to show higher levels 
of support for a military intervention than politically informed ones at the starting 
stage (phase 2) of that intervention.
15
   
Hypothesis 2: Going from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting 
stage (phase 2) of a military intervention, politically uninformed individuals are 
likely to show a higher rate of increase in support for that intervention than 
politically informed ones.   
Hypothesis 4: In the presence of actual casualties, politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to show lower levels of support for a military intervention 
than politically informed ones in the subsequent stages of that intervention. 
Hypothesis 5: In the presence of actual casualties, politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to show higher rates of decrease in support for a military 
intervention than politically informed ones in the subsequent stages of that 
intervention.   
Level of Support across All Four Intervention Stages 
The results of the repeated measures 2x2x4 ANOVA analysis of Experiment 1 
are presented in Table 1.  The results demonstrate statistically significant main effect of  
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 In the design of Experiment 1, the number of actual casualties was not reported in phase 1 and phase 2.  
Hypothesis 3 presented in Chapter III proposes that in the absence of actual casualties, politically 
uninformed individuals are likely to show higher levels of support for a military intervention than 
politically informed ones.  Accordingly, the testing of Hypothesis 1 via examining the level of support at 
phase 1 and phase 2 is also a test of Hypothesis 3 in these analyses.     
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ad hoc information (F (1, 361) = 4.74, p < .05).  Specifically, the group that received the 
ad hoc information treatment shows a lower level of support for the intervention (MPI = 
54.81) compared to the group without ad hoc information (MPU = 59.62) across four 
intervention stages.  The main effect of intervention stages is also significant (F (3, 
1083) = 106.11, p < .0001).  The level of support at the pre-intervention stage/phase 1 
(MPHASE_1 = 49.36) increases at the starting stage of the intervention (MPHASE_2 = 66.35).  
However, as the intervention proceeds, one observes a gradual decrease in support at 
phase 3 (MPHASE_3 = 62.62) and at phase 4 (MPHASE_4 = 51.07).   
Apart from the two main effects, the interaction of ad hoc information with the 
intervention stages is also statistically significant (F (3, 1083) = 3.71, p < .05).  As 
shown in Figure 4, one observes a similar pattern in the levels of support across 
intervention stages among the ad hoc treatment group and the control group.  The major 
difference between the two information treatment groups concerns the level of change in 
support going from one intervention stage to the other; the individuals with no ad hoc 
information demonstrates a higher amount of change in their expressed level of support 
compared to the group with ad hoc information.   
Specifically, going from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting stage 
(phase 2), the group with no ad hoc information shows a higher amount of increase in 
the level of support ([M = 70.28 at phase 2] – [M = 50.12 at phase 1] = 20.16%) 
compared to the group with ad hoc information ([M = 61.95 at phase 2] – [M = 48.51 at 
phase 1] = 13.44%).  Similarly, the mean level of support that participants with no ad 
hoc information express at phase 2 (M = 70.28) decreases by 4.86% at phase 3 (M = 
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65.42) whereas participants with ad hoc information show less change (2.48%) in their 
level of support for the intervention going from phase 2 (M = 61.95) to phase 3 (M = 
59.47).  On a parallel basis, the mean level of support at phase 4 for the group with no ad 
hoc information is 52.65% indicating 12.77% decrease from the level of support 
expressed at phase 3 (M = 65.42).  The ad hoc information group, on the other hand, 
once again express a lower amount of decrease (10.16%) in the mean level of support 
going from phase 3 (M = 59.47) to phase 4 (M = 49.31).   
Level of Support at the Pre-Intervention and Starting Stages of an Intervention 
In Hypothesis 1, I proposed that politically uninformed individuals are likely to 
show higher levels of support for a military intervention than politically informed ones at 
the starting stage of that intervention.  Furthermore, going from pre-intervention stage 
(phase 1) to the starting stage (phase 2) of a military intervention, Hypothesis 2 predicts 
that politically uninformed individuals are likely to show a higher rate of increase in 
their support for that intervention than the politically informed.  Since these hypotheses 
refer to the level of support for the first two stages of an intervention, I conducted a 2x2 
ANOVA repeated measures analysis of political information (as between-group factor) 
across intervention phases 1 and 2 (as within-group factor).   
As Table 2 shows, the results regarding the level of support for the first two 
phases of the intervention are consistent with the larger analysis in Table 1 using all four 
intervention stages.  The results indicate that the main effect of ad hoc information on 
the level of support for military intervention is statistically significant (F (1, 367) = 5.11, 
p < .05).  Specifically, individuals with no ad hoc information show a higher level of 
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support for intervention (MPU = 60.20) than the ones with ad hoc information (MPI = 
55.23).  The main effect of intervention stages demonstrate statistical significance, as 
well (F (1, 367) = 226.62, p < .0001).  The level of support expressed at the pre-
intervention stage/phase 1 (MPHASE_1 = 49.36) increases at the starting stage/phase 2 of 
the intervention (MPHASE_2 = 66.35).  This finding is in line with the literature on the 
rally-around-the-flag effect observed right after the initiation of a military intervention.   
The interaction of ad hoc information with the intervention stages is also 
statistically significant (F (1, 367) = 9.07, p < .01).  As Figure 5 illustrates, the 
participants in the ad hoc information treatment group show lower levels of support for 
military intervention at the starting stage (phase 2) of the intervention (M = 61.95) 
compared to the group that did not receive the ad hoc information treatment (M = 70.28).  
This finding is in line with Hypothesis 1.
16
   
Figure 5 also illustrates the change in the level of support going from the pre-
intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting stage (phase 2).  Specifically, the group with 
no ad hoc information shows a higher amount of increase in their expressed level of 
support going from phase 1 to phase 2 ([M = 70.28 at phase 2] – [M = 50.12 at phase 1] 
= 20.16%) compared to the group with ad hoc information ([M = 61.95 at phase 2] –  
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 As mentioned above, Hypothesis 3 proposes that in the absence of actual casualties, support of 
politically uninformed individuals is likely to be higher than that of informed individuals.  At the pre-
intervention stage (phase 1) and the starting stage (phase 2) of the intervention, only the number of 
expected casualties was provided in the experimental scenarios.  The number of actual casualties was 
introduced at phase 3 and phase 4.  This being the case, the analysis of the level of support at the first two 
phases of the intervention presented at Table 2 above for the testing of Hypothesis 1 and 2 is also a test of 
Hypothesis 3.  As shown in Figure 5, the lower means regarding the level of support of the ad hoc 
information treatment group in phase 1 and phase 2 compared to those of the no ad hoc information group 
are in line with Hypothesis 4 (F (1, 367) = 9.07, p < .01; MPU = 50.12 and MPI = 48.51 in phase 1; MPU = 
70.28 and MPI = 61.95 in phase 2).  
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[M = 48.51 at phase 1] = 13.44%), which supports Hypothesis 2.   
Level of Support at Phase 3 and Phase 4 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that in the presence of actual casualties (as in the case of 
phase 3 and phase 4 in Experiment 1), support of politically uninformed individuals for a 
military intervention is likely to be lower than that of the politically informed.  However, 
as shown in Figure 3 above, the group that did not receive the ad hoc information 
treatment in fact demonstrates higher levels of support at phase 3 and phase 4 (M = 
65.42 at phase 3 and M = 52.65 at phase 4) than the group with ad hoc information (M = 
59.47 at phase 3 and M = 49.31 at phase 4).  In short, the results do not provide 
empirical support for Hypothesis 4.   
One reason behind this unexpected finding may be related to the duration of the 
intervention.  As mentioned, the time since the initiation of the intervention was set to 
three months at phase 3 and nine months at phase 4 in the experimental scenarios.  
However, the presence of actual casualties may in fact take longer to lead to a significant 
decrease in the level of support for the intervention among the politically uninformed.  
Another factor that may account for this contradictory finding is the number of actual 
casualties given at phase 3 and phase 4.  As mentioned, the number of actual casualties 
reported at phase 3 was 124, which increased to 437 at phase 4.  If the number of actual 
casualties continues to increase and reach a certain level, the support for intervention 
among the politically uninformed people may eventually get lower than the politically 
informed as hypothesized.   
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To investigate these possibilities, one should construct alternative experimental 
scenarios with more variation in the duration of the intervention and the number of 
actual casualties.  One can also compare the rate of decrease in support among the 
politically informed and the uninformed in the presence of actual casualties.  This way, 
one can make inferences about the projected level of support among the politically 
informed and uninformed.  Specifically, if the politically uninformed individuals 
demonstrate a higher rate of decrease in their level of support for intervention than the 
politically informed going from one phase to another given rising numbers of casualties, 
the level of support among the politically uninformed will ultimately become lower than 
the informed at one point as proposed by Hypothesis 4.  Reflecting this way of thinking, 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that compared to the expressed level of support at the starting 
stage of the intervention, the politically uninformed are likely to show higher amount 
decrease in support for a military intervention than politically informed individuals once 
actual casualties occur.   
Looking at the results presented in Table 1 and Figure 4 above, once the number 
of actual casualties are introduced in phase 3 and phase 4, the level of support among the 
participants that did not receive the ad hoc information treatment drops at a significantly 
higher rate compared to the participants with ad hoc information.  Specifically, as 
displayed in Figure 4 above, the mean level of support that participants with no ad hoc 
information express at phase 2 (M = 70.28) decreases by 4.86% at phase 3 (M = 65.42), 
whereas participants with ad hoc information show less change (2.48%) in their level of 
support for the intervention going from phase 2 (M = 61.95) to phase 3 (M = 59.47).  On 
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a parallel basis, the mean level of support at phase 4 for the group with no ad hoc 
information is 52.65% indicating 12.77% decrease from the level of support expressed at 
phase 3 (M = 65.42).  The ad hoc information group, on the other hand, once more 
express a lower amount of decrease (10.16%) in the mean level of support going from 
phase 3 (M = 59.47) to phase 4 (M = 49.31) compared to the group with no ad hoc 
information.   
The results, therefore, are in line with the prediction of Hypothesis 5.  These 
findings also suggest a hint of support for Hypothesis 4; if the duration of the 
intervention gets longer and the number of actual casualties keeps rising, the higher rate 
of decrease among individuals with no ad hoc political information may eventually lead 
to a lower level of support among these individuals compared to the ones with ad hoc 
information.  
Intervention Prospect Patterns (Improving versus Deteriorating) 
Apart from the effect of political information, the course and duration of 
intervention, and the role of casualties, another important factor to consider regarding 
the level of public support for military interventions is the prospect of success at a 
certain intervention stage.  The presence of casualties may reflect differently on the level 
of support when the state of the intervention is improving rather than deteriorating or 
vice versa.  Moreover, the time elapsed since the start of the intervention may be a 
compounding factor when considering the impact of the intervention prospect.  In other 
words, prospects of improvement or deterioration may have different effects on the level 
of support if the intervention has just started as opposed to an intervention that has been 
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going on for a long time.  The interaction of political information with the intervention 
prospect is also an interesting avenue to explore.   
To account for these considerations, two alternative prospect patterns were 
introduced at phase 3 and phase 4, depicting the state of intervention either as improving 
or as deteriorating at each of these two stages.  As mentioned, at phase 3, the participants 
were informed that it had been three months since the U.S. initiated military intervention 
in Kuzeya against Suman forces and to protect Amians.  At phase 4, the time was set to 
nine months since launch of the military intervention.   
Table 3 presents the results for the 2x2x2 ANOVA analysis of the level of public 
support across intervention phases 2 and 3 as within-group factor, with ad hoc 
information and success of phase 3 (improving versus deteriorating) as between-group 
factors.  The results indicate that the main effect of ad hoc information on the level of 
support for military intervention is statistically significant (F (1, 365) = 10.32, p < .01).  
The participants that did not received the ad hoc information treatment express higher 
level of support (MPU = 67.85) compared to the ones with ad hoc information (MPI = 
60.71).  The main effect of intervention stages (phase 2 and phase 3) also shows 
statistical significance (F (1, 365) = 16.94, p < .0001).  The level of support expressed at 
the starting stage (phase 2) of the intervention (MPHASE_2 = 66.35) drops at phase 3 
(MPHASE_3 = 62.62).  The success of phase 3 has no statistically significant main effect (F 
(1, 365) = 8.052E-6, p > .1; MDETERIORATING = 64.36 and MIMPROVING = 64.60).  That said, 
the results indicate an interesting three-way interaction between ad hoc political 
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information, success of phase 3, and intervention stages 2 and 3 (F (1, 365) = 4.46, p < 
.05; see Figure 6).  
As Figure 6 illustrates, when the state of the intervention is portrayed as 
improving at phase 3, similar effects are observed on both ad hoc information and no ad 
hoc information treatment groups.  Specifically, the level of support expressed at phase 2 
is maintained around the same level at phase 3 by both groups (MPU = 69.71 in phase 2 
and MPU = 70.81 in phase 3; MPI = 58.48 in phase 2 and MPI = 58.16 in phase 3).  On the 
other hand, when the state of the intervention is portrayed as deteriorating, the level of 
support significantly drops going from phase 2 to phase 3.  That said, such decrease in 
the level of support is significantly more pronounced for the group that did not receive 
the ad hoc information treatment ([M = 70.89 at phase 2] – [M = 59.75 at phase 3] = 
11.14%) compared to the ad hoc information group ([M = 65.66 at phase 2] – [M = 
60.88 at phase 3] = 4.78%).   
The findings, therefore, indicate that when the intervention proceeds on a 
successful course following the initiation stage, there is no substantial difference 
regarding the level of support for the intervention between the politically informed and 
uninformed people.  On the other hand, if the intervention prospects prove to be 
deteriorating, the politically uninformed individuals react more extremely in terms of the 
amount of decrease in their level of support compared to the politically informed ones.  
Table 4 presents the results for the 2x2x2 ANOVA analysis of the level of public 
support across intervention phases 3 and 4 as within-group factor, with ad hoc 
information and success of phase 4 (improving versus deteriorating) as between-group 
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factors.  The results indicate that the main effect of ad hoc political information on the 
level of support for military intervention is on the verge of statistical significance (F (1, 
365) = 3.47, p < .10).  The group with no ad hoc information shows higher level of 
support (MPU = 59.03) than the group with ad hoc information (MPI = 54.39).  The main 
effect of intervention stages (phase 3 and phase 4) also show statistical significance (F 
(1, 365) = 132.27, p < .0001).  Specifically, the expressed level of support for 
intervention at phase 3 (MPHASE_3 = 62.62) decreases at phase 4 (MPHASE_4 = 51.07).  In 
contrast to the success of phase 3, success of phase 4 demonstrates statistically 
significant main effect (F (1, 365) = 5.36, p < .05).  Predictably, the level of support for 
intervention is higher when the state of the intervention is depicted as improving 
(MIMPROVING = 59.64) rather than deteriorating (MDETERIORATING = 54.03).   
The results indicate no significant three-way interaction between ad hoc 
information, success of phase 4, and intervention stages 3 and 4 (F (1, 365) = 1.62, p > 
.1; see Figure 7).  However, the interaction of the success of phase 4 with intervention 
phases 3 and 4 is statistically significant (F (1, 365) = 31.88, p < .0001).  As Figure 8 
illustrates, when the state of the intervention is portrayed as deteriorating, the level of 
support significantly drops going from phase 3 to phase 4 (MPHASE_3 = 62.64 and 
MPHASE_4 = 45.42).  Even when the state of the intervention is portrayed as improving at 
phase 4, the level of support expressed at phase 3 keeps decreasing at phase 4, although 
at a lower rate (MPHASE_3 = 62.59 and MPHASE_4 = 56.59).  In short, as the duration of 
intervention gets longer—in the case of phase 4, the intervention had been going on for 
  
63 
nine months—the level of support drops even with improving prospects and the impact 
of ad hoc information disappears.   
Experiment 2  
Experiment 2 introduced measures of perceived costs, benefits, and expected 
success of the intervention to test the components of expected utility assumptions, which 
lead to the hypotheses I tested in Experiment 1 regarding the level of support for military 
intervention.  Accordingly, Experiment 2 was designed to check whether the expected 
utility parameters worked as predicted.  In the formal framework chapter, I argued that 
the politically informed are likely to expect higher level of costs, lower level of utilities, 
and lower likelihood of success from an intervention at the pre-intervention stage 
compared to the politically uninformed individuals.  I also argued that compared to the 
politically uninformed, politically informed individuals are likely to demonstrate lower 
level of change in their assessments of costs, utilities, and success going from the pre-
intervention stage to the starting stage.  These assumptions on the expected utility 
parameters constituted the basis of the hypotheses regarding the level of support for 
military interventions across intervention phases 1 and 2.   
Apart from measures of perceived costs, benefits, and expected success of the 
intervention, Experiment 2 also introduced a measure of tolerance for expected 
casualties.  This measure was designed to test Auxiliary Proposition 1, which 
hypothesized that the expected casualty tolerance of politically informed individuals is 
likely to be lower than that of politically uninformed ones.  In Experiment 2, I also tested 
Auxiliary Proposition 3, which hypothesized that the expected casualty tolerance of the 
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politically uninformed is lower than that of politically informed individuals once actual 
casualties occur. 
In addition to the testing of expected casualty tolerance, Experiment 2 also 
measured tolerance for actual casualties.  This measure was designed to test Auxiliary 
Proposition 2, which hypothesized that actual casualty tolerance of the politically 
informed is likely to be higher than that of the politically uninformed individuals.   
Level of Perceived Costs 
To start with the level of perceived costs, I argued that politically informed 
individuals are likely to expect a higher level of costs from a military intervention at the 
pre-intervention stage (phase 1) compared to politically uninformed ones.  I also argued 
that going from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting stage of an 
intervention (phase 2), politically informed individuals are likely to demonstrate a lower 
level of change in their assessments of costs than politically uninformed ones.  
Table 5 reports the results of the 2x2 ANOVA analysis regarding the level of 
perceived costs.  The results indicate statistically significant main effect of ad hoc   
information (F (1, 263) = 107.35, p < .0001).  Specifically, the participants in the ad hoc 
information condition perceive higher level of costs for the military intervention (M = 
6.69) than the participants with no ad hoc information (M = 4.60), which is in line with 
my expectations.  The main effect of intervention phases 1 and 2 is also statistically 
significant (F (1,263) = 8.19, p < .01).  The level of perceived costs in the starting stage 
(phase 2) of the intervention (M = 5.62) is lower than the pre-intervention stage (M = 
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5.81).  This finding is compatible with the literature on the rally-around-the-flag effect 
observed at the beginning of an intervention.   
The interaction of ad hoc information with the intervention phases 1 and 2, 
displayed in Figure 9, has statistical significance (F (1, 263) = 3.71, p < .05).  In terms of 
the amount of change in the perceived costs going from phase 1 to phase 2, the results 
demonstrate that the participants with no ad hoc information demonstrate a higher level 
of change than the ones with ad hoc information.  As Figure 9 shows, the mean level of 
perceived costs for no ad hoc information group decreases from 4.79 at phase 1 to 4.41 
at phase 2 (.38 decrease), whereas the mean of 6.68 for perceived costs at phase 2 among 
participants with ad hoc information indicates only a slight change from 6.71 at phase 1 
(.03 decrease).  Furthermore, simple effects analysis within each information treatment 
group shows that such decrease across intervention stages is statistically significant for 
only the group with no ad hoc information (F (1, 123) = 12.42, p < .001).  In contrast, 
the change in perceived costs from phase 1 to phase 2 in the ad hoc information 
treatment group does not entail statistical significance (F (1, 140) = .13, p > .1).  In short, 
these findings are in line with my expected utility assumptions regarding the level of 
perceived costs among politically informed and uninformed individuals across 
intervention phases 1 and 2.   
Level of Perceived Benefits 
In the formal framework chapter, I argued that politically informed individuals 
are likely to expect a lower level of benefits from a military intervention at the pre-
intervention stage (phase 1) compared to politically uninformed individuals.  I also 
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argued that informed individuals are likely to demonstrate less change in their 
assessments of benefits going from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting 
stage of an intervention (phase 2) compared to politically uninformed individuals.   
Table 6 reports the results of the 2x2 ANOVA analysis regarding the level of 
perceived benefits.  The main effect of ad hoc information is statistically significant (F 
(1, 263) = 129.94, p < .0001).  As expected, the mean for perceived benefits among 
participants that received the ad hoc information treatment (M = 4.22) is lower than that 
of the ones without ad hoc information (M = 6.93).  Intervention phases 1 and 2 also 
show statistically significant main effect (F (1,263) = 39.00, p < .0001).  Specifically, the 
mean level of perceived benefits increases from 5.17 at phase 1 to 5.80 at phase 2.  This 
finding, as in the case of perceived costs, can be tied to the rally-around-the-flag effect 
observed at the starting phase of a military intervention.    
There is a significant interactive effect of the ad hoc information and the 
intervention stages 1 and 2 (F (1, 263) = 6.52, p < .05), as Figure 10 shows.  Regarding 
the change in the level of perceived benefits across intervention stages, both treatment 
groups demonstrate an increase in the perceived benefits at phase 2.  In fact, the amount 
of increase is higher for the participants with ad hoc information ([M = 4.65 at phase 2] 
– [M = 3.78 at phase 1] = .87) than the ones with no ad hoc information ([M = 7.11 at 
phase 2] – [M = 6.75 at phase 1] = .36).  Further analysis of simple effects indicate that 
such increase is statistically significant for both ad hoc information and no ad hoc 
information groups ((F (1, 140) = 36.18, p < .0001) and F (1,123) = 7.64, p < .01 
respectively).  The significant and higher amount of change among the participants with 
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ad hoc information compared to the ones with no ad hoc information is a finding 
contradictory to my expectations and thus requires further investigation. 
Level of Expected Success 
In Chapter III, I argued that politically informed individuals are likely to expect a 
lower level of success from a military intervention at the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) 
than the politically uninformed.  I also argued that politically informed individuals are 
likely to demonstrate a lower level of change in their assessments of expected success 
going from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting stage of an intervention 
(phase 2) compared to the uninformed individuals.   
Table 7 presents the results for the 2x2 ANOVA analysis regarding the level of 
expected success.  Similar to the analyses of perceived costs and benefits, the main and 
interactive effects of ad hoc information and intervention stages are statistically 
significant.  As expected, the group that was exposed to the ad hoc information treatment 
expect a lower level of success from the intervention (M = 4.74) than the group without 
the ad hoc information (M = 7.40) (F (1, 263) = 124.77, p<.0001).  In addition, the mean 
level of expected success at phase 2 (M = 6.13) is higher than the mean at phase 1 (M = 
5.84) (F (1, 263) = 13.68, p < .001), which corresponds well to the rally-around-the-flag 
effect following the initiation of an intervention.   
 There is a significant interactive effect of the ad hoc information and the 
intervention stages 1 and 2 (F (1, 263) = 6.57, p < .01) on the level of expected success, 
as Figure 11 illustrates.  Specifically, the amount of change in the level of expected 
success going from phase 1 to phase 2 is higher for the participants with no ad hoc 
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information ([M = 7.66 at phase 2] – [M = 7.15 at phase 1] = .51) compared to the ones 
with ad hoc information ([M = 4.78 at phase 2] – [M = 4.69 at phase 1] = .09).  
Furthermore, simple effects analysis shows that such difference between two phases is 
statistically significant only for the no ad hoc information group (F (1,123) = 11.02, p< 
.01), as suggested in the expected utility assumptions. 
Tolerance for Expected Casualties 
As for the tolerance for expected casualties, in the formal framework chapter, I 
suggested that politically informed people are more inclined to evaluate the intervention 
prospectively and therefore place more emphasis on expected costs (including expected 
casualties) compared to the politically uninformed when making their decision on 
whether and to what extent to support an intervention.  Accordingly, Auxiliary 
Proposition 1 hypothesizes that expected casualty tolerance of the politically informed is 
likely to be lower than that of the politically uninformed individuals.   
I also proposed that expected costs are a function of actual costs for the 
politically uninformed rather than being independent.  Accordingly, in the presence of 
actual casualties, I suggested that the politically uninformed are likely to have inflated 
estimates of expected costs compared to the politically informed individuals.  In 
contrast, I do not anticipate observing such a correlated effect between actual and 
expected costs for the politically informed.  In other words, the evaluation of the 
politically informed individuals are likely to be based on more objective points of 
consideration when estimating the future costs that may be incurred in the subsequent 
stages of an intervention.  These considerations led to Auxiliary Proposition 3, which 
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suggests that expected casualty tolerance of the politically uninformed is lower than that 
of the politically informed individuals given actual casualties.  
To measure the level of expected casualty tolerance, participants were asked the 
following question: “Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US 
military intervention in this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties 
that are expected to occur?  Please indicate whether you think the number of expected 
casualties estimated for this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = 
exceedingly low expected casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high 
expected casualties for a mission like this).”  Accordingly, lower numbers translate as 
higher tolerance for expected casualties.   
Table 8 reports the results of the 2x2x4 ANOVA analysis of the expected 
casualty tolerance using repeated measures across four intervention stages.  Regarding 
the main effect of ad hoc information, participants that received the information 
treatment generally show lower tolerance for expected casualties (MPI = 5.47) than the 
control group (MPU = 5.04) (F (1, 257) = 2.95, p < .1).  Across stages of intervention, the 
expected casualty tolerance at phase 1 (M = 4.93) gradually decreases at phase 2 (M = 
4.97), at phase 3 (M = 5.10) and at phase 4 (M = 6.08) (F (3, 771) = 52.80, p < .0001).       
Figure 12 illustrates the significant interaction between ad hoc information and 
intervention phases regarding the tolerance for expected casualties (F (3, 771) = 45.35, p 
< .0001).  In line with Auxiliary Proposition 1, the ad hoc information group expresses a 
lower tolerance for expected casualties at phase 1 (M = 5.56) and phase 2 (M = 5.58) 
compared to that of the group with no ad hoc information at phase 1 (M = 4.22) and 
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phase 2 (M = 4.28).  However, with the introduction of actual casualty information at 
phase 3 and phase 4, expected casualty tolerance of the no ad hoc information group 
becomes lower (M = 5.15 at phase 3 and M = 6.51 at phase 4) than the ad hoc 
information group (M = 5.06 at phase 3 and M = 5.70 at phase 4).  This finding provides 
support for Auxiliary Proposition 3.   
Tolerance for Expected Casualties and Intervention Prospect Patterns  
In Experiment 1, I analyzed the effects of intervention prospects (improving 
versus deteriorating) at a certain stage on the level of public support for military 
interventions.  I replicate this analysis in Experiment 2 for examining the impact of 
intervention prospect patterns on tolerance for expected casualties.  As mentioned, two 
alternative prospect patterns were introduced at phase 3 and phase 4, depicting the state 
of intervention either as improving or as deteriorating at each of these two stages.  
Parallel to the level of support for an intervention, tolerance for expected casualties may 
vary across intervention stages and information levels when the state of the intervention 
is improving rather than deteriorating or vice versa.  An additional factor to consider is 
the amount of time passed since the start of the intervention when considering the impact 
of the intervention prospect.  Specifically, prospects of improvement or deterioration 
may have different impact on expected casualty tolerance if the intervention has just 
started as opposed to a protracted intervention.  As mentioned, in the experimental 
scenarios, the time was set to three months at phase 3 and nine months at phase 4 since 
the initiation of the U.S. military intervention in the hypothetical ethnic conflict.   
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Table 9 presents the results for the 2x2x2 ANOVA analysis of expected casualty 
tolerance across intervention phases 2 and 3 as within-group factor, with ad hoc 
information and success of phase 3 (improving versus deteriorating) as between-group 
factors.  The results indicate that the main effect of ad hoc information on tolerance for 
expected casualties is statistically significant (F (1, 261) = 5.56, p < .01).  The 
participants that did not received the ad hoc information treatment generally express 
higher tolerance for expected casualties (MPU = 4.71) compared to the ones with ad hoc 
information (MPI = 5.32).  The main effect of intervention stages (phase 2 and phase 3) is 
on the verge of statistical significance (F (1, 261) = 3.00, p < .1).  Tolerance for expected 
casualties expressed at the starting stage (phase 2) of the intervention (MPHASE_2 = 4.97) 
slightly decreases at phase 3 (MPHASE_3 = 5.01).  The success of phase 3 also 
demonstrates statistically significant main effect (F (1, 261) = 6.36, p <.01).  Predictably, 
when intervention conditions are deteriorating, tolerance for expected casualties is lower 
(MDETERIORATING = 5.38) compared to expected casualty tolerance under improving 
prospects (MIMPROVING = 4.75).  That said, the results do not indicate significant three-
way interaction between ad hoc information, success of phase 3, and intervention stages 
2 and 3 (F (1, 261) = .38, p > .1). 
Table 10 presents the results for the 2x2x2 ANOVA analysis of tolerance for 
expected casualties across intervention phases 3 and 4 as within-group factor, with ad 
hoc information and success of phase 4 (improving versus deteriorating) as between-
group factors.  The results indicate that the main effect of ad hoc information on the 
level of support for military intervention is statistically significant (F (1, 261) = 3.78, p < 
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.05).  Specifically, the group with no ad hoc information shows lower tolerance for 
expected casualties (MPU = 5.83) than the group with ad hoc information (MPI = 5.38).  
The main effect of intervention stages (phase 3 and phase 4) also shows statistical 
significance (F (1, 261) = 159.73, p < .0001).  Specifically, tolerance for expected 
casualties expressed at phase 3 (MPHASE_3 = 5.1) decreases at phase 4 (MPHASE_4 = 6.08).  
In contrast to the success of phase 3, success of phase 4 does not demonstrate 
statistically significant main effect (F (1, 261) = 2.21, p > .1).   
The results point to an interesting three-way interaction between ad hoc 
information, success of phase 4, and intervention stages (F (1, 261) = 15.45, p < .0001).  
As Figure 13 show, when the state of the intervention is portrayed as improving at phase 
4, expected casualty tolerance of the individuals with no ad hoc information drops by .69 
([M = 5.69 at phase 4] – [M = 5.22 at phase 3]).  In comparison, expected casualty 
tolerance of individuals with ad hoc information drops by .54 ([M = 5.58 at phase 4] – 
[M = 5.04 at phase 3]).  Therefore, the amount of decrease in expected casualty tolerance 
under improving prospects is not very different among the individuals with and without 
ad hoc information.  On the other hand, when the state of the intervention is portrayed as 
deteriorating, the amount of decrease in expected casualty tolerance among individuals 
with no ad hoc information is significantly higher than the ones with ad hoc information.  
Specifically, given deteriorating prospects, expected casualty tolerance of the group with 
no ad hoc information significantly drops by 2.15 ([M = 7.22 at phase 4] – [M = 5.07 at 
phase 3]) going from phase 3 to phase 4.  Such decrease in tolerance for expected 
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casualties is less for the group that received the ad hoc information treatment ([M = 5.82 
at phase 4] – [M = 5.08 at phase 3] = .74 decrease).     
 The findings indicate that going from the starting stage of an intervention to the 
subsequent stage, the prospects of an intervention does not demonstrate an immediate 
effect on expected casualty tolerance across levels of political information and 
intervention stages.  However, as the duration of intervention gets longer—in the case of 
phase 4, the intervention had been going on for nine months—tolerance for expected 
casualties drops even with improving prospects.  Such decrease in expected casualty 
tolerance going from phase 3 to phase 4 is more pronounced when the course of the 
intervention is deteriorating and among individuals that did not receive the ad hoc 
information treatment.   
Tolerance for Actual Casualties 
Regarding the tolerance for actual casualties, in the formal framework chapter, I 
suggested that politically informed people are likely to have more accurate estimates of 
expected costs (including casualties) and show less severe reaction if these expected 
costs turn into actual costs.  Accordingly, Auxiliary Proposition 2 hypothesized that the 
actual casualty tolerance of the politically informed is likely to be higher than that of 
politically uninformed individuals.   
To measure the level of actual casualty tolerance, participants were asked the 
following question: “Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US 
military intervention in this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties 
that have occurred so far?  Please indicate whether you think the number of casualties 
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that have occurred for this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = 
exceedingly low actual casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high 
actual casualties for a mission like this).”  Accordingly, selecting lower numbers on the 
scale stands for higher tolerance for actual casualties.   
As Table 11 presents, the results of the 2x2x2 ANOVA analysis on actual 
casualty tolerance show significant main effect of ad hoc sophistication (F (1, 257) = 
7.95, p < .01).  Specifically, no ad hoc information group expresses lower tolerance for 
actual casualties (MPU = 5.63) than ad hoc information group (MPI = 5.07), which 
provides support for Auxiliary Proposition 2.  The main effect of intervention stages 
(phase 3 and phase 4) is also statistically significant (F (1, 257) = 109.84, p < .0001).  
Tolerance for actual casualties decreases as the intervention proceeds from phase 3 (M = 
4.85) to phase 4 (M = 5.81).   
In addition, the interaction between ad hoc information and intervention stages 
demonstrate statistically significant effect (F (1, 257) = 3.83, p < .05).  As Figure 14 
illustrates, tolerance for actual casualties in both ad hoc information treatment and 
control groups demonstrate a gradual decrease going from phase 3 to phase 4.  However, 
tolerance of individuals for actual casualties in the no ad hoc information group 
decreases at a higher rate going from phase 3 to phase 4 ([M = 6.21 at phase 4] – [M = 
5.05 at phase 3] = 1.16) than that of individuals who received the ad hoc information 
treatment ([M = 5.46 at phase 4] – [M = 4.67 at phase 3] = .79).        
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Tolerance for Actual Casualties and Intervention Prospect Patterns  
 Similar to the level of support for an intervention and expected casualty 
tolerance, actual casualty tolerance may vary across intervention stages and information 
levels when the state of the intervention is improving or deteriorating.  Once again, time 
is an important factor to consider when analyzing the impact of the intervention 
prospects on tolerance for actual casualties.  Specifically, prospects of improvement or 
deterioration may have different impact on actual casualty tolerance concerning a 
recently initiated intervention (as in phase 3) rather than a prolonged intervention (as in 
phase 4).  Accordingly, in this section, I examine the effects of intervention prospect 
patterns on tolerance for actual casualties across levels of political information and 
intervention phases 3 and 4.   
Table 12 presents the results for the analysis of actual casualty tolerance across 
intervention phases 3 and 4 as within-group factor, with ad hoc information and success 
of phase 4 (improving versus deteriorating) as between-group factors.
17
  The results 
indicate that the main effect of ad hoc information on tolerance for actual casualties is 
statistically significant (F (1, 261) = 6.47, p < .01).  The participants that did not 
received the ad hoc information treatment generally express lower tolerance for actual 
casualties (MPU = 5.63) compared to the ones with ad hoc information (MPI = 5.07).  The 
main effect of intervention stages (phase 3 and phase 4) also demonstrate statistical 
significance (F (1, 261) = 118.46, p < .0001).  Tolerance for actual casualties expressed 
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 As mentioned, the experimental scenarios began to report actual casualties at phase 3.  As a result, I do 
not conduct an analysis across phases 2 and 3 since there is no measure of actual casualty tolerance at 
phase 2.   
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at phase 3 (MPHASE_3 = 4.85) decreases at phase 4 (MPHASE_4 = 5.81).  In addition, the 
main effect of the success of phase 4 is on the verge of statistical significance (F (1, 261) 
= 2.99, p <.1).  Predictably, when intervention conditions are deteriorating, tolerance for 
actual casualties is lower (MDETERIORATING = 5.53) compared to actual casualty tolerance 
under improving prospects (MIMPROVING = 5.16).   
The three-way interaction between ad hoc information, success of phase 4, and 
intervention stages 3 and 4 does not demonstrate statistical significance (F (1, 261) = .71, 
p > .1).  Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 15, the results indicate an interesting two-
way interaction between success of phase 4 and intervention stages (F (1, 261) = 19.08, 
p < .0001).  Figure 15 shows that when the course of intervention is portrayed as 
deteriorating, tolerance for actual casualties significantly drops by 1.38 at phase 4 ([M = 
5.45 at phase 4] – [M = 4.86 at phase 3]).  In comparison, when the course of 
intervention is portrayed as improving, tolerance for actual casualties still drops by .59 at 
phase 4, although at a lower rate ([M = 6.22 at phase 4] – [M = 4.84 at phase 3]).  In 
short, going from phase 3 to phase 4, tolerance for actual casualties decreases even when 
the course of intervention is depicted as improving.  That said, the amount of decrease in 
actual casualty tolerance is higher under deteriorating prospects of phase 4.       
What about the “Real” Political Information? 
 As previously mentioned, apart from my main analyses, I also included a 
conventional measure of political information—one’s general knowledge of domestic 
politics and international facts—as a covariate in my models.  Interestingly, I did not 
obtain statistical significance for this factor in any of the analyses.  Controlling for 
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general political information does not change the statistical significance and coefficient 
signs of the main experimental factors. 
Summary 
Overall, the findings of the ANOVA analyses of the level of support for the 
military intervention, expected utility parameters of cost, benefit, and success, as well as 
actual and expected casualty tolerance are generally in line with my expectations 
presented in the formal framework chapter.   
The findings of Experiment 1 indicate that individuals with no ad hoc political 
information express higher levels of support for the military intervention than the ones 
that received the ad hoc information treatment at the starting stage of an intervention.  
Compared to the expressed level of support at the pre-intervention stage, the group 
without ad hoc information shows higher levels of increase in their support for the 
intervention than the ad hoc information treatment group at the starting stage of an 
intervention.   
In the absence of actual casualties (at phase 1 and phase 2), support of the ad hoc 
information treatment group is lower than that of the group with no ad hoc information.  
That said, when actual casualties occur (at phase 3 and phase 4), I proposed that the 
support of the politically uninformed individuals is likely to be lower than that of the 
politically informed.  The results do not provide support for this expectation.  
Nevertheless, going from the starting stage of the intervention (phase 2) to phase 3 and 
phase 4, the support of the individuals who did not receive the ad hoc information 
treatment decrease at a higher rate than the individuals with ad hoc information as 
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expected.  These findings hint that if the duration of the intervention gets longer and the 
number of actual casualties keeps rising, the higher rate of decrease among individuals 
with no ad hoc political information may eventually lead to a lower level of support 
among these individuals compared to the ones with ad hoc information. 
The findings of Experiment 2 demonstrate that compared to the individuals with 
no ad hoc information, individuals that received the ad hoc information treatment expect 
higher costs, lower benefits, and have lower expectations of success at the first two 
stages of the intervention.  Regarding the change in the assessments of expected costs, 
benefits, and success, the results support the expected utility assumptions that the 
politically informed express less change in their perceptions of costs and expected 
success going from the pre-intervention stage to the starting stage of the intervention.  
On the other hand, individuals with ad hoc information demonstrate a higher level of 
increase regarding their expectations of benefits at the starting stage compared to the 
ones without ad hoc information.  This finding is contradictory to my expectations and 
requires further investigation.      
As for the analysis of the expected casualty tolerance, the participants that 
received the information treatment generally show lower tolerance for expected 
casualties than the control group as proposed.  However, with the introduction of actual 
casualty information, expected casualty tolerance of the no ad hoc information group 
becomes lower than the ad hoc information group.  The results of the analysis of 
Experiment 2 data also provide support for the proposition that the actual casualty 
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tolerance of the politically uninformed individuals is lower than that of the politically 
informed.   
Apart from the effect of political information, the course and duration of 
intervention, and the role of casualties, this chapter also explored the role of the 
intervention prospect patterns (improving versus deteriorating).  The results show that 
when the state of the intervention is portrayed as improving at phase 3, the level of 
support expressed at phase 2 is maintained at phase 3 by both ad hoc information and no 
ad hoc information treatment groups.  In comparison, when the state of the intervention 
is portrayed as deteriorating at phase 3, the level of support significantly drops in both 
groups going from phase 2 to phase 3.  Nevertheless, such decrease in the level of 
support is significantly more pronounced for the group that did not receive the ad hoc 
information treatment compared to the ad hoc information group.  As the duration of 
intervention gets longer, the level of support drops even with improving prospects and 
the impact of ad hoc information disappears.  Specifically, when the state of the 
intervention is portrayed as deteriorating, the level of support significantly drops going 
from phase 3 to phase 4.  Even when the state of the intervention is portrayed as 
improving at phase 4, the level of support expressed at phase 3 keeps decreasing at phase 
4, although at a lower rate.   
I also analyzed the effect of intervention prospects on actual and expected 
casualty tolerance.  Regarding expected casualty tolerance, the prospects of an 
intervention does not demonstrate an immediate effect on expected casualty tolerance 
across levels of political information and intervention stages going from the starting 
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stage of an intervention to the subsequent stage.  However, similar to the level of 
support, tolerance for expected casualties decreases even with improving prospects, as 
the duration of intervention gets longer.  Such decrease in expected casualty tolerance 
going from phase 3 to phase 4 is more prominent when the course of the intervention is 
deteriorating and among individuals with no ad hoc information.  On a parallel basis,  
going from phase 3 to phase 4, tolerance for actual casualties significantly decreases 
under deteriorating prospects.  Even with improving prospects, actual casualty tolerance 
drops at phase 4 although not as prominent as when the course of intervention is 
deteriorating.   
In short, these interesting findings call for future investigation for a more 
thorough exploration of the main and interactive effects of the prospects of success at a 
certain stage of intervention.     
Links between Experiment 1 and 2 
In the formal framework chapter, I suggested that individuals decide on their 
support for (or opposition to) initiating and sustaining a foreign military intervention 
based on a rational expected utility calculation.  The basic formal framework of this 
study posits that an individual’s value for sustaining a foreign military engagement is a 
function of his or her (1) subjective evaluation of the utility of the intervention objective, 
(2) estimate of the probability of success in attaining that objective, and (3) expectation 
of the human and material costs that are likely to be incurred in the course of an 
intervention.  I introduced certain specifications to cost, utility, and success parameters 
of this basic model with reference to differences in expected utility calculations between 
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the politically informed and uninformed individuals and across intervention stages.  
From these expected utility assumptions, I then derived my hypotheses regarding the 
level of support for military interventions across levels of political information and 
phases of intervention.      
Experiment 2 was designed to examine the effects of ad hoc political information 
and intervention stages on the expected utility parameters (costs, benefits, and success).  
The results demonstrate that compared to the individuals with no ad hoc information, 
individuals that received the ad hoc information treatment expect higher costs, lower 
benefits, and have lower expectations of success at the stating stage of the intervention.  
Placing these parameters on an expected utility equation concerning decisions on 
military intervention, one would infer that the level of support among individuals with 
ad hoc information should be lower than the ones with no ad hoc information at the 
starting stage of an intervention.  The findings of Experiment 1 provide support for this 
inference.  Therefore, the findings of Experiment 2 regarding the expected utility 
parameters are complementary to the findings of Experiment 1 regarding the level of 
support at the starting stage of the intervention.   
Regarding the change in the assessments of costs, benefits, and success, the 
results of Experiment 2 support the expected utility assumptions that the politically 
informed express less change in their perceptions of costs and expected success going 
from the pre-intervention stage to the starting stage of the intervention.  One unexpected 
finding is that the ad hoc information group demonstrates a higher level of increase 
regarding their expectations of benefits at the starting stage compared to the group 
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without ad hoc information.  Therefore, with the exception of perceived benefits, the 
individuals with ad hoc information generally show less change in their expected utility 
calculations regarding their support for military intervention going from one stage to the 
other.  Less change in expected utility calculations should reflect as less change in the 
level of support among individuals with ad hoc information across the first two stages of 
an intervention.  The results of Experiment 1 are in line with these expectations.  
Specifically, the results show that the group without ad hoc information shows higher 
levels of increase in their support for the intervention than the ad hoc information 
treatment group going from the pre-intervention stage to the starting stage of an 
intervention.  Thus, the findings of Experiment 2 mostly corroborate the findings of 
Experiment 1. 
As for the analysis of the expected casualty tolerance in Experiment 2, the results 
show that participants that received the information treatment generally show lower 
tolerance for expected casualties than the control group.  This ties well with lower levels 
of support observed in the first two phases of the intervention among the individuals 
with ad hoc information compared to the ones without ad hoc information in the 
presence of expected casualty reports (and before actual casualties occur).  That said, 
with the introduction of actual casualty information, the results of the analysis of 
Experiment 2 indicate lower actual and expected casualty tolerance among the no ad hoc 
information group compared to the ad hoc information group.  In addition, tolerance of 
individuals for expected as well as actual casualties in the no ad hoc information group 
decreases at a higher rate than that of individuals who received the ad hoc information 
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treatment across intervention stages.  On a parallel basis, the findings of Experiment 1 
demonstrate that going from the starting stage of the intervention (phase 2) to phase 3 
and consequently to phase 4, the level of support among individuals who did not receive 
the ad hoc information treatment decrease at a higher rate than the individuals with ad 
hoc information.  In short, the findings of Experiment 2 regarding actual and expected 
casualty tolerance correspond well with those of Experiment 1.     
Lastly, the analyses in Experiment 1 and 2 regarding the intervention prospect 
patterns also show significant links between the findings of the two experiments.  The 
findings of Experiment 2 indicate that going from phase 3 to phase 4, tolerance for 
actual casualties decreases even when the course of intervention is depicted as 
improving and irrespective of ad hoc information.  That said, the amount of decrease in 
actual casualty tolerance is higher under deteriorating prospects than under improving 
prospects at phase 4.  This translates directly to the findings of Experiment 1 regarding 
the level of support.  Specifically, as the duration of the intervention gets longer—in the 
case of phase 4, the results indicate that the level of support drops even with improving 
prospects regardless of ad hoc political information.   
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSES OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS  
ON MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ 
As part of the multi-method strategy of this dissertation, I test my hypotheses 
using public opinion survey data in addition to the experimental analyses.  Given the 
problems regarding the availability and quality of public opinion data on military 
interventions coupled by further data constraints on measuring policy-specific 
information, I limit my investigation to the analysis of public support for military 
intervention in Iraq.  Specifically, I examine the effect of policy-specific information 
across five intervention phases: (1) the pre-intervention phase, (2) the starting (rally) 
phase of the intervention, (3) the major combat phase, (4) the occupation phase, and (5) 
the sovereign Iraq phase.   
Phases of Military Intervention in Iraq 
 
A major argument of this dissertation is that when examining public opinion on 
military interventions, one should consider the changing dynamics of public support 
across different phases of an intervention.  The direction, significance, and relative 
weight of the factors concerning public support before and/or immediately following an 
intervention may be different than support for the “stay the course” and “withdrawal” 
options that arise once an operation is underway.   
Several scholars point out how actual support for an intervention already in 
progress may be significantly different from the originally expressed support in the pre-
intervention period (see Russett 1990; Russett and Nincic 1976).  A vast body of 
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research confirms that presidents enjoy spikes in their approval ratings right after a high 
profile foreign policy incident, even when public support for initiating that an 
intervention has been low just before the incident takes place (Brody 1991; Brody and 
Shapiro 1989; Jordan and Page 1992; Lian and Oneal 1993; Mueller 1970, 1973; Oneal, 
Lian, and Joyner 1996; Parker 1995).  Scholars refer to this as the “rally-round-the-flag” 
phenomenon that is observed in the starting phase of an intervention.  Once the short-
term rally effects start to abate, other dynamics of public opinion come into play during 
the subsequent courses of intervention.  For instance, in their study on casualty 
sensitivity and the war in Iraq, Gelpi et al. (2005/06) find that the impact of casualties on 
public approval for the president has varied dramatically between the “major combat,” 
“occupation,” and “sovereign Iraq” phases of the war.  They assert that such different 
effects on presidential approval during different phases of the war in Iraq are due to 
substantial differences in public expectations of U.S. success.   
 Given the importance of observing the changing dynamics of public support 
during the course of a military intervention, I divide intervention stages into basic phases 
as I discussed in Chapters III and IV.  The pre-intervention stage/phase 1 is the stage 
when there are considerations of a possible intervention, but the military operation has 
not yet initiated.  The starting stage/phase 2 is the very beginning phase of the 
intervention.  As this stage, the intervention has just started so it is too soon to have 
steady feedback about how well and costly the operation is going.  This phase can also 
be referred as the rally stage of an intervention.  The intervention goes into phase 3 and 
more when structural changes occur in the course of  intervention that lead to changes in 
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costs, utilities, as well as probability of success, and accordingly to changes in the public 
perceptions of the intervention.  As I mentioned, identification of the cut off point for the 
final phase of an intervention is post-hoc.   
 Applying this general rubric to the war in Iraq, I determine five major 
intervention phases: (1) the pre-intervention phase, (2) the starting (rally) phase, (3) the 
major combat phase, (4) the occupation phase, and (5) the sovereign Iraq phase.  The 
pre-intervention phase is the period prior to the launch of the military intervention in 
Iraq on March 19, 2003.  The starting (rally) phase of the intervention begins on March 
19, 2003 with the initiation of the military campaign in Iraq.  Since the rally phase refers 
to a short period of time immediately following an intervention, I assume that this period 
lasted for the first two weeks of the intervention ending in the first week of April.  For 
the identification of the intervention stages that follow the starting (rally) phase, I relied 
on the codings of Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005/06).  Gelpi et al. (2005/06, 17-18) 
divide the military intervention in Iraq into three periods based on media reports drawn 
from the Tyndall Report.
18
  The “major combat phase” of the war covers the initial 
invasion of Iraq, the toppling of the Baath regime, and the movement of coalition forces 
into a position of occupation in Iraq.  The “occupation phase” begins in late May 2003 
and continues until the coalition transferred sovereignty to an Iraqi authority.  With the 
transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi authority in June 2004, the “sovereign Iraq phase” of 
the war starts.  
 
                                                 
18
 See http://www.tyndallreport.com. 
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Research Design 
Studies of public support for military interventions face several data constraints.  
To begin with, the availability and quality of public opinion data regarding military 
interventions varies across both time and space.  As Sullivan (2008) points out, the units 
are sampled rather than fixed, the number of observations per case varies, and the time 
between observations is not constant.  Consequently, this generates serious problems for 
model specifications for conducting cross-sectional time-series analyses of multiple 
interventions.  
The availability and quality of public opinion data for military interventions is 
even more problematic for examining the effects of policy-specific information on 
public support across intervention stages.  Specifically, survey questions that are suitable 
for the measurement of policy/event-specific information are extremely scarce.  Among 
already sparse questions that may be used as proxies of policy-specific information, on 
the other hand, only a very few of them are consistently asked across different time 
points of a military intervention.   
 Another limitation that concerns my study is the lack of panel survey data of 
public opinion on military interventions.  This constitutes a challenge given that one 
major objective of this dissertation is to examine the changes in individuals’ support 
across different stages of an intervention.  As Bartels (1999, 1-2) points out, panel design 
offers more direct evidence of change compared to the primary alternative, the 
longitudinal design, in which the researcher infers change from comparisons of different 
survey respondents at different times rather than from comparisons of the same 
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respondents at different times.  Although I manage to overcome this data deficiency 
problem by conducting panel experiments (see Gartner 2008a), my public opinion 
survey analyses are limited to the examination of non-panel data.      
Data and Research Method 
 
This study analyzes public opinion survey data at the individual level.  A 
majority of the previous work on public support for military interventions has relied 
almost exclusively on periodic aggregations of survey data (Gelpi et al. 2005/06).  In 
particular, most studies of public support for war examine differences in collective 
public support across military interventions, while overlooking the differences among 
individuals within an intervention (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Klarevas 
2002; Larson 1996; Mueller 1973).  Consequently, as Berinsky (2007) points out, 
several existing theories rest on untested notions of collective rationality.  Conducting 
statistical analyses at the individual level enables me to better identify the mechanisms 
by which members of the mass public process information during the course of a 
military intervention.    
 For the analysis of public support for military intervention in Iraq, I compiled a 
dataset that combined five surveys conducted within the specified time frame of five 
intervention phases (the pre-intervention phase, the starting (rally) phase of intervention, 
the major combat phase, the occupation phase, and the sovereign Iraq phase).
19
  I  
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 The survey I used for the pre-intervention phase was conducted on March 4-5, 2003.  For the starting 
(rally) phase of the intervention, I analyzed a survey conducted on April 2-3, 2003.  The survey for the 
major combat phase was conducted on April 30-May 4, 2003.  For the analysis of the occupation phase, I 
extracted the survey conducted between June 19 and July 2, 2003.  Finally, the survey for the sovereign 
Iraq phase was conducted on August 5-10, 2004.     
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gathered the surveys from iPoll archive of the Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research.  I extracted the surveys for the analyses of the pre-intervention phase and the 
starting (rally) phase of the intervention in Iraq from CBS News Polls.  For the analyses 
of the major combat phase, the occupation phase, and the sovereign Iraq phase, I used 
the surveys conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International/ Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press.
20
  In all of the surveys, data was obtained 
via telephone interviews with nationally representative samples.   
 Given the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable (support for the military 
intervention), I employ probit model as my method of analysis.  I use robust standard 
errors to account for any unspecified heteroskedasticity.  I first analyze each survey data 
within its respective intervention phase.  I then conduct an overall analysis of the data 
across five intervention phases by aggregating all surveys into a single dataset.  All 
significance tests employ the more conservative two-tailed tests.  
Dependent Variable 
 
 The dependent variable is the support for the military intervention in Iraq.  
Evidently, the form of support changes as the intervention goes through different phases.  
At the pre-intervention phase, starting (rally) phase, and the major combat phase of the 
intervention, people express their support for taking military action in Iraq.  On the other 
hand, in the occupation and sovereign Iraq phases, people express their support for  
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 I would prefer using the same survey format across all five intervention phases.  That said, the main 
criteria for choosing a survey was whether the time the survey was conducted corresponded to a certain 
intervention phase and whether the survey included the question I used as measure of policy-specific 
information.  CBS News Polls meet these criteria for the first two phases of the intervention whereas 
PSRAI/PEW polls are fitting for the last three intervention phases.   
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sustaining military presence for the rebuilding of Iraq.      
 To construct the support variable, I use the following question for the pre-
intervention phase and the starting (rally) phase of the intervention: “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the United States taking military action against Iraq to try to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power?”  I coded the answer as “1” if the survey respondent 
approved the military action in Iraq and “0” otherwise.   
 In the major combat phase, the survey did not include a direct support question.  
Instead, the participants were asked, “Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or 
the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?”  I use this question as a proxy 
measure of support at the major combat phase.  The survey respondent’s answer is coded 
as “1” if s/he thinks that using military force in Iraq was the right decision and “0” 
otherwise.  Many studies of public support for war use the question on whether going to 
war was the right decision as a proxy measure of support.  Of course, questions that 
directly ask whether the respondent supports the military action are more desirable.  
Nevertheless, availability of data concerning the examination of support across different 
levels of political information and intervention phases obliges me to rely on this proxy 
measure at the major combat phase.  To check for the validity of using this proxy 
measure, I look at the correlation of this proxy support question with the direct support 
question in the surveys conducted at the pre-intervention phase and the starting (rally) 
phase of the intervention.  The correlations are high and statistically significant (.62, p < 
.001 for the pre-intervention phase; .66, p < .001 for the starting (rally) phase of the 
intervention).   
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 For measuring support at the occupation phase, I use the following question: “Do 
you favor or oppose a major American effort to rebuild Iraq and establish a stable 
government there?”  I code the answers in favor of rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq as “1” 
and the ones against maintaining U.S. military presence in Iraq as “0.” A similar 
question on support for continuation of military action in Iraq was posed in the survey 
conducted at the sovereign Iraq phase: “Do you think the U.S. should keep military 
troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the U.S. should bring its 
troops home as soon as possible?”  I give a code of “1” if the respondent prefers to keep 
the troops in Iraq and “0” otherwise.   
Major Independent Variables 
 
Policy-Specific Information 
 As I mentioned, survey questions suitable for measuring policy/event-specific 
information are extremely scarce.  Furthermore, only a very few survey questions that 
can be used as proxies for policy-specific information are consistently asked across 
different time points of a military intervention.  Given these data constraints, I use the 
following question, which was posed in all the surveys conducted within five specified 
phases of the intervention in Iraq in order to construct the variable of policy-specific 
information: “How closely have you been following the news about the situation with 
Iraq -very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all?”  I give a code of “1” 
for the responses “not at all closely”; a code of “2” for “not too closely”; a code of “3” 
for “somewhat closely”; and a code of “4” for “very closely.”  Accordingly, I construct 
an ordinal measure of policy-specific information that ranges from 1 to 4.   
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 Evidently, this indicator is not a strong proxy measure for policy-specific 
information (see Price and Zaller 1993; Zaller 1992).  One should acknowledge that 
paying attention to news related to the intervention in Iraq does not necessarily translate 
to genuine knowledge of policy implications of military intervention in Iraq.  That said, 
it is safe to argue that the mass media is the primary way people obtain information 
about politics (see Barabas and Jerit 2009; Graber 2001, 2002; Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 
2006; Kahn and Kenney 2002; Patterson 2002; Zaller 2003).  Some scholars find that 
political knowledge, political interest, and media exposure have fairly similar effects as 
proxies for political awareness/information (see, for example, Gabel and Scheve 2007; 
Krosnick and Brannon 1993).  As Barabas and Jerit (2009, 73) show, “the volume, 
breadth, and prominence of news media coverage increase policy-specific knowledge 
above and beyond common demographic factors.
21
  
General Political Information  
 To measure general political information, most studies use indicators such as 
factual test items, self-descriptions, interviewer evaluations of the respondents, one’s 
attitudinal consistency across policy issues, or proxy indicators such as levels of formal 
education.  Although far from perfect, numerous studies find education significantly 
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 Several studies find that different forms of media exposure (such as television versus newspapers or the 
Internet) may lead to variations in the level of political information (see Beck, Dalton, Greene, and 
Huckfeldt 2002; Nafziger, Engstrom, and MacLean 1951).  Furthermore, an individual’s primary source of 
news may affect the valence of political information s/he obtains from that news outlet, and in turn, her/his 
policy preferences (see, for example, Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003/04).  To put it differently, the makeup 
of political information and the level of support for war in Iraq for a person watching Fox news may be 
different than a person watching CNN as the primary news source.  This is mostly due to variations among 
different media outlets in terms of offering diverse policy perspectives.  Based on these considerations, it 
would be ideal to add control variables for the forms and sources of media exposure to the statistical 
models.  Unfortunately, the surveys I used for my analyses of military intervention in Iraq do not allow for 
such controls. 
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correlated with political information and, therefore, employ it for their statistical 
analyses (e.g., Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Converse 1964; Krause 1997).  Following this 
latter practice, I use the survey respondent’s education level as an ordinal proxy measure 
of general political information.  Specifically, I use the generic question “What was the 
last grade in school you completed?”  I code the level of education as “1” if the 
respondent is not a high school graduate, “2” if s/he graduated from high school, “3” if 
s/he attended some college, “4” if s/he is a college graduate, and “5” if s/he has post-
graduate work or degree.   
Control Variables 
 
Presidential Approval 
 Several scholars suggest that an individual is more likely to support military 
actions if s/he endorses the president (e.g., Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003/04).  
Accordingly, I include “presidential approval” variable to my analytical models to 
control for the respondents’ attitude toward the president.  To construct this variable, I 
use the following generic question “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George 
W. Bush is handling his job as President?”  I code the respondent’s answer as “1” if s/he 
expresses approval for the president and “0” otherwise.   
Ideology 
 Several scholars find evidence that individuals use political ideology as a 
heuristic tool for deriving their policy stances on specific policy issues (e.g., Hinich and 
Munger 1994).  Studies show that conservatives are generally more “hawkish” and, 
therefore, more likely to favor increased military spending and use of military force 
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compared to liberals who generally possess more “dovish” political attitudes and foreign 
policy preferences (see Eichenberg 1989; Foster and Palmer 2006; Klingemann, 
Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).  To illustrate, Rohall, Ender, and Matthews (2006) find 
that conservatives are overall more supportive of going to war in Afghanistan and Iraq 
than liberals and moderates.  To construct the “ideology” variable, I use the following 
question: “How would you describe your views on most political matters? Generally do 
you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or conservative?”  The responses “liberal” are 
coded as “1”, “moderate” as “2”, and “conservative” as “3.” 
Party Identification  
 A president’s decision for military intervention is more likely to draw a higher 
level of support among her/his fellow partisans compared to the members of the 
opposition party and Independents (see Baum 2002; Gartner 2008b; Kernell and Hibbs 
1981).  Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, and Verkuilen (2007) argue that individuals, 
in seeking to support their own party leaders, use partisan interpretations of factual 
information to rationalize their existing opinions as the intervention conditions change.  
Accordingly, I anticipate that Republicans have greater support for the military 
intervention in Iraq than the Democrats and the Independents.  I use the question, 
“Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what?” to construct “party identification” variable.  If the respondent is a 
Democrat, a code of “1” is given.  The Independents are coded as “2.”  Finally, the 
Republicans are coded as “3.” 
 
  
95 
Perceived Success 
 Several scholars argue that public support for military interventions is 
conditional on beliefs about how likely the military intervention is to be successful 
(Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi et al. 2005/06).  For the pre-
intervention phase, I use the following question to measure perceptions of success: “If 
the United States does get militarily involved in Iraq, which of the following would be 
the more likely: a fairly quick and successful effort, or a long and costly involvement?”  
In the starting (rally) phase of the intervention, the question’s wording slightly changes: 
“Regarding the war with Iraq, which of the following do you think is the most likely: a 
fairly quick and successful effort, or a long and costly involvement?”   I give a code of 
“1” if the respondent’s answer was “quick/successful effort” and “0” otherwise.  For the 
occupation phase and the sovereign Iraq phase of the intervention, I use the following 
question to measure perceptions of success: “How well is the U.S. military effort in Iraq 
going?”  I construct an ordinal variable by coding the answer “not at all well” as “1”, 
“not too well” as “2”, “fairly well” as “3”, and finally “very well” as “4.”
22
  
Utility 
 Scholars suggest that individuals decide on their support for (or opposition to) 
initiating and sustaining a military intervention based on a rational expected utility, 
cost/benefit calculation (Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gartner 2008a; 
Gartner and Segura 1998, 2005; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Larson and  
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 Unfortunately, the survey for the major combat phase did not include any question that could be used as 
a measure of perceived success.  
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Savych 2005).  The surveys conducted in the pre-intervention phase and starting (rally) 
phase of the intervention in Iraq include a question that enables me to control for this 
factor for the first two phases: “Do you think removing Saddam Hussein from power is 
worth the potential loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not?”  I 
construct a dummy “utility” variable, where positive responses to this question are coded 
as “1” and “0” otherwise.   
Socio-Demographic Controls 
 
Gender 
 Several scholars suggest that gender is an important factor to consider when 
examining public support for military interventions (see Eichenberg 2003; Fite, Genest, 
and Wilcox 1990; Conover and Sapiro 1993; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Smith 1984).  
Overall, women are found to be less supportive of the use of military force, and more 
sensitive to humanitarian concerns and casualties.  One theory of gender differences in 
support for military action suggests that because women play a unique role in human 
reproduction, they are less likely to support policies that lead to the loss of life.  Another 
explanation is that different patterns of socialization lead to differences in social and 
political values; men are raised to be more aggressive than women.  One other argument 
is that because women are generally less affluent than men, they may perceive execution 
of a costly military policy as a potential competitor for funds needed for social programs 
(Wilcox, Ferrara, and Allsop 1993).  Accordingly, I control for gender in my models.  I 
give a code of “1” if the respondent is male and “2” if female.   
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Race 
 Racial differences in support for war was one of the central concerns of the 
Vietnam-era research on public opinion (e.g., Converse and Schuman 1970; Cramer and 
Schuman 1975; Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse 1970; Wright 1972).  This area of 
study has produced consistent findings with regards to race; support for Vietnam War 
was stronger among whites.  Continuing this line of research on group differences, 
Wilcox, Ferrara, and Allsop (1993) find that whites are generally more supportive than 
other races for military action in the Persian Gulf.  In addition, Burris (2008) finds that 
racial differences are among the strongest divisions in public attitudes towards the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, with whites indicating stronger support for 
military action than nonwhites (see also Gartner 2008b; Gartner and Segura 2000).  
Some scholars attribute this racial gap in support for the use of force to the 
disproportionate number of casualties that military actions generally impose upon 
nonwhites, whereas others interpret it as an indicator of alienation.  To control for this 
factor, I construct a dichotomous “race” variable.  White respondents are coded as “1” 
and respondents that belong to other race categories are coded as “2.”    
Age 
 Several studies find greater support for military interventions among younger 
generations (see Erskine 1970; Hamilton 1968; Mueller 1971; Wright 1972).  Lunch and 
Sperlich (1979, cited in Burris 2008, 445) attribute this pattern to several factors such as 
(1) the greater experience of older generations with the horrors of war, (2) the closer 
proximity of younger people to the patriotic indoctrination in schools, (3) the weaker 
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ideological and party attachment among younger people that may mitigate the impact of 
wartime propaganda, and (4) the propensity of younger people, who are most exposed to 
the adversities of war, to avoid cognitive dissonance by embracing opinions that justify 
such adversities.  That said, Burris (2008) finds a relative decline in militaristic 
sentiment within the younger age groups.  To control for this factor, I include a 
continuous age variable in my models that range from 18 to 97.   
Income 
 Early studies of group differences in public opinion on military interventions find 
stronger support among the more affluent segments of the public (Converse and 
Schuman 1970; Hamilton 1968; Patchen 1970).  Similar to these earlier findings, Burris 
(2008) concludes that higher levels of income tend to be associated with higher levels of 
support for military action in Iraq.  Several scholars attribute this positive association 
between income and support for military interventions to stronger integration of high-
income groups into the mainstream political culture and closer identification with the 
appeals of the government.  In my analytical models, I measure family income as an 
ordinal measure with slight categorical variations from one survey to the next.     
Results 
Probit analyses of support for military intervention in Iraq at each intervention 
phase and across all five phases are generally in line with my expectations.  The results 
show that higher levels of policy-specific information lead to lower likelihood of support 
for war in Iraq at the pre-intervention phase and the starting (rally) phase of the 
intervention.  As the intervention proceeds to “major combat”, “occupation”, and 
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“sovereign Iraq” phases, the effect of policy-specific information changes its direction 
and becomes positive.  Specifically, once the starting (rally) stage of intervention is over, 
the probability to support the military efforts in Iraq increases as the level of policy-
specific information increases.    
The overall analysis of the data across all five intervention phases points to a 
significant interaction between policy-specific information and intervention stages.  
Specifically, the probability of support for intervention is significantly different between 
individuals with high policy-specific information and the ones with low policy-specific 
information at the occupation phase and the sovereign Iraq phase.  At these intervention 
stages, one observes a more stable and higher probability of support for military 
intervention in Iraq among highly informed individuals compared to the steadily 
declining and lower probability of support among the politically uninformed.        
Pre-Intervention Phase  
 
Several scholars suggest that fully-informed opinion on foreign policy issues 
tends to be relatively more dovish than less informed opinion (see, for example, Althaus 
1998).  As Jaros, Sigelman, and Conover (1982, 152) argue, the tendency of politically 
uninformed individuals to support military policies is not because of their direct 
preference for aggressive policy options, but because of their limited consideration of 
other alternatives to military solutions in a foreign-policy crisis.   
As discussed in Chapter III, I expect that factors related to future prospects of an 
intervention are likely to have more weight for the politically informed whereas factors 
related to the past and current state of an intervention will have more influence on 
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support decisions of the politically uninformed.  Since the number of expected casualties 
in an intervention is a reflection of future performance of an intervention, the politically 
informed individuals are likely to place more weight on expected casualties as a 
reflection of their prospective thinking.  In comparison, the number of actual casualties 
is likely to weigh more in the cost/benefit calculations of politically uninformed 
individuals given their proclivity to retrospective evaluations.  Accordingly, in 
Hypothesis 3, I propose that support of the politically uninformed is likely to be higher 
than that of politically informed individuals in the absence of actual casualties.  Given 
that U.S. casualties had not occurred until March 20, 2003, the analysis of the pre-
intervention phase of war in Iraq is a test of Hypothesis 3.     
Table 13 presents the coefficients, standard errors, and the changes in the 
predicted probabilities of the probit analysis of support for military intervention in Iraq 
at the pre-intervention phase.  The results demonstrate that the level of policy-specific 
information indicates a statistically significant and negative impact on the likelihood to 
support the initiation of the military intervention in Iraq (p < .01).  Specifically, the 
results show that the predicted probability to support military intervention decreases by 
24% as the level of policy-specific information goes from its minimum to its maximum 
value (1 to 4), thus illustrating the substantive significance of the relationship.  This 
finding is in line with my expectations, particularly with regards to Hypothesis 3, as well 
as with the results of the experimental analysis presented in Chapter IV.  On the other 
hand, education does not demonstrate a significant effect on the probability of support 
for military intervention at the pre-intervention phase.      
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Regarding the control variables, the results are consistent with the public opinion 
literature.  The support for the initiation of military intervention in Iraq is significantly 
more likely when the respondent is expecting the intervention to be successful (p < 
.001).  The variable “utility” also has a statistical significant and positive impact on the 
probability of support for military intervention (p < .001).  Thus, when the respondent 
sees taking military action in Iraq is worth the potential casualties and other costs, s/he is 
more likely to support the war.  In addition, having a conservative ideology increases the 
probability of support for military intervention as expected (p < .05).  The likelihood of 
support for intervention also increases if the respondent expresses approval for the 
president, although the level of statistical significance is not high for this factor at the 
pre-intervention phase (p < .1).  Finally, none of the social-demographic controls (age, 
gender, race, and income) demonstrate statistically significant effect at the pre-
intervention phase.      
The Starting (Rally) Phase  
In Hypothesis 1 presented in Chapter III, I propose that politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to show higher levels of support for a military intervention than 
politically informed ones at the starting stage (phase 2) of that intervention.  Table 14 
presents the results of the analysis regarding the probability of support for military 
intervention in Iraq at the starting (rally) phase of the intervention.  The results show that 
policy-specific information has a significant and negative impact on the likelihood of 
support at the starting (rally) stage, similar to the results of the pre-intervention stage (p 
< .01).  Specifically, one observes an 8% decrease in the predicted probability of support 
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for war in Iraq as the values of the policy-specific information increase from minimum 
to the maximum level.  This finding thus corroborates Hypothesis 1.  On the other hand, 
the coefficient of education does not demonstrate statistical significance at this stage as 
in the pre-intervention stage.          
Regarding the effects of the control variables, the results are generally consistent 
with the analysis of the pre-intervention phase.  The variable “utility” is still highly 
significant and positive at the starting (rally) phase of the intervention (p < .001).  As the 
respondents perceive the utility of the intervention higher than the costs, they are 
significantly more likely to support the war efforts.  The “perceived success” variable 
still demonstrates a positive impact on support for the military intervention, albeit with a 
lower level of statistical significance than the pre-intervention phase (p < .1).  On the 
other hand, the positive effect of the variable “presidential approval” is highly significant 
at this stage of the intervention (p < .001).  Different from the results of the pre-
intervention phase, ideology does not demonstrate statistical significance whereas 
partisanship is statistically significant at the starting (rally) phase: the Republicans are 
more likely to support war in Iraq than the Democrats and the Independents as expected 
(p < .001).  As in the analysis of the pre-intervention phase, the effects of the social-
demographic control variables (age, gender, race, and income) do not demonstrate 
statistical significance at the starting (rally) phase of the intervention.      
Major Combat Phase 
 Based on my expectations of prospective versus retrospective evaluations of 
expected and actual costs among the politically informed and uninformed that I 
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discussed in Chapter III, I expect the politically uninformed to have lower tolerance for 
actual casualties.  Consequently, I anticipate that the politically uninformed will 
overstate the expected costs, understate the utility of the intervention, and have lower 
expectations of success compared to the politically informed individuals once actual 
casualties occur.  Accordingly, in Hypothesis 4, I propose that in the presence of actual 
casualties, support of the politically uninformed in the subsequent stages of a military 
intervention is likely to be lower than that of politically informed individuals.  In the 
major combat phase of the intervention in Iraq, the U.S. began to suffer significant 
number of casualties.  At the time that the survey used for the analysis of this 
intervention stage was completed (May 4, 2003), the number of casualties had reached 
140.
23
  Therefore, the analyses of the major combat phase, the occupation phase, and the 
sovereign Iraq phase of the intervention are tests of Hypothesis 4.    
Table 15 presents the results of the probit analysis of support for military 
intervention in Iraq at the major combat phase.  Unlike the pre-intervention phase and 
the starting (rally) phase of the intervention, the effect of policy-specific information on 
the probability of support for intervention is positive at the major combat phase (p < 
.05).  As the level of policy-specific information increases from its minimum to 
maximum value, the probability of support for war in Iraq increases by 33%.  Therefore, 
this finding provides support for Hypothesis 4.  Education also demonstrates a 
statistically significant impact at the major combat phase (p < .01).  Interestingly, 
education has the opposite effect of policy-specific information at this stage.  
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 See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm. 
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Specifically, the probability of support for war decreases as the level of education 
increases.  This finding is not in the expected direction and thus requires further 
investigation.          
 As in the analysis of the starting (rally) phase of the intervention, the effect of 
presidential approval is highly significant and positive in the major combat phase (p < 
.001).  Unlike the first two phases, ideology does not have a significant impact on the 
probability of support for war at this phase.  That said, party identification is significant 
in the expected direction; the Republicans are more likely to support war in Iraq than the 
Democrats and the Independents (p < .05).  Similar to the previous analyses, the effects 
of the social-demographic control variables (age, gender, race, and income) do not 
demonstrate statistical significance at the major combat phase of the intervention.
24
   
Occupation Phase  
 Table 16 presents the results of the probit analysis of support for military 
intervention in Iraq at the occupation phase.  Similar to the analysis of the major combat 
phase and unlike the pre-intervention phase and the starting (rally) phase of the 
intervention, the effect of policy-specific information on the probability of support for 
intervention is positive at the occupation phase (p < .001).  Specifically, the probability 
of support for sustaining the military intervention in Iraq increases by 24% as the level 
of policy-specific information increases from its minimum to maximum value.  Thus, the 
results corroborate Hypothesis 4, which predicts that politically uninformed individuals 
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 Unfortunately, the survey conducted in the major combat phase does not include questions for 
measuring “utility” and “perceived success.”  Consequently, I could not control for these factors in the 
analysis of this phase of the intervention.      
  
105 
are less likely to support a military intervention compared to the politically informed in 
the presence of actual casualties.
25
  As in the first two stages of the intervention, 
education does not demonstrate statistically significant impact on the probability of 
support for war at the occupation phase.   
 As in the analyses of the first three phases of the intervention, the respondents 
who approve the president are more likely to support the continuation of the military 
intervention in Iraq (p < .001).  In addition, the variable “perceived success” has a 
significant and positive effect on the probability of support for the military intervention 
similar to the pre-intervention phase and the starting (rally) phase of the intervention.  
Specifically, the respondent is more likely to support the continuation of military efforts 
in Iraq if s/he believes that the intervention is going successful.  Unlike the major 
combat phase, party identification does not show a significant impact on the probability 
of support for war at this phase.  That said, the effect of ideology is on the verge of 
statistical significance and in the expected direction; conservatives are more likely to 
support sustaining the military efforts in Iraq than moderates and liberals (p < .1).  
Similar to the previous analyses, the effects of the social-demographic control variables 
(age, gender, race, and income) are not statistically significant at the occupation phase of 
the intervention.
26
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 At the time that the survey used for the analysis of this intervention stage was completed (July 2, 2003), 
the number of casualties had reached 208.   
See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm. 
26
 Because the survey conducted in occupation phase does not include a measure of “utility,” I do not 
control for this factor in the analysis of this intervention stage.      
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Sovereign Iraq Phase  
 Table 17 presents the results of the probit analysis of support for military 
intervention at the sovereign Iraq phase.  Similar to the analysis of the major combat and 
occupation phases and contrary to the pre-intervention and the starting (rally) phases, the 
effect of policy-specific information on the probability of support for intervention is 
positive at the sovereign Iraq phase (p < .05).  Specifically, the probability of support for 
sustaining the military intervention in Iraq increases by 24% as the level of policy-
specific information increases from its minimum to maximum value.  The results thus 
corroborate Hypothesis 4, which predicts a higher level of support for a military 
intervention among politically informed individuals compared to the less informed in the 
presence of actual casualties.
27
  In addition, education also has a statistically significant 
and positive impact on the probability of support for sustaining the military intervention 
at the sovereign Iraq phase (p < .001).   
 As in the previous analyses, the respondents who approve the president are more 
likely to support the continuation of the military intervention in Iraq (p < .01).  Once 
again, the probability of support for sustaining the intervention is higher among the 
respondents who perceive the intervention as a successful venture (p < .001).  Neither 
party identification nor ideological orientation demonstrates significant impact on the 
probability of support for war at this phase of the intervention.  Age is on the verge of 
statistical significance at the sovereign Iraq phase (p < .1).  Specifically, older 
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 At the time that the survey used for the analysis of this intervention stage was completed (August 10, 
2004), the number of casualties had reached 925.   
See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm. 
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respondents tend to support continued military presence for rebuilding Iraq more than 
younger respondents.  This is in line with recent studies that find a relative decline in 
militaristic sentiment within the younger age groups (see Burris 2008).  Similar to the 
previous analyses, on the other hand, the effects of other social-demographic control 
variables (gender, race, and income) are not statistically significant at the sovereign Iraq 
phase.
28
   
Public Support across All Intervention Phases 
Table 18 below presents the analysis of support for the military intervention in 
Iraq across all intervention phases.  In this analysis, I introduce the interaction of policy-
specific information and intervention phases.
29
  The results demonstrate that as the 
number of intervention stages increase, the probability of support for the military 
intervention decreases (p < .001).  This finding is in line with previous research, which 
suggests that the public may perceive the length of an intervention as a sign of the 
progress of the military campaign and may become less optimistic about the eventual 
success of the intervention as duration gets longer (see Sullivan 2008; Voeten and 
Brewer 2006).  The level of policy-specific information, on the other hand, has a 
negative impact on the overall probability of success when data of all intervention 
phases are aggregated (p < .1).  This is in line with the findings of the experimental 
analysis, which shows a lower mean of support for intervention among individuals with  
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 Because the survey conducted in sovereign Iraq phase does not include a measure of “utility,” I do not 
control for this factor in the analysis of this intervention stage.      
29
 Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder’s (2006) advice, I incorporate the constitutive terms of the 
interactive variable to the analytical model in order to avoid biased estimates and omitted variable bias 
(see also Braumoeller 2004; Kam and Franzese 2007).   
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ad hoc information than the control group across four experimental intervention stages.  
Similar to policy-specific information, education has a negative effect on the probability 
of support for the military intervention (p < .05).      
The interaction of policy-specific information with intervention stages is 
statistically significant with a positive coefficient (p < .001).  For the observation and 
interpretation of the interaction effect, I generate a graph using the “Clarify” program in 
Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001; see also King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).
30
  
Figure 16 shows the change in the predicted probability of support for military 
intervention with two scenarios—one with policy-specific information is set to low 
(level 1) and one with policy-specific information is set to high (level 4) across five 
specified phases of the intervention.   
The graph illustrates that the probability of support for military intervention 
across stages 1 through 5 steadily declines when policy-specific information is low.  In 
comparison, the probability of support among respondents with high policy-specific 
information shows less change across different intervention stages.  That said, for stage 1 
and stage 2 (the pre-intervention phase and the starting (rally) phase of the intervention), 
the interaction between the stages and the level of policy-specific information does not 
demonstrate statistical significance regarding the probability of support for military 
intervention.  This finding does not corroborate Hypothesis 2, which proposes that going  
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 Clarify estimates 1000 parameters from the analytical model for each interaction scenario while the 
control variables are held at either their mean or another plausible or intuitive value.  Simulated quantities 
of interest are then estimated for a specified level of increase for the relevant variables from the 5
th
 
percentile to the 95
th
 percentile.  This provides the change in the predicted probability of support for 
military intervention at the 95% confidence interval for each level of the variables of interest.   
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from the pre-intervention stage (phase 1) to the starting stage (phase 2) of a military 
intervention, politically uninformed individuals are likely to show a higher rate of 
increase in support for that intervention than politically informed ones.   
The difference in the probability of support between low policy-specific 
information and high policy-specific information starts bordering on statistical 
significance at stage 3 (the major combat phase).  That said, the probability of support 
for military intervention among respondents with low policy-specific information is 
significantly different from those with high policy-specific information at intervention 
stages four and five (i.e., at the occupation phase and the sovereign Iraq phase).  
Specifically, the probability of support is significantly higher among respondents with 
high policy-specific information than the ones with low policy-specific information at 
stage four and stage five.  Given that the occupation phase and the sovereign Iraq phase 
are the stages where the U.S. military suffered significant number of casualties, the 
results corroborate Hypothesis 4 that in the presence of actual casualties, support of the 
politically uninformed in the subsequent stages of a military intervention is likely to be 
lower than that of politically informed individuals.  In addition, the graph illustrates a 
significant drop in the probability of support among politically uninformed individuals, 
whereas the likelihood of support among politically informed individuals is stable across 
stage 4 and stage 5.  Accordingly, these results also provide support for Hypothesis 5, 
which proposes that in the presence of actual casualties, the politically uninformed are 
likely to show higher rates of decrease in support for a military intervention than 
politically informed individuals in the subsequent stages of that intervention.   
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Regarding the control variables, the results are consistent with the literature on 
public support for military interventions and generally with the findings of the analyses 
at each intervention stage.  To start with, “presidential approval” has a highly significant 
and positive effect on the likelihood of supporting the intervention in Iraq (p < .001).  , 
Partisanship is also significant in the expected direction: the Republicans are more likely 
to support war in Iraq than the Democrats and the Independents (p < .001).  However, 
the “ideology” variable does not demonstrate statistical significance in the overall 
analysis of support for intervention.  Different from the analyses conducted at each 
intervention stage, gender has a statistically significant effect when data across all 
intervention stages is aggregated (p < .01).  Specifically, women are less supportive of 
the military intervention in Iraq, which is in line with the findings of previous research 
on gender gap in support for war.  In addition, race is statistically significant with a 
negative coefficient sign indicating less support for intervention among nonwhites as 
studies on racial differences suggest (p < .001). 
 For robustness checks, I analyzed the survey data using two other methods of 
analyses—ANOVA and logistic regression—in addition to the probit model.  I also used 
alternative codings of the major independent variable, political information, as part of 
my sensitivity analyses.  Specifically, I reran the analyses using dichotomous and three-
level ordinal measures of political information.  In addition, I analyzed the data with 
alternative model specifications by excluding several control variables.  Overall, the 
results are consistent across different methods of analyses, alternative categorizations of 
political information, and alternative model specifications.              
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As a final note, one may expect a high level of correlation between education and 
policy-specific information variables.  This possibility raises concerns regarding the 
issue of multicollinearity.  One way to detect whether the sample suffers from a 
multicollinearity problem is to check if pair-wise correlations among the explanatory 
variables are extremely high, say, in excess of .8 (Gujarati 2003).  The correlation 
between education and policy-specific information variables is below .2 across all 
models.  The pair-wise correlations among other explanatory variables are also generally 
low.
31
  As an alternative method to detect multicollinearity in the data, I reassess each of 
the models with variance inflation factors (VIF).  Overall, the mean VIF values in all 
analytical models are less than 2.5 and is thus well below the VIF value of 10, which 
scholars consider to be the excess point.  Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to 
be a problem in the analysis.
32
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 Unsurprisingly, the correlation between ideology and party identification is moderately high, yet it does 
not exceed .45 in none of the models.   
32
 One should acknowledge that analysis of individual responses in a specific survey may entail 
endogeneity problems.  One major source of endogeneity is the possibility of simultaneous/reciprocal 
causality where the causal relationships may run in both directions: from the regressor(s) to the dependent 
variable and from the dependent variable to the regressor(s).  In my analyses, I examine the effects of 
political information and several other factors on public support.  Nevertheless, support for military 
intervention in Iraq may also stimulate one to follow the news about Iraq, increase approval of the 
president, and/or affect perceptions of success, utility, and cost of the intervention.   
 One common strategy to address endogeneity concerns is to use instrumental variables methods.  
That said, the difficulty of knowing or demonstrating that a potential instrument is really exogenous is 
widely acknowledged (see Bartels 1991b).  Furthermore, as Johnston (1972, 280-81) aptly puts it, the real 
difficulty is actually finding variables to play the role of instruments.  Using instruments that are not 
highly exogenous, that are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors, and/or that are 
employed in finite samples in fact create serious estimation problems rather than alleviate the endogeneity 
issues.  As for this study, finding instruments for the potentially endogenous independent variables in my 
models is unfortunately not viable.   
 Another strategy to solve endogeneity problems due to ambiguity about the direction of causality 
is to employ time-series analyses.  But, as Gabel and Scheve (2007) point out, time-series analyses may 
fall short of accounting for time-varying omitted factors that affect both the endogenous regressor and the 
dependent variable.  More importantly, time-series analyses are not always feasible for certain research 
topics due to the limited availability and quality of time-series data, which is the case for this study.     
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Summary 
 In this chapter, I analyze public support for military intervention in Iraq across 
five intervention phases—the pre-intervention phase, the starting (rally) phase of the 
intervention, the major combat phase, the occupation phase, and the sovereign Iraq 
phase.  The findings of my probit analyses at each intervention stage and across all 
stages are generally in line with my hypotheses.   
 The results show that as the level of policy-specific information increases, the 
likelihood of support for war in Iraq decreases at the pre-intervention phase.  This 
finding is in line with Hypothesis 3, which proposes that support of the politically 
informed is likely to be lower than that of politically uninformed individuals before 
actual casualties occur.  Similar to the pre-intervention phase, the level of policy-specific 
information has a significant and negative effect at the starting (rally) phase of the 
intervention.  This finding provides support for Hypotheses 1, which proposes that 
politically uninformed individuals are likely to show higher levels of support than 
politically informed ones at the starting stage (phase 2) of an intervention.   
 At the major combat, occupation, and sovereign Iraq phases, on the other hand, 
the effect of policy-specific information changes its direction and becomes positive.  In 
other words, the probability to support the military efforts in Iraq increases as the level 
of policy-specific information increases beginning from the major combat phase.  
                                                                                                                                                
 One other strategy to deal with endogeneity concerns due to potential reciprocal causality is to 
conduct randomized controlled experiments, which ensure that the direction of causality is as suggested.  
This dissertation makes use of experimentation as part of a multi-method approach.  Therefore, although I 
am constraint by data and analytical limitations to address fully the endogeneity issue in my survey data 
analyses, I manage to demonstrate the exogenous effect of political information on public support for 
military intervention via the use of laboratory experiments.   
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Therefore, the results corroborate Hypothesis 4, which predicts a higher level of support 
for a military intervention among politically informed individuals compared to the less 
informed in the presence of actual casualties.   
In addition to the analyses conducted at each intervention stage, I also run a 
probit model using data across all intervention stages.  The main purpose of this general 
analysis is to examine the interaction between policy-specific information and 
intervention stages.  The results show that the probability of support for intervention 
among individuals with high policy-specific information is significantly different from 
those with low policy-specific information at the occupation phase and sovereign Iraq 
phase.  Specifically, there is a more stable and higher probability of support among 
highly informed individuals compared to the steadily declining and lower probability of 
support among the politically uninformed individuals at the occupation phase and 
sovereign Iraq phase.  This finding corroborates Hypothesis 5, which proposes that in the 
presence of actual casualties, the politically uninformed are likely to show higher rates 
of decrease in support for a military intervention than politically informed individuals in 
the subsequent stages of that intervention.  On the other hand, the findings do not 
indicate support for Hypothesis 2, which suggests that going from the pre-intervention 
stage (phase 1) to the starting stage (phase 2) of a military intervention, politically 
uninformed individuals are likely to show a higher rate of increase in support for that 
intervention compared to politically informed ones.
33
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 Here, a brief discussion of media exposure and coverage is warranted.  One may argue that the different 
effects of policy-specific information on public support for war in Iraq across intervention stages might be 
due to (1) changes in the level of media attention to war in Iraq, as well as (2) changes in the level of the 
public’s attention to the news about Iraq over the course of the intervention.  Concerning the level of 
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 In the final chapter, I discuss the links between the experimental findings 
presented in Chapter IV and the findings of the analyses of public opinion survey data on 
military intervention in Iraq.  I also talk about future avenues of research regarding 
public support for military interventions across levels of political information and phases 
of intervention.  After a brief overview of the major objectives and findings of this 
dissertation, I offer a conclusion.  
                                                                                                                                                
media attention, both combat in Iraq and the post-war reconstruction of Iraq are among the most covered 
stories on the major network television news broadcasts in 2003 and 2004 (see Gelpi et al. 2005/06).  With 
regards to the public’s attention to news about Iraq, looking at the descriptive statistics on the percentage 
distribution of observations at each level of policy-specific knowledge (1-4) demonstrate similar patterns 
across stages of military intervention in Iraq.  
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Scholars widely acknowledge that democratic political leaders seek public 
support for their policy endeavors, particularly when conducting costly policies as in the 
case of military interventions.  A deeper understanding of the factors that affect public 
support for military interventions is crucial to explaining more definitively the 
determinants of foreign policy decisions regarding military interventions.  Most studies 
in this area of research examine the public as an undifferentiated mass that reacts 
uniformly to changes in the course of an intervention.  In reality, the mass public is 
divided across different levels of political information, which leads to differences in 
perceptions of and attitudes about political events.  In addition, scholars often overlook 
the varying dynamics of public support across different phases of a military intervention.  
However, the direction, significance, and relative weight of the factors concerning public 
support immediately following an intervention may be different than support for the 
“stay the course” and “withdrawal” options that arise once an operation is underway.   
 To remedy these shortcomings, this dissertation has examined public support as a 
function of political information levels and intervention phases by using a multi-method 
approach that combines an expected utility framework, experimentation, and statistical 
analyses of public opinion survey data.  In this final chapter, I first discuss the links 
between the experimental findings and the findings of the survey data analyses.  I then 
reflect on the theoretical and methodological implications of the study.  I conclude by 
suggesting some future avenues of research.     
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Links between Experimental Findings and Findings of the Survey Data Analyses 
 The major objective of this dissertation is to examine public support for military 
interventions across levels of political information and phases of intervention.  Pursuing 
a multi-method strategy, I conduct two experiments designed around a hypothetical 
military intervention and statistical analyses using actual public opinion surveys on 
military intervention in Iraq.  Table 19 summarizes the results of the experiments and 
survey data analyses regarding the effect of political information on public support for 
military intervention across intervention phases.    
 As discussed in the previous chapters, I divide intervention stages into basic 
phases to investigate the changing dynamics of public support during the course of a 
military intervention.  The pre-intervention stage/phase 1 refers to the period before the 
initiation of the intervention.  The starting stage/phase 2 is the early phase of the 
intervention, which can also be referred as the rally phase.  As this stage, it is too soon to 
have steady feedback about how well and costly the operation is going.  The intervention 
goes into phase 3 and more when structural changes occur in the course of  intervention 
that lead to changes in costs, utilities, and the likelihood of success, and accordingly to 
changes in the public perceptions of the intervention.  Following this general rubric, the 
experiments exposed the participants to an intervention scenario presented as a sequence 
of four basic intervention phases—the pre-intervention phase, the starting (rally) phase 
of the intervention, phase 3, and phase 4.  On a parallel basis, I analyzed public support 
for military intervention in Iraq using surveys conducted across five intervention 
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phases—the pre-intervention phase, the starting (rally) phase of the intervention, the 
major combat phase, the occupation phase, and the sovereign Iraq phase.   
To examine the effect of political information on public support for military 
interventions, in the experiments, one-half of the participants were given a 45-minute 
lecture on ethnic conflict and military interventions as the manipulation of ad hoc 
political information before their exposure to the experimental scenarios.  To measure 
the participants’ level of general political information, I administered a conventional 
factual political information test at the end of the experiments.  In comparison, for my 
survey data analyses of public support for intervention in Iraq, I construct the variable of 
policy-specific information by using a survey question that asks the respondents how 
closely they have been following the news about the situation with Iraq.  In addition, I 
use education in my survey data analyses as the proxy measure of general political 
information following a common practice in public opinion research.   
I observe significant links between the findings of experimental analyses and 
survey data analyses.  To start with, the experimental findings indicate that individuals 
with ad hoc political information express lower levels of support for the military 
intervention than the ones that did not receive the ad hoc information treatment at the 
pre-intervention phase and the starting (rally) phase of the hypothetical intervention.  
Similarly, the results of the survey data analyses show that as the level of policy-specific 
information increases, the likelihood of support for war in Iraq decreases at the pre-
intervention phase and at the starting (rally) phase of the intervention in Iraq.  These 
findings corroborate Hypotheses 1, which proposes that politically uninformed 
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individuals are likely to show higher levels of support than the politically informed ones 
at the starting stage (phase 2) of an intervention.   
Regarding the change in support going from phase 1 to phase 2 of an 
intervention, the results of the experimental analyses demonstrate that compared to the 
expressed level of support at the pre-intervention stage, the group without ad hoc 
political information shows higher levels of increase in support for the intervention than 
the ad hoc information treatment group at the starting (rally) stage.  This finding 
substantiates Hypothesis 2.  That said, analyses of the survey data on intervention in Iraq 
do not lead to a similar finding.  Although the level of support for military intervention 
in Iraq is higher among individuals with low policy-specific information, there is no 
statistically significant difference in the amount of change in support between the 
politically informed and uninformed going from the pre-intervention phase to the 
starting (rally) phase of the military intervention in Iraq.        
There may be several reasons for this discrepancy between the experimental 
findings and the results of the survey analyses regarding the amount of increase in 
support across political information levels at the starting (rally) phase.  One possible 
explanation is that the principal policy objective of the hypothetical intervention scenario 
in the experiments is different from the principal policy objective of the intervention in 
Iraq.
34
  The principal policy objective of the hypothetical intervention scenario is to stop 
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 As mentioned, some scholars suggest that public support varies as a function of the “principal policy 
objectives” of a military intervention (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; see also Eichenberg 
2005).  The first type of objective is called the “foreign policy restraint,” which entails military 
interventions against an aggressive adversary that threatens one’s national interests.  A second category, 
“internal political change,” involves force used to engineer internal political change within another country 
whether in support of an existing government considered an ally or seeking to overthrow a government 
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an ethnic conflict with the purpose of “internal policy change” via peacekeeping 
operations.  On the other hand, the U.S. government portrayed the principal policy 
objective of intervention in Iraq as a “foreign policy restraint” mission based on national 
security purposes.  Specifically, the Bush Administration characterized the war in Iraq as 
being primarily about removing Saddam Hussein’s threats of weapons of mass 
destruction and assistance to terrorists attacking the United States.  These different 
catalysts may affect the influence of political information on public support for military 
intervention.   
Scholars find that the public is often highly supportive of conducting military 
interventions for “realpolitik” issues with the objective of foreign policy restraint.  
Particularly in the post-9/11 world, public support for use of military force for national 
security purposes is high across all political information levels.  As Eichenberg (2003) 
puts it, the attacks of September 11 brought near unanimity to the view citizens and 
leaders alike that military force was necessary to protect the U.S. from grievous harm.  
To illustrate, at the height of major combat operations in Iraq in April 2003, over 75% of 
the public supported the U.S. having gone to war in Iraq.
35
  Consequently, the 
differences in the level of support among the politically informed and uninformed are 
not stark at the first two phases of the intervention in Iraq.   
                                                                                                                                                
considered an adversary.  The third category is “humanitarian intervention” that refers to the provision of 
emergency relief through military and other means.  Several studies have shown that the public will accept 
missions with “foreign policy restraint” goals as important missions that are worth a substantial cost.  In 
comparison, “humanitarian intervention” missions enjoy public support only if the costs are relatively low.  
Finally, “internal political change” missions face lowest levels of public support.  
35
 Data from a nationally representative sample of adults interviewed by ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 
as reported on http://www.pollingreport.com.   
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In comparison, the experiments were designed around a hypothetical U.S. 
intervention in an ethnic conflict.  Scholars find that citizen support for intervening in 
civil wars for the purpose of peacekeeping and internal political change is low (Jentleson 
and Britton 1998; Russett and Nincic 1976).  One reason for the public’s reticence in 
civil wars is the uncertain prospects for success due to the zero-sum nature of civil wars 
and because reconciliation of warring parties requires a political solution rather than a 
military victory (Eichenberg 2005).  Support for military interventions in civil wars is 
likely to be particularly low among individuals who are more aware of the difficulties 
associated with interventions in civil wars.  Consequently, one is less likely to observe 
an increase in support among politically informed individuals at the starting (rally) phase 
of interventions in ethnic conflicts.  On the other hand, politically uninformed 
individuals are likely to be predisposed to the rally effect even in this type of 
interventions.  Therefore, it is probable to observe a significant difference between the 
politically informed and uninformed regarding the amount of increase in support at the 
starting (rally) phase in interventions in ethnic conflict compared to interventions 
directly related to national security purposes.    
An additional factor to consider for the discrepancies in the results of the 
experiments and survey data analyses at the starting (rally) phase of the intervention is 
the level of policy-specific information.  Because military intervention in Iraq is a highly 
salient national security issue, the public has been inundated with information about the 
war (Berinsky 2007).  As Gelpi et al. (2005/06, 7-8) point out, combat in Iraq and the 
post-war reconstruction of Iraq were the most covered stories on the major network 
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television news broadcast in 2004.  Given this high information environment, most 
people follow the news about Iraq closely so that the differences in policy-specific 
information levels are not very stark.   
In contrast, the experiments introduced an effective manipulation of policy-
specific information by generating ad hoc political information of ethnic conflict and 
military intervention among one-half of the participants.  The other half of the 
participants did not receive this information treatment.  This way, I was able to form two 
experimental groups with stark differences in their level of ad hoc political information 
and I managed to observe the main effect of policy-specific information in the 
experiments without the mitigating impact of a host of extraneous factors such as 
intelligence and personal interest.  In short, analyses of public support for military 
intervention in Iraq at the first two intervention phases are in fact conservative tests of 
my hypotheses. 
Going back to the main findings, I proposed in Hypothesis 4 that the support of 
the politically uninformed individuals is likely to be lower than that of the politically 
informed in the presence of actual casualties.  The experimental results do not provide 
support for this expectation.  That said, going from the starting (rally) stage of the 
intervention to phase 3 and phase 4, support of the individuals who did not receive the ad 
hoc information treatment decrease at a higher rate than the individuals with ad hoc 
information as Hypothesis 5 predicts.  These findings hint that if the duration of the 
intervention gets longer and the number of actual casualties keeps rising, the higher rate 
of decrease among individuals with no ad hoc political information may eventually lead 
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to a lower level of support among these individuals compared to the ones with ad hoc 
information.  In fact, the results of the survey data analyses corroborate this expectation.  
Specifically, at the major combat, occupation, and sovereign Iraq phases, the probability 
to support the military efforts in Iraq significantly increases as the level of policy-
specific information increases.  The results of the survey analyses thus corroborate 
Hypothesis 4.  Furthermore, similar to the experimental findings, one observes a more 
stable and higher probability of support among highly informed individuals compared to 
the steadily declining and lower probability of support among the politically uninformed 
individuals at the occupation phase and sovereign Iraq phase in line with Hypothesis 5.   
  One explanation for the dissimilarity between the findings of experimental 
analyses and the analyses of the survey data concerning Hypothesis 4 may be due to the 
differences in the hypothetical intervention scenario and the actual military intervention 
in Iraq with regards to casualty rates and the duration of the intervention phases.  First of 
all, the number of casualties is higher in intervention in Iraq than the experimental 
scenarios.  In addition, at the early stages of the intervention, the general public 
impression was that Iraq would be a fairly easy mission.  Thus, the expected number of 
casualties was low at the very beginning of the war in Iraq, which proved to be 
inaccurate.  By the date the survey was conducted in the major combat phase, the 
number of casualties had reached 140 within one and a half months since the launch of 
military operations in Iraq.  At the time that the survey used for the analysis of 
occupation phase of was completed (July 2, 2003), the number of casualties had reached 
208 and it had been 3 months since the start of war in Iraq.  At the time that the survey 
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used for the analysis of the sovereign Iraq phase was completed (August 10, 2004), the 
number of casualties had reached 925 and it had been over 16 months since the initiation 
of the military intervention in Iraq.   
In comparison, at phase 3 of the experiments, the number of actual casualties was 
reported as 124 and it had been three months since the start of the intervention.  At phase 
4, the number of expected casualties was raised to 437 and the time was set to nine 
months since launch of the military intervention.  In both phases, the number of actual 
casualties was within the expected casualty range.  In short, higher number of casualties 
and the longer duration of the intervention phases in intervention in Iraq compared to the 
hypothetical intervention scenario may explain lower levels of support among the 
politically uninformed than the informed in the survey data analyses as opposed to the 
experiments. 
Overall, the findings of the ANOVA analyses of the experiments and the probit 
analyses of survey data on military intervention in Iraq are generally in line with my 
expectations that I presented in the expected utility framework chapter.  Regarding the 
dissimilar results, further investigation requires the use of alternative scenarios designed 
around interventions with different foreign policy objectives and additional survey data 
analyses of civil war interventions with variations in the casualty rates and duration of 
intervention phases. 
Theoretical and Methodological Contributions and Implications  
A multi-method strategy is rarely used in the literature on public support for 
military interventions despite its many advantages and its growing acknowledgment in 
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political science.  One important contribution of this study is methodological through the 
use of a multi-method approach that brings together an expected utility framework, 
experimentation, and large-N statistical analyses of public opinion survey data.  In doing 
so, I develop a more refined theory and attain more robust empirical results.   
The use of a formal framework provides an internally consistent logic that 
accounts for the stipulated relationships among abstract variables and ensures that the 
causal stories are coherent and non-contradictory (see Laitin 2002).  In this study, I 
employ an expected utility framework to derive my propositions and hypotheses.  In 
doing so, I attempt to link the process of expected utility calculations to decisions 
regarding support for a military intervention.  The literature on public opinion on 
military interventions often disregards the process, while exclusively focusing on the 
outcomes.  Such an outcome-oriented approach may answer questions of “whether” or 
“what,” but without the process, one cannot explain “how” and “why.”  By specifically 
looking at the building parameters of the expected utility framework (namely, costs, 
benefits, and the probability of success), I am able to unpack the expected utility model 
and account for the process that leads to the outcome.   
 The use of experimentation also has many advantages for this study.  First, 
experimentation allows a panel design that offers more direct evidence of opinion 
change compared to non-panel designs.  Nevertheless, research topics that require a 
panel design are often set aside due to the scarcity of panel survey data in political 
science.  Given that my main objective is to observe the level of support at the individual 
level across different stages of an intervention, panel data is vital for this study.  I 
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manage to obtain panel data with experimentation.  Second, I observe the differences in 
expected utility parameters of the politically informed and uninformed individuals using 
experimentation.  Specifically, by introducing specific measures of perceived costs, 
utilities, and success in Experiment 2, I explore the processing mechanisms behind the 
level of support for military interventions.  Third, with experimentation, I effectively 
manipulate policy-specific information by generating ad hoc political information among 
randomly assigned subjects.  This resolves the problem of individual differences (such as 
intelligence, motivation, and interest in politics) that may contaminate the analytical 
observations regarding the main effect of political information.     
 Conducting large-N statistical analyses using public opinion surveys on military 
intervention in Iraq, on the other hand, ensures that the results of the experimental 
findings using a hypothetical intervention scenario also holds when public support for 
military intervention is analyzed using actual data.  As discussed above, the findings of 
the experimental analyses and the survey data analyses demonstrate important links and 
thus substantiate the robustness of the theoretical expectations and the findings of this 
dissertation.        
In addition to methodological contributions, this dissertation also addressed 
several issues that research on public support for use of military force overlooks.  First, 
and most importantly, the study examined public support for an intervention as a 
function of political information and the progress of the intervention.  As Larson (1996, 
12) argues, “Support can be thought of as a constant rebalancing of the benefits and 
prospects for success and a determination of whether the outcome is judged worth the 
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costs.”  On a parallel basis, Gartner (2008a, 95) suggest, “Public support for a conflict is 
not a blank check.  Combat provides information people use to update their expectations 
about the outcome, direction, value, and cost of a war.”  By considering the intervention 
as divided into different phases and the public as divided among different political 
information segments, I managed to better explore the dynamics of public support for 
military interventions.   
Second, by including measures of both policy-specific information and general 
political information in my experimental and survey data analyses, I tackled an 
interesting question on which type of political information has a more direct influence on 
the level of support for military interventions across different phases of intervention.  
The analyses generally show that policy-specific information is a more influential factor 
on public support for military interventions.  Thus, these findings contribute to the 
ongoing debate on the side of scholars that suggest that individuals are information 
specialists rather than generalists.   
Third, as mentioned above, this dissertation unpacked and measured the main 
components of the expected utility framework in view of political information levels and 
intervention phases.  Although most studies of public support for military interventions 
adopt a rational approach, almost none of them dissect the expected utility model into its 
building components to test whether these components are working as assumed. 
Accordingly, the experimental findings of this dissertation regarding the assessments of 
costs, benefits, and success constitute an important contribution.  Specifically, the results 
of Experiment 2 show that compared to the politically uninformed, politically informed 
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individuals have higher expected costs, lower expected utilities, and lower expectations 
of success at the first two stages of an intervention. Moreover, the politically informed 
express less change in their perceptions of costs and expected success (except for the 
perceived benefits) going from the pre-intervention stage to the starting (rally) stage of 
the intervention.  Thus, the findings of Experiment 2 mostly corroborate the findings of 
Experiment 1 and the survey data analyses regarding the level of support for military 
interventions.   
Fourth, this dissertation also investigated variations in tolerance for expected and 
actual casualties and support for military interventions across political levels and 
intervention stages.  This is also an important contribution given that the literature falls 
short of making a clear distinction between tolerance for expected casualties and actual 
casualties in general and specifically among politically informed and less informed 
segments of the public.  The results of Experiment 2 show that participants with ad hoc 
information show lower tolerance for expected casualties than the control group in the 
absence of actual casualties.  However, once actual casualties occur, the actual and 
expected casualty tolerance among individuals with no ad hoc information group is 
lower than the ad hoc information group.  In addition, tolerance of individuals for 
expected and actual casualties in the no ad hoc information group decreases at a higher 
rate than that of individuals who received the ad hoc information treatment across 
intervention stages.  In short, the findings of Experiment 2 regarding actual and expected 
casualty tolerance correspond well with the findings of Experiment 1 and the analyses of 
the survey data regarding the level of support for military interventions.   
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 Finally, a brief discussion is warranted on the policy implications of this 
dissertation.  A wide literature on casualty aversion has emerged from the perception 
that the public may force political leaders to avoid military involvement in an 
international crisis all together or in some cases immediate termination of missions.  
Although more recent research has demonstrated that the public is not entirely casualty-
phobic, there is still strong evidence that the number of casualties may significantly 
diminish public support for a military intervention.  One striking historical case example 
is the U.S. withdrawal from the intervention in Somalia following the deaths of 18 U.S. 
Army Rangers on October 3-4, 1993 given rising public opposition.  The Clinton 
administration's refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda that began in April 1994 is 
also attributed in part to its retreat from Somalia.  Burk (1999) suggests that quick 
reversals of public support based on casualties ignore the long-range goals of foreign 
policy, jeopardize mission accomplishments, and underestimate logistical difficulties or 
political costs of rapid withdrawal (see also Filson and Werner 2002; Goemans 2000; 
Slantchev 2004; Wagner 2000; Werner 1998).  This dissertation demonstrates that 
politically informed segments of the public are likely to be more cognizant of long-term 
foreign policy objectives, credibility issues, sunk costs, and major political and military 
concerns than the politically uninformed and thus react less severely to actual casualties 
in consideration of other factors.  As Sullivan (2008) points out, for political leaders, 
both overestimating and underestimating the level of costs their political constituency is 
willing to bear can contribute to poor foreign policy outcomes.  The findings of this 
  
129 
dissertation, therefore, points to the importance of the public’s level of political 
information concerning military intervention on the part of political decision makers.   
   To conclude, this dissertation provides important contributions to the growing 
body of the literature on public support for uses of military force.  As I continue to 
develop this project, I intend to collect cross-sectional time-series data of public support 
for military operations.  In addition, I want to replicate the analyses with alternative 
measures of policy-specific information and general political information.  I also plan to 
conduct my experiments with a nationally representative sample as an external validity 
check.  Another future avenue of research may be to explore the effects of political 
information across different intervention stages on public support in different cultural 
settings.  I anticipate, with future work, this line of research will lead to a better 
understanding of the dynamics of public support for military interventions.   
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APPENDIX A 
FIGURES 
FIGURE 1.  Phases of Military Interventions 
 
Phase 1 (Pre-intervention Stage) 
Phase 2 (Starting Stage) 
Phase 3  Structural changes regarding cost, utility, and success of 
    an intervention at a given point 
Phase 4  
............. 
Phase n (Post-Hoc Final Stage) 
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FIGURE 2.  Design of Experiment 1 
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FIGURE 3.  Design of Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 4.  Public Support for Intervention across Levels of Ad Hoc Political 
Information and Intervention Phases - Experiment 1 
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FIGURE 5.  Public Support for Intervention across Levels of Ad Hoc Political 
Information and Intervention Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 1 
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FIGURE 6.  Public Support for Intervention: Three-Way Interaction between “Success of 
Phase 3,” “Intervention Phases 2 and 3,” and “Ad Hoc Political Information”– 
Experiment 1 
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FIGURE 7.  Public Support for Intervention: Three-Way Interaction between “Success of 
Phase 4,” “Intervention Phases 3 and 4,” and “Ad Hoc Political Information”– 
Experiment 1  
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FIGURE 8.  Public Support for Intervention: Two-Way Interaction between “Success of 
Phase 4” and “Intervention Phases 3 and 4”- Experiment 1 
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FIGURE 9.  Perceived Costs across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 10.  Perceived Benefits across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 11.  Expected Success across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 2 
 
7.15
4.69
7.66
4.78
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
No Ad-hoc Information Ad-Hoc Information
L
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 S
u
c
c
e
s
s
Pre-intervention Phase
Starting (Rally) Phase
 
  
154 
FIGURE 12.  Tolerance for Expected Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political 
Information and Intervention Phases - Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 13.  Tolerance for Expected Casualties: Three-Way Interaction between 
“Success of Phase 4,” “Intervention Phases 3 and 4,” and “Ad Hoc Political 
Information”– Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 14.  Tolerance for Actual Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political 
Information and Intervention Phases 3 and 4 - Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 15.  Tolerance for Actual Casualties: Two-Way Interaction between “Success of 
Phase 4” and “Intervention Phases 3 and 4”– Experiment 2 
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FIGURE 16.  The Effect of Policy-Specific Information on the Probability of Support for 
the Intervention in Iraq across Intervention Phases 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1.  Public Support for Intervention across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases - Experiment 1 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 7525.08 1 7525.08 4.74 .03 
Success of phase 3 (Phase 3) 2001.41 1 2001.41 1.26 .26 
Success of phase 4 (Phase 4) 3358.45 1 3358.45 2.11 .14 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 8364.43 1 8364.43 5.27 .02 
Ad hoc * Phase 4 472.33 1 472.33 .29 .58 
Phase 3 * Phase 4 1710.66 1 1710.66 1.07 .29 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 * Phase 4  1131.12 1 1131.12 .71 .39 
Subject(Group) 572889.9 361 1586.95   
Intervention stages (Stages) 75137.36 3 25045.7 106.11 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  2628.70 3 876.23 3.71 .01 
Stages * Phase 3 5478.61 3 1826.20 7.73 <.0001 
Stages * Phase 4 8715.96 3 2905.32 12.30 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 782.97 3 260.99 1.10 .34 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 4 532.71 3 177.57 .75 .52 
Stages * Phase 3 * Phase 4 127.84 3 42.61 .18 .90 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 * Phase 4 681.96 3 227.32 .96 .40 
Stages * Subject(Group) 255619.2 1083 236.02   
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TABLE 2.  Public Support for Intervention across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 1 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-
value 
p-value 
Ad hoc information  4546.32 1 4546.32 5.11 .02 
Subject(Group) 325980.3 367 888.23   
Intervention stages (Phase 1 and 2) 51891.51 1 51891.51 226.62 <.0001 
Intervention stages * Ad hoc information 2077.54 1 2077.54 9.07 .002 
Intervention stages * Subject (Group) 84032.43 367 228.97   
Means Table 
Main Effects  Mean St. dev. N 
Ad hoc information  55.23 25.32 390 
No Ad hoc information  60.20 24.97 348 
     
Intervention phase 1  49.36 24.82 369 
Intervention phase 2  66.35 22.71 369 
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TABLE 3.  Public Support for Intervention across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 2 and 3 - Experiment 1 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 8983.13 1 8983.13 10.32 .001 
Success of phase 3 (Phase 3) .007 1 .007 8.05 .99 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 4483.41 1 4483.41 5.15 .023 
Subject(Group) 317447.8 365 869.72   
Intervention stages (Stages 2 and 3) 2633.81 1 2633.81 16.94 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  278.97 1 278.97 1.79 .18 
Stages * Phase 3 3202.65 1 3202.65 20.59 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 693.86 1 693.86 4.46 .03 
Stages * Subject(Group) 56749.01 365 155.47   
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TABLE 4.  Public Support for Intervention across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 3 and 4 - Experiment 1 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 3537.47 1 3537.47 3.47 .06 
Success of phase 4 (Phase 4) 5469.63 1 5469.63 5.36 .02 
Ad hoc * Phase 4 160.56 1 160.56 .15 .69 
Subject(Group) 371992.7 365 1019.15   
Intervention stages (Stages 3 and 4) 24383.69 1 24383.69 132.27 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  450.92 1 450.92 2.44 .11 
Stages * Phase 4 5877.75 1 5877.75 31.88 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 4 299.85 1 299.85 1.62 .20 
Stages * Subject(Group) 67285.53 365 184.34   
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TABLE 5.  Perceived Costs across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and Intervention 
Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information  578.45 1 578.45 107.35 <.0001 
Subject(Group) 1417.15 263 5.38   
Intervention stages (Phase 1 and 2) 5.44 1 5.44 8.19 <.004 
Intervention stages * Ad hoc information 3.71 1 3.71 5.58 .01 
Intervention stages * Subject (Group) 174.87 263 .66   
Means Table 
Main Effects  Mean St. dev. N 
Ad hoc information  6.69 1.66 248 
No Ad hoc information  4.60 1.82 282 
     
Intervention phase 1  5.81 2.02 265 
Intervention phase 2  5.62 2.03 265 
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TABLE 6.  Perceived Benefits across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and Intervention 
Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information  970.22 1 970.22 129.94 <.0001 
Subject(Group) 1963.70 263 7.46   
Intervention stages (Phase 1 and 2) 49.75 1 49.75 39.00 <.0001 
Intervention stages * Ad hoc information 8.32 1 8.32 6.52 .01 
Intervention stages * Subject (Group) 335.55 263    
Means Table 
Main Effects  Mean St. dev. N 
Ad hoc information  4.22 2.28 248 
No Ad hoc information  6.93 1.90 282 
     
Intervention phase 1  5.17 2.52 265 
Intervention phase 2  5.80 2.45 265 
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TABLE 7.  Expected Success across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and Intervention 
Phases 1 and 2 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information  937.96 1 937.96 124.77 <.0001 
Subject(Group) 1976.97 263 7.51   
Intervention stages (Phase 1 and 2) 11.88 1 11.88 13.68 .0003 
Intervention stages * Ad hoc information 5.70 1 5.70 6.57 .01 
Intervention stages * Subject (Group) 228.39 263    
Means Table 
Main Effects  Mean St. dev. N 
Ad hoc information  4.74 2.33 248 
No Ad hoc information  7.40 1.66 282 
     
Intervention phase 1  5.84 2.42 265 
Intervention phase 2  6.13 2.46 265 
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TABLE 8.  Tolerance for Expected Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information 
and Intervention Phases - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 39.22 1 39.22 2.95 .08 
Success of phase 3 (Phase 3) 63.16 1 63.16 4.75 .03 
Success of phase 4 (Phase 4) 22.43 1 22.43 1.69 .19 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 1.48 1 1.48 .11 .73 
Ad hoc * Phase 4 1.77 1 1.77 .13 .71 
Phase 3 * Phase 4 1.87 1 1.87 .14 .70 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 * Phase 4  2.96 1 2.96 .22 .63 
Subject(Group) 3411.76 257 13.27   
Intervention stages (Stages) 256.54 3 85.51 52.80 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  220.36 3 73.46 45.35 <.0001 
Stages * Phase 3 7.72 3 2.57 1.58 .19 
Stages * Phase 4 24.32 3 8.10 5.00 .001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 10.72 3 3.57 2.20 .08 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 4 15.73 3 5.24 3.23 .02 
Stages * Phase 3 * Phase 4 1,24 3 .41 .25 .85 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 * Phase 4 1.07 3 .35 .22 .88 
Stages * Subject(Group) 1248.70 771 1.62   
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TABLE 9.  Tolerance for Expected Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 2 and 3 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 41.92 1 41.92 5.56 .01 
Success of phase 3 (Phase 3) 47.97 1 47.97 6.36 .01 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 .34 1 .34 .04 .83 
Subject(Group) 1966.39 261 7.53   
Intervention stages (Stages 2 and 3) 4.94 1 4.94 3.00 .08 
Stages * Ad hoc  65.60 1 65.60 39.83 <.0001 
Stages * Phase 3 3.25 1 3.25 1.97 .16 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 .63 1 .63 .38 .53 
Stages * Subject(Group) 429.86 261 1.64   
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TABLE 10.  Tolerance for Expected Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information 
and Intervention Phases 3 and 4 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 29.36 1 29.36 3.78 .05 
Success of phase 4 (Phase 4) 17.16 1 17.16 2.21 .13 
Ad hoc * Phase 4 6.39 1 6.39 .82 .36 
Subject(Group) 2024.10 261 7.75   
Intervention stages (Stages 3 and 4) 139.94 1 139.94 159.73 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  20.02 1 20.02 22.85 <.0001 
Stages * Phase 4 22.59 1 22.59 25.79 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 4 13.54 1 13.54 15.45 .0001 
Stages * Subject(Group) 228.65 261 .87   
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 TABLE 11.  Tolerance for Actual Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 3 and 4 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 54.10 1 54.10 7.98 .005 
Success of phase 3 (Phase 3) 90.87 1 90.87 13.36 .0003 
Success of phase 4 (Phase 4) 31.04 1 31.04 4.56 .03 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 1.94 1 1.94 .28 .59 
Ad hoc * Phase 4 8.78 1 8.78 1.29 .25 
Phase 3 * Phase 4 8.13 1 8.13 1.19 .27 
Ad hoc * Phase 3 * Phase 4  1.62 1 1.62 .24 .62 
Subject(Group) 1747.24 257 6.79   
Intervention stages (Stages 3 and 4) 120.73 1 120.73 109.84 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  4.21 1 4.21 3.83 .05 
Stages * Phase 3 6.38 1 6.38 5.80 .01 
Stages * Phase 4 18.81 1 18.81 17.12 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 .91 1 .91 .83 .36 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 4 .14 1 .14 .13 .71 
Stages * Phase 3 * Phase 4 .99 1 .99 .90 .34 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 3 * Phase 4 .29 1 .29 .26 .60 
Stages * Subject(Group) 282.48 257 1.09   
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TABLE 12.  Tolerance for Actual Casualties across Levels of Ad Hoc Political Information and 
Intervention Phases 3 and 4 - Experiment 2 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Independent Variables SS df MS F-value p-value 
Ad hoc information (Ad hoc) 45.74 1 45.74 6.47 .01 
Success of phase 4 (Phase 4) 21.15 1 21.15 2.99 .08 
Ad hoc * Phase 4 8.49 1 8.49 1.20 .27 
Subject(Group) 1843.93 261 7.06   
Intervention stages (Stages 3 and 4) 131.91 1 131.91 118.46 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc  4.97 1 4.97 4.46 .03 
Stages * Phase 4 21.25 1 21.25 19.08 <.0001 
Stages * Ad hoc * Phase 4 .14 1 .14 .12 .71 
Stages * Subject(Group) 290.64 261 1.11   
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TABLE 13.  Probit Analysis of Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq at the Pre-
intervention Phase 
 
Variables Coefficients  
(Std. Error) 
Changes in predicted probabilities  
(min→max)                           
Policy-specific information -.425** 
(.16) 
-.24 
Education -.023 
(.09) 
-.02 
Presidential approval .391† 
(.23) 
.11 
Party identification .272 
(.25) 
.07 
Ideology .317* 
(.14) 
.18 
Utility 1.709*** 
(.22) 
.50 
Perceived success .734*** 
(.21) 
.20 
Age -.005 
(.006) 
-.13 
Gender .092 
(.21) 
.02 
Race .254 
(.29) 
.06 
Income -.101 
(.09) 
-.11 
Constant .163 
(.98)  
N 326  
Wald χ²(12) 167.87***  
Pseudo R
2
 .47  
Log likelihood -106.90  
†significant at p<.10 level.  *significant at p<.05 level.  **significant at p<.01 level.  
***significant at p<.001 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 14.  Probit Analysis of Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq at the Starting 
(Rally) Phase 
 
Variables Coefficients  
(Std. Error) 
Changes in predicted probabilities  
(min→max)                           
Policy-specific information -.380** 
(.16) 
-.08 
Education -.158 
(.10) 
-.07 
Presidential approval 1.53*** 
(.22) 
.30 
Party identification .342** 
(.13) 
.09 
Ideology -.235 
(.14) 
-.05 
Utility 1.77*** 
(.20) 
.39 
Perceived success .385† 
(.21) 
.04 
Age -.005 
(.005) 
-.06 
Gender -.059 
(.19) 
-.007 
Race -.322 
(.22) 
-.04 
Income -.114 
(.08) 
-.05 
Constant 3.11** 
(1.10)  
N 597  
Wald χ²(12) 235.48***  
Pseudo R
2
 .65  
Log likelihood -109.96  
†significant at p<.10 level.  *significant at p<.05 level.  **significant at p<.01 level.  
***significant at p<.001 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 15.  Probit Analysis of Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq at the Major 
Combat Phase 
 
Variables Coefficients  
(Std. Error) 
Changes in predicted probabilities  
(min→max)                           
Policy-specific information .358* 
(.17) 
.33 
Education -.240** 
(.09) 
-.25 
Presidential approval 1.640*** 
(.26) 
.48 
Party identification .526* 
(.26) 
.12 
Ideology -.013 
(.13) 
-.01 
Age -.003 
(.007) 
-.05 
Gender .031 
(.23) 
.007 
Race -.120 
(.29) 
-.02 
Income .059 
(.06) 
.09 
Constant .507 
(1.27)  
N 252  
Wald χ²(12) 93.43***  
Pseudo R
2
 .44  
Log likelihood -76.25  
†significant at p<.10 level.  *significant at p<.05 level.  **significant at p<.01 level.  
***significant at p<.001 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 16.  Probit Analysis of Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq at the 
Occupation Phase 
 
Variables Coefficients  
(Std. Error) 
Changes in predicted probabilities  
(min→max)                           
Policy-specific information .243*** 
(.07) 
.24 
Education .094 
(.09) 
.05 
Presidential approval .522*** 
(.15) 
.16 
Party identification .063 
(.08) 
.03 
Ideology .120† 
(.07) 
.14 
Perceived success .252** 
(.08) 
.24 
Age .001 
(.003) 
.03 
Gender -.067 
(.12) 
-.02 
Race -.138 
(.17) 
-.04 
Income -.026 
(.03) 
-.05 
Constant -1.215 
(.60)  
N 547  
Wald χ²(12) 47.55***  
Pseudo R
2
 .08  
Log likelihood -281.25  
†significant at p<.10 level.  *significant at p<.05 level.  **significant at p<.01 level.  
***significant at p<.001 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 17.  Probit Analysis of Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq at the Sovereign 
Iraq Phase 
 
Variables Coefficients  
(Std. Error) 
Changes in predicted probabilities  
(min→max)                           
Policy-specific information .213* 
(.10) 
.24 
Education .217*** 
(.05) 
.47 
Presidential approval .629** 
(.23) 
.22 
Party identification .173 
(.24) 
.06 
Ideology -.006 
(.12) 
-.005 
Perceived success .354*** 
(.11) 
.36 
Age .008† 
(.005) 
.23 
Gender -.126 
(.16) 
-.04 
Race -.399 
(.26) 
-.15 
Income -.020 
(.05) 
-.06 
Constant -1.922** 
(.77)  
N 290  
Wald χ²(12) 51.09***  
Pseudo R
2
 .18  
Log likelihood -155.59  
†significant at p<.10 level.  *significant at p<.05 level.  **significant at p<.01 level.  
***significant at p<.001 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 18.  Probit Analysis of Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq across All Five 
Phases 
 
Variables Coefficients  
(Std. Error) 
Changes in predicted probabilities  
(min→max)                           
Stages * Policy-specific 
information 
.089*** 
(.02) 
.50 
Stages -.384*** 
(.09) 
-.44 
Policy-specific information -.162† 
(.09) 
-.13 
Education -.056* 
(.02) 
-.07 
Presidential approval 1.262*** 
(.06) 
.42 
Party identification .164*** 
(.03) 
.10 
Ideology .004 
(.03) 
.002 
Age .0002 
(.001) 
.005 
Gender -.130** 
(.05) 
-.04 
Race -.248*** 
(.07) 
-.08 
Income .011 
(.01) 
.03 
Constant 1.576*** 
(.40)  
N 3335  
Wald χ²(12) 865.44***  
Pseudo R
2
 .24  
Log likelihood -1524.20  
†significant at p<.10 level.  *significant at p<.05 level.  **significant at p<.01 level.  
***significant at p<.001 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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TABLE 19.  Summary Matrix of the Effect of Political Information on Public Support for 
Military Intervention across Intervention Phases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq – Analyses of Survey Data 
 Pre-
intervention 
Phase 
Starting 
(Rally) 
Phase  
 
Major Combat 
Phase 
Occupation 
Phase 
Sovereign 
Iraq Phase 
Political 
Information 
- - + + + 
Rate of 
change in 
support going 
from one 
phase to the 
other 
 PI ≈ PU        PI < PU        PI < PU PI < PU 
Hypotheses 
Corroborated 
H3, Yes H1, Yes 
H2, No 
H4, Yes 
H5, Yes 
H4, Yes 
H5, Yes 
H4, Yes 
H5, Yes 
Public Support for Military Intervention in Iraq – Analyses of Survey Data 
 Pre-
intervention 
Phase 
Starting 
(Rally) 
Phase  
 
Major Combat 
Phase 
Occupation 
Phase 
Sovereign 
Iraq Phase 
Political 
Information 
- - + + + 
Rate of 
change in 
support going 
from one 
phase to the 
other 
 PI ≈ PU        PI < PU        PI < PU PI < PU 
Hypotheses 
Corroborated 
H3, Yes H1, Yes 
H2, No 
H4, Yes 
H5, Yes 
H4, Yes 
H5, Yes 
H4, Yes 
H5, Yes 
PI = Politically informed; PU = Politically uninformed 
-’s and +’s indicate the direction of the relationship between political information and public 
support for military intervention across intervention phases.   
All effects are significant at p < .05 level.  Two-tailed tests.   
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APPENDIX C 
TRAINING MATERIAL ON MILITARY INTERVENTIONS* 
* The information summarized below under major headings was presented as a lecture 
using PowerPoint. 
 
Basics on Military Interventions 
 
The information under the following headlines is from: Hauss, Charles.  2003.  “Military 
Intervention.”  In Beyond Intractability, edited by Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess.  
Conflict Research Consortium, Boulder, CO: University of Colorado.   
 
 Definition of military intervention  
 
 Some major questions and possible answers regarding military interventions  
 
- Why does military intervention occur in some cases but not others?  
 
- What determines whether an intervention will succeed or fail?  
 
- Do military interventions lead to stable peace?  
 
 The role of individual states and the international community concerning military 
interventions 
 
 
Some Examples to US Military Interventions* 
 
The information under the following headlines is from: Collier, Ellen C.  1993.  
Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798 – 1993.  Congressional Research 
Service, the Library of Congress, 7 October 1993.  http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/ 
foabroad.htm. 
 
 1950-53 – Korean War  
 1964-73 – Vietnam War 
 1982 – Lebanon 
 1983 – Grenada 
 1989 – Panama 
 1992 – Somalia 
 1993 – Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 1993 – Macedonia 
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U.S. Casualty Rates in Principal Wars and Military Interventions* 
 
*Source: U.S. Department of Defense official website.  http://www.defenselink.mil/news 
/casualty.pdf; http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/WCPRINCIPAL.pdf 
  
Basics on Military Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts* 
 
* The information under the following headlines is from: Taras, Raymond C., and Rajat 
Ganguly.  2005.  Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension.  New 
York: Longman.   
 
 What is ethnic group, ethnic conflict?  
- Definition of ethnic group 
- Definition of ethnic conflict  
 Major types of ethnic conflict: secessionist and irredentist.  
- Secessionist/distributional conflict 
- Irredentist conflict 
 Major international principals pertaining to ethnic conflict 
- The principle of state sovereignty  
- The principle of national self-determination 
 Potential causes of ethnic conflict 
- Ancient hatreds  
- Insecurity and fear 
- Elite manipulation 
 Consequences of ethnic conflict and international security 
- Humanitarian emergency 
- State failure and collapse 
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- Spread of the ethnic conflict from one state to the others 
 Resolving ethnic conflicts through intervention   
 States as third parties in ethnic conflict resolution 
Option 1: Third party as negotiator / Non-military intervention 
- Arbitration 
- Mediation  
Option 2: The use of military forces / Military intervention 
- Neutral military intervention/Physical barrier 
- Non-neutral military intervention/Taking sides 
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Quiz on the Training Material 
 
(1) Please identify if the statements below are true of false. 
 
• An international third party can intervene in a conflict only as a negotiator 
      ___true     ___false   
• To intervene in an international crisis, an international third party may not always 
be neutral, that is it may also take a side. 
___true     ___false   
• In neutral military third party interventions, third parties’ use of force must be 
limited, which means that they can use force only to defend themselves. 
___true     ___false   
 
(2) In peacemaking operations, an international third party can be the negotiator by 
employing such methods as arbitration or mediation.  Match the type of negotiation 
method with the definitions below: 
 
This type of negotiation method refers to binding, authoritative third-party 
intervention in which conflicting parties agree to hand the determination of a final 
settlement to the third-party.   
a. Arbitration b. Mediation 
 
This type of negotiation method refers to offering good offices to the adversaries 
to initiate meaningful political dialogue by suggesting face-saving compromises, 
stressing common interest between the adversaries, and offering alternative 
proposals for settlement.   
a. Arbitration b. Mediation 
 
(3) Please list (at least two) US military interventions (other than Iraq)  
……………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(4) Which of the characteristics below does not define an ethnic group? 
 
a. Common inherited culture 
b. Racial similarity 
c. Common religion 
d. Ideological similarity 
e. Common history and ancestry 
 
(5) Match the type of ethnic conflict with the definitions below: 
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In this type of ethnic conflict, ethnic groups seek reduction of state control 
and/demand more political/economic power.   They might even demand total 
separation from the state where they reside in order to establish their own.  
a. Secessionist ethnic conflict  b. Irredentist ethnic conflict   
 
This type of ethnic conflict is one state’s claim to another state’s territory, which is 
usually regarded as cultural homeland or historic state, or as an integral part of one 
state in which an ethnic group of that state is a numerical minority. 
a. Secessionist ethnic conflict  b. Irredentist ethnic conflict   
 
(6) To which international rule ethnic groups usually refer in order to justify their 
demands? 
 
a. Sovereignty of the state 
b. National self-determination  
c. The principle of nonintervention  
d. The principle of non-use of force 
 
(7) Please list (at least two) ongoing ethnic conflicts in the world today. 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX D   
EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS 
 
(For both experiments) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On the following page, you will be exposed to an international crisis where the U.S. may 
intervene militarily.  The progress of that crisis and the actions that the U.S. takes are 
presented as a sequence of information organized into four different stages.  We would 
like you to indicate your level of support for the U.S. policies that are enacted for each 
stage with regards to your evaluation of the intervention and crisis at hand. 
 
Please read carefully the information given for each stage and then write your responses 
in the space provided.   
 
***Please note that the instructions and information for this experiment are printed on 
double-sided paper (front and back).  Be careful not to skip any pages.  
 
This questionnaire is anonymous.  We appreciate your honest and attentive responses.   
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(For both experiments) 
 
PRE-INTERVENTION STAGE/PHASE 1 
 
 
The International Crisis Scenario: 
Tensions in Kuzeya 
 
The National Security Council has prepared a brief analysis of an emerging problem in 
the Mediterranean Sea.  The island of Kuzeya has been classified, as a “nation of 
concern” because of the ethnic conflict that led to a major international problem with 
hundreds of civilian casualties.  The crisis has the potential to shake the stability of the 
region.  The following brief provides some basic information about the country as well 
as two policy recommendations that were offered by the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense. 
 
The Department of State is recommending to “Act as a Non-Military Third-Party 
Negotiator” to solve the problem. 
 
The Defense Department is recommending to “Initiate Military Intervention” to solve 
the problem. 
 
Based on the following brief (next page), your task is to decide which of the two policy 
options the U.S. should pursue in response to the crisis and report your level of support 
(as a percentage). 
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(For both experiments) 
 
 
Ethnic conflict in Kuzeya 
 
The country of Kuzeya is an independent island strategically located in the 
Mediterranean Sea with a population of six million.  The island consists of an ethnically 
divided society.  One of these two ethnic groups, the Sumans (which make up 80% of 
the population) are followers of Islam and have strong loyalties to Muslim countries in 
the region.  Amians, the minority ethnic group, are of the Christian faith and have a 
strong allegiance to the U.S.  
 
In the last couple of decades, inter-ethnic disputes have disturbed the peace on the 
island.  However, the discovery of rich natural resources – diamonds and uranium – 
helped to bring some economic prosperity and to decrease tension so that a somewhat 
stable government was established and democratization has become the primary goal. 
 
Unfortunately, things have taken a turn for the worse.  With the sudden launch of a 
bloody Suman Islamist revolt-turned guerilla war, the prospect of Kuzeya’s stability has 
become an international problem and minority rights are now in shambles.  The Sumans 
demand the union of Kuzeya with a neighboring fundamentalist Islamic country.  
Furthermore, the Sumans want a complete withdrawal of U.S. interests and absolute 
Suman control over government powers, stating specifically that no power sharing with 
Amians is allowed any longer.   
In recent weeks there is a surge of violence in the island. Suman guerilla forces were 
responsible for bombings that target specifically Amian civilians.  The Sumans set 
roadblocks along the Amian neighborhoods to harass and kidnap Amians.  Many of 
those kidnapped are then found dead in Sumans territories. UN observers estimate that 
hundreds of civilians were killed in the last weeks and the violence and number of 
casualties is expected to rise.  
 
According to the estimates of some high-rank military officials, speaking on condition of 
anonymity, if the U.S. decides to intervene militarily in the conflict, the potential U.S. 
military casualty rate is expected to be between 100-300. 
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(For experiment 2) 
 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation, if the US decides to intervene in 
this conflict, how costly do you think this military intervention will be?  Please circle 
below the level of costs that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not costly at all and 10 = 
exceedingly costly).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation, if the US decides to intervene in 
this conflict, how beneficial do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of benefits that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not beneficial at 
all and 10 = exceedingly beneficial).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation, if the US decides to intervene in 
this conflict, how successful do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of success that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not successful at 
all and 10 = exceedingly successful).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the possibility of the US’s 
intervention in this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties that are 
expected to occur?  Please indicate whether you think the number of expected 
casualties estimated for this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = 
exceedingly low expected casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high 
expected casualties for a mission like this).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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(For both experiments) 
 
 
The Decision 
 
Please decide which of the two policy options the U.S. should pursue to deal with the 
international crisis that you have just been exposed to.  Please place a check mark in 
the box next to your preferred policy option.  Please also report your level of support 
(as a percentage value ranging from 0 to 100) for your preferred policy option (for 
example, you may prefer military intervention OR withdrawal of troops, and show 55% 
of support for that option).   
  
 
► “INITIATE MILITARY INTERVENTION”                      % Support 
 
OR  
 
► “ACT AS THIRD-PARTY NEGOTIATOR”                      % Support 
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(For both experiments) 
 
THE STARTING STAGE/PHASE 2 
 
 
Initiation of the U.S. Military Intervention in Kuzeya 
 
The president of the United States decided to intervene in the conflict in Kuzeya.  
In the following newsflash, you will read the president’s remarks on the decision to 
initiate the intervention in Kuzeya against Suman forces to protect Amians.    
 
At this point, there are two policy options that the U.S. may follow.  The first option is to 
“withdraw the troops.”  The second option is to “sustain military intervention.” 
  
Based on the following newsflash, your task is to decide which of the two policy options 
the U.S. should pursue and report your level of support (as a percentage). 
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(For both experiments) 
 
 
Newsflash 
 
The president has deployed U.S. forces to Kuzeya in an attempt to help quell the 
violence that erupted there since the Suman forces within Kuzeya initiated violence 
against the Amians.  At the press conference, the President provided a few brief remarks 
on the current situation: 
 
“As you know, the Sumans, an enemy group within the country of Kuzeya, recently 
initiated an unjust and unprovoked attack on our friends and allies, the Amian people of 
Kuzeya.  What we witnessed is a malicious attack on liberty and democracy.  As a result, 
the freedom of the Amian people is in great peril.  The treacherous forces of the Sumans 
have viciously besieged the basic rights of humanity and safety in Kuzeya.  For many 
years, we have shown support and have expressed good faith towards the virtuous 
people of Kuzeya, the Amians, and their goal towards a free, democratic society like 
ours.  In return, our Amian allies never faltered to show us their great gratitude.  The 
Amians are a good and a proud people like us and, like us, they are not afraid to fight 
and die for their freedom and their way of life.   
 
My fellow Americans, when an ally of ours is attacked, we stand to support them in their 
time of peril.  When the Nazis attacked, America led the way to defeat the enemies of 
freedom.  When the communists attacked, we stood up and the iron curtain fell.  When 
terrorists attacked us on 9/11, our allies came to our side, and when the terrorists 
attacked our allies, we did not hesitate to take a stand.  Well, today we see our friends, 
the Amians, under attack and we will stand with them for the moral cause of freedom 
and democracy.  American soldiers are on their way and will stand arm in arm with the 
Amians against the Sumans, and the Sumans will fall because evil is no match for liberty 
and freedom.  I say to the Amians, freedom is with you, liberty is at hand, and America 
is at your side.  God bless you, God bless the Amians, and God bless America.”  
 
According to the estimates of some high-rank military officials, speaking on condition of 
anonymity, the potential U.S. military casualty rate is expected to be between 100-300. 
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(For experiment 2) 
 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s decision to intervene 
in this conflict, how costly do you think this military intervention will be?  Please circle 
below the level of costs that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not costly at all and 10 = 
exceedingly costly).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s decision to intervene 
in this conflict, how beneficial do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of benefits that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not beneficial at 
all and 10 = exceedingly beneficial).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s decision to intervene 
in this conflict, how successful do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of success that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not successful at 
all and 10 = exceedingly successful).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s decision to intervene 
in this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties that are expected to 
occur?  Please indicate whether you think the number of expected casualties estimated 
for this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = exceedingly low expected 
casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high expected casualties for a 
mission like this).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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(For both experiments) 
 
 
The Decision 
 
Please decide which of the two policy options the U.S. should pursue in response to the 
situation that you have just been exposed to.  Please place a check mark in the box next 
to your preferred policy option.  Please also report your level of support (as a 
percentage value ranging from 0 to 100) for your preferred policy option (for example, 
you may prefer military intervention OR withdrawal of troops, and show 55% of support 
for that option).   
 
► “SUSTAIN MILITARY INTERVENTION”                           % Support 
 
OR  
 
► “WITHDRAW TROOPS”                                                         % Support 
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(For both experiments) 
 
PHASE 3 
 
 
The Ongoing U.S. Military Intervention in Kuzeya 
 
It has been 3 months since the U.S. initiated military intervention in Kuzeya against 
Suman forces to protect Amians.  In the following newsflash, you will read a news 
update that details the current situation in Kuzeya and the ongoing state of the U.S. 
military intervention there. 
 
At this point, there are two policy options that the U.S. may follow.  The first option is to 
“withdraw the troops.”  The second option is to “sustain military intervention.” 
  
Based on the following newsflash, your task is to decide which of the two policy options 
the U.S. should pursue and report your level of support (as a percentage). 
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(For both experiments)  
 
(Scenario depicting the course of intervention as improving) 
 
 
Newsflash  
 
New reports surfacing on the Suman-Amian conflict in Kuzeya and the U.S. military 
intervention there -initiated 3 months ago- show signs of improvement in the region.  
American soldiers collaborating with Amian forces gained significant ground in the 
Northern provinces and more than a third of the Suman forces have now laid down their 
weapons and surrendered.  Meanwhile, in the all too important southern province, the 
second-in-command Suman general ordered his fighters to withdraw and release a large 
number of civilian captives after negotiations with Amian forces resulted in a cease-fire 
and truce.  Only weeks ago, such an agreement was thought by many to be a near 
impossible task.   
 
The U.S. President, speaking at a forum at the United Nations delivered a speech in 
which he stated that, “Although I still believe that there remains much work to be done 
and serious fighting continues in certain areas of Kuzeya, we see that the light of peace 
and liberty is drawing closer upon the good people of Kuzeya.” 
 
 
 
Based on the information from reporters on the conflict zone and from the UN observers, 
the actual military casualty rate so far is 124.   
 
According to the estimates of some high-rank military officials, speaking on condition of 
anonymity, the  military casualty rate is expected to reach at least 300 in the next 3 
months.   
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(Scenario depicting the course of intervention as deteriorating) 
 
 
Newsflash  
 
New reports surfacing on Suman-Amian conflict in Kuzeya and the U.S. military 
intervention there show signs of worsening in the region.  American soldiers 
collaborating with Amian forces lost significant ground in the Northern provinces and 
only less than a third of the Suman forces have now laid down their weapons and 
surrendered.  Meanwhile, in the all too important southern province, the second-in-
command Amian general ordered his fighters to withdraw and thus leave behind a large 
number of civilian captives after failed negotiations with Suman forces resulted in a 
break of the previous cease-fire and truce.  Only weeks ago, an agreement was thought 
by many to be close at hand.   
 
The U.S. President, speaking at a forum at the United Nations delivered a speech in 
which he stated that, “Although I still believe that the light of peace and liberty is 
drawing closer upon the good people of Kuzeya, we see that there remains much work to 
do and serious fighting continues in certain provinces of Kuzeya.” 
 
 
 
Based on the information from reporters on the conflict zone and from the UN observers, 
the actual military casualty rate so far is 124.  According to the estimates of some high-
rank military officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, the  military casualty rate is 
expected to reach at least 300 in the next 3 months.   
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(For experiment 2)  
 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US military intervention in 
this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties that are expected to 
occur?  Please indicate whether you think the number of expected casualties estimated 
for this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = exceedingly low expected 
casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high expected casualties for a 
mission like this).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US military intervention in 
this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties that have occurred so 
far?  Please indicate whether you think the number of casualties that have occurred for 
this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = exceedingly low actual 
casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high actual casualties for a 
mission like this).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s military intervention 
in this conflict, how costly do you think this military intervention will be?  Please circle 
below the level of costs that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not costly at all and 10 = 
exceedingly costly).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s military intervention 
in this conflict, how beneficial do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of benefits that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not beneficial at 
all and 10 = exceedingly beneficial).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s military intervention 
in this conflict, how successful do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of success that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not successful at 
all and 10 = exceedingly successful).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
  
196 
(For both experiments)  
 
 
The Decision 
 
Please decide which of the two policy options the U.S. should pursue in response to the 
situation that you have just been exposed to.  Please place a check mark in the box next 
to your preferred policy option.  Please also report your level of support (as a percentage 
value ranging from 0 to 100) for your preferred policy option (for example, you may 
prefer military intervention OR withdrawal of troops, and show 55% of support for that 
option).   
 
► “SUSTAIN MILITARY INTERVENTION”                           % Support 
 
OR  
 
► “WITHDRAW TROOPS”                                                         % Support 
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PHASE 4  
 
 
The Ongoing U.S. Military Intervention in Kuzeya 
 
It has been 9 months since the U.S. initiated military intervention in Kuzeya against 
Suman forces to protect Amians.  In the following newsflash, you will read a news 
update that details the current situation in Kuzeya and the ongoing state of the U.S. 
military intervention there. 
 
At this point, there are two policy options that the U.S. may follow.  The first option is to 
“withdraw the troops.”  The second option is to “sustain military intervention.” 
  
Based on the following newsflash, your task is to decide which of the two policy options 
the U.S. should pursue and report your level of support (as a percentage). 
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(Scenario depicting the course of intervention as improving) 
 
 
Newsflash  
 
Now for the news on the Suman-Amian conflict in Kuzeya and the continuing progress 
by U.S. intervention forces in trying to end the violence there.  Reports indicate that the 
enduring efforts of the U.S. forces to aid the Amians have thus far resulted in a steady 
advance towards resolving the conflict.  All provinces of Kuzeya, save for it southern 
province, are safely in control of Amian forces.  Reports from the front lines indicate 
that Amian forces are taking the lead in the fighting, with the American forces serving 
mostly as backup support for most military operations.  U.S. officials see this as a strong 
sign that U.S. intervention efforts have succeeded and that the Amians will eventually be 
able to take full control over Kuzeya.   
 
Answering to reporters from the White House, the president expressed his great gratitude 
to the U.S. forces for their efforts and signaled to the international community that the 
conflict looks to be heading in a peaceful and positive direction.  Shaking the hand of a 
visiting and high-ranking Amian official, the president remarked that, “We see that the 
safety and well being of Kuzeya are in good hands with our Amian friends and I assure 
you we will continue to do whatever possible to help the Amians in their efforts to 
secure a lasting peace.” 
 
 
 
Based on the information from reporters on the conflict zone and from the UN observers, 
the actual military casualty rate so far is 437.   
 
According to the estimates of some high-rank military officials, speaking on condition of 
anonymity, the  military casualty rate is expected to reach at least 600 in the next 3 
months.   
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(Scenario depicting the course of intervention as deteriorating) 
 
 
Newsflash  
 
Now for the news on the Suman-Amian conflict in Kuzeya and the current state of the 
U.S. military intervention in trying to end the violence there.  Reports indicate that the 
enduring efforts of the U.S. forces to aid the Amians have thus far resulted in a steady 
decline towards resolving the conflict.  All provinces of Kuzeya, save for it southern 
province, remain in control of Suman forces.  Reports from the front lines indicate that 
American forces continue to take the brunt of the responsibility in the fighting, with the 
Amian forces serving mostly as backup support for most military operations.  U.S. 
officials see this as a strong sign that U.S. intervention efforts have faltered and that the 
Amians may not be able to take control over Kuzeya.   
 
Answering to reporters from the White House, the president expressed his great gratitude 
to the U.S. forces for their efforts but signaled to the international community that the 
conflict looks to be heading in an even more violent and disappointing direction.  
Speaking to a visiting and high-ranking Amian official, the president remarked that, “We 
regret that the safety and well being of Kuzeya remain in peril for our Amian friends, but 
we will continue to do whatever possible to help the Amians in their efforts to secure a 
lasting peace.” 
 
 
 
Based on the information from reporters on the conflict zone and from the UN observers, 
the actual military casualty rate so far is 437.  According to the estimates of some high-
rank military officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, the  military casualty rate is 
expected to reach at least 600 in the next 3 months.   
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Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US military intervention in 
this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties that are expected to 
occur?  Please indicate whether you think the number of expected casualties estimated 
for this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = exceedingly low expected 
casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high expected casualties for a 
mission like this).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US military intervention in 
this conflict, what do you think about the number of casualties that have occurred so 
far?  Please indicate whether you think the number of casualties that have occurred for 
this mission is high or low on a 0 to 10 scale below (0 = exceedingly low actual 
casualties for a mission like this and 10 = exceedingly high actual casualties for a 
mission like this).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s military intervention 
in this conflict, how costly do you think this military intervention will be?  Please circle 
below the level of costs that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not costly at all and 10 = 
exceedingly costly).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s military intervention 
in this conflict, how beneficial do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of benefits that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not beneficial at 
all and 10 = exceedingly beneficial).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
Having read the information about the crisis situation and the US’s military intervention 
in this conflict, how successful do you think this military intervention will be?  Please 
circle below the level of success that you expect on a 0 to 10 scale (0 = not successful at 
all and 10 = exceedingly successful).   
 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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The Decision 
 
Please decide which of the two policy options the U.S. should pursue in response to the 
situation that you have just been exposed to.  Please place a check mark in the box next 
to your preferred policy option.  Please also report your level of support (as a 
percentage value ranging from 0 to 100) for your preferred policy option (for example, 
you may prefer military intervention OR withdrawal of troops, and show 55% of support 
for that option).   
 
► “SUSTAIN MILITARY INTERVENTION”                           % Support 
 
OR  
 
► “WITHDRAW TROOPS”                                                         % Support 
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APPENDIX E  
GENERAL POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This knowledge questionnaire is the final section of the experiment.  Please do the best 
you can.   
 
 
Part I 
 
Please answer the following identification questions.  Name the most recent political 
position each of the following people holds or has held.  Please write your answers in the 
space provided. 
 
1. Condoleezza Rice?         ……………………………………………………………. 
2. Kim Jong-il?                  ……………………………………………………………. 
3. Vladimir Putin?             ……………………………………………………………. 
4. Tony Blair?                   ……………………………………………………………. 
5. Yasser Arafat?               ……………………………………………………………. 
6. Donald Rumsfeld?           ……………………………………………………………. 
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Part II  
 
Please circle the correct answer. 
 
1. Which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington? 
a. Democrats 
b. Republicans 
c. Don’t know 
 
2. Which political party currently has a majority in the U.S. Senate?  
a. Democrats 
b. Republicans 
c. Don’t know 
 
3. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives to override a presidential veto? 
a. One-half plus one vote 
b. Three-fifths 
c. Two-thirds 
d. Don’t know 
 
 
4. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not—is it the 
president, Congress, or the Supreme Court?  
a. President 
b. Congress 
c. Supreme Court  
d. Don’t know 
 
5. How many four-year terms can the president of the United States serve?  
a. Two 
b. Three 
c. Some other number 
d. Don’t know 
 
6. How many members of the U.S. Supreme Court are there?  
a. Nine 
b. Twelve 
c. Some other number 
d. Don’t know 
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Part III 
 
Please circle the correct answer. 
 
1. In his first term, President Bush withdrew U.S. support for an international treaty 
known as the Kyoto Protocol.  What issue does this agreement address?  
a. Nuclear weapons 
b. Environment 
c. Economic cooperation  
 
2. Do you happen to know the name of the country in Latin America that recently has 
been in a diplomatic dispute with the U.S. over oil trade?  
a. Mexico 
b. Cuba 
c. Argentina 
d. Venezuela 
 
3. Please give me your best guess for this next question.  For every dollar spent by the 
federal government in Washington, how much of each dollar do you think goes for 
foreign aid to help other countries?  
a. 5% or less 
b. Almost 10%  
c. 15%-20% 
 
4. Which, if any, of the following nations DO NOT have nuclear weapons?  
a. Pakistan 
b. Russia 
c. Turkey 
 
5. Which of the following countries shares a border with Afghanistan? 
a. Russia 
b. Pakistan 
c. Iraq 
d. Kazakhstan 
 
6. Please identify one ongoing conflict in the world today (other than the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq).  Please write your answer in the space provided below. 
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Part IV 
 
1.   Please identify if the statements below are true of false. 
 
• An international third party can intervene in a conflict only as a negotiator 
 
      ___true     ___false   
 
• To intervene in an international crisis, an international third party does not have 
to be neutral; it may also take sides in the conflict. 
 
___true     ___false   
 
• In neutral military third party interventions, third parties’ use of force must be 
limited, which means that they can use force only to defend themselves. 
 
___true     ___false   
 
2.   An international third party can engage in peacemaking efforts as a negotiator in a 
conflict using method of arbitration or mediation.  Match the type of negotiation 
method with the definitions below: 
 
• This negotiation method refers to binding, authoritative third-party intervention 
in which conflicting parties agree to hand the determination of a final settlement 
to the third-party.   
 
a. Arbitration  b. Mediation 
 
• This negotiation method refers to offering good offices to the adversaries to 
initiate meaningful political dialogue by suggesting face-saving compromises, 
stressing common interest between the adversaries, and offering alternative 
proposals for settlement.   
 
a. Arbitration b. Mediation 
3.   Please identify two U.S. military interventions (other than Iraq and Afghanistan)  
4.   Which of the characteristics below does not define an ethnic group? 
f. Racial similarity 
g. Common religion 
h. Ideological similarity 
i. Common history and ancestry 
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